Roosevelt Papers: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Presidents Special Assistant (Hopkins)1
routine
Personal and top secret for Harry Hopkins from Harriman.
I feel that I should report to the President at the earliest convenient time and place. Now that the end of the war is in sight our relations with the Soviets have taken a startling turn evident during the last two months. They have held up our requests with complete indifference to our interests and have shown an unwillingness even to discuss pressing problems.
We started the proposal for winter program for Frantic at the end of June and formally presented it to the Foreign Office in early July. No acknowledgement even of my letters or numerous talks has been received. All requests for PR unit have been unacted upon for the last several weeks. Prior to that time they were operating several a day. No answer or permission to transport trucks to our air forces in China has been received. There has been no reply to our request presented a week ago followed by urgent conversation with Molotov to allow General Eakcr’s bombing appraisal party to visit Ploeşti. The Soviets’ indifference to world opinion regarding their unbending policy toward Poland and ruthless attitude toward the uprising in Warsaw are best described by Molotov’s statement that the Soviets would judge their friends by those that accept the Soviet position.2 In spite of Stalin’s promises no action has been taken on major future planning. These are only a few examples.
I have been conscious since early in the year of a division among Stalin’s advisors on the question of cooperation with us. It is now my feeling that those who oppose the kind of cooperation we expect have recently been getting their way and the policy appears to be crystallizing to force us and the British to accept all Soviet policies backed by the strength and prestige of Red Army.
[Page 199]Demands on us are becoming insistent. You have seen a part of it in the negotiations over financial terms of the Protocol3 in Washington. We have other examples here. The general attitude seems to be that it is our obligation to help Russia and accept her policies because she has won the war for us.
I am convinced that we can divert this trend but only if we materially change our policy toward the Soviet Government. I have evidence that they have misinterpreted our generous attitude toward them as a sign of weakness, and acceptance of their policies.
Time has come when we must make clear what we expect of them as the price of our good will. Unless we take issue with the present policy there is every indication the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved. This policy will reach into China and the Pacific as well when they can turn their attention in that direction. No written agreement[s] can be of any value unless they are carried out in a spirit of give and take and recognition of the interests of other people.
I am disappointed but not discouraged. The job of getting the Soviet Government to play a decent role in international affairs is however going to be more difficult than we had hoped. The favorable factors are still the same. Ninety percent of the Russian people want friend ship with us and it is much to the interest of the Soviet Government to develop it. It is our problem to strengthen the hand of those around Stalin who want to play the game along our lines and to show Stalin that the advice of the counselors of a tough policy is leading him into difficulties.
I realize I cannot in a cable convey to you a fully comprehensible picture of the perplexing developments. However, what I say is fully endorsed by General Deane, the air officers here and the Embassy officers.
The relation[s] of Deane and our other officers with the Red Air Force are good. The Soviet officers have shown embarrassment at the attitude expressed through the Foreign Office. The influences that I speak of are as unpopular with this group as with us. When it comes to the question of what we should do in dealing with the situation I am not going to propose any drastic action but a firm but friendly quid pro quo attitude. In some cases where it has been possible for us to show a firm hand we have been making definite progress.
[Page 200]I feel that I should urgently report personally to the President these recent developments and my recommendations. I would appreciate your discussing this message with the President and advising me.4
- Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The White House Map Room sent the text of the message to Roosevelt, at Quebec, on September 11, 1944, and at the President’s direction a paraphrase was given to Churchill at Quebec. Hopkins discussed the message with the Department of State on September 10 or 11, and a paraphrase was sent to Hull on September 14.↩
- Molotov had made this statement in a conversation with Harriman and Clark Kerr reported in Harriman’s telegram No. 3049 of August 17, 1944, not printed (710.0011 E.W./8–1744).↩
- The reference is to the “Soviet supply protocols”. Concerning the 1944 negotiations with the Soviet Union about assistance from the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1032 ff.↩
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Hopkins sent Roosevelt the following telegram (MR–out–384) on September 11, 1944:
↩“Have talked to Chip Bohlen and he tells me Secretary Hull feels very strongly that Harriman should not come back immediately.
“We are in the critical stage of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and Gromyko may not get his instructions for a few days and we cannot take any chance of having that bitched up. Furthermore, a cable which you now have in your hands [presumably Harriman’s telegram of September 9] indicates Harriman’s immediate point of view and I doubt if he could tell you much more than is indicated in that message.
“Unless you disagree I propose to wire Harriman today that you do not wish him to come home at this moment but will expect to see him later.” (Hopkins Papers)
Roosevelt replied later on September 11 that Hopkins’ proposed message to Harriman was approved (MR–in–142). Hopkins thereupon sent Harriman a telegram, also dated September 11, informing him that Roosevelt “thinks it best, therefore, that you delay your departure until he gives you the green light which I assure you will be soon as he wants to go over with you personally all the problems which you raised in your cable.” (Hopkins Papers)