J.C.S.
Files
The Deputy Director of the Office of European
Affairs (Matthews) to the
Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)
top secret
Washington, September 9, 1944.
My Dear General McFarland: With reference
to our telephone conversation, I enclose a copy of a telegram which
a member of the British Embassy handed me last evening. That
telegram embodies the instructions sent by the British Foreign
Office to the British Ambassador at Moscow with regard to a joint
Anglo-American approach to the Russians with respect to Norway.
You will note that paragraph 5 of the enclosure suggests that the
State Department might send similar instructions to Ambassador
Harriman for the purpose of giving some political background to
General Deane.
Since the State Department is not informed as to the nature of the
instructions sent to General Deane, we are not in position to judge
how much of the background and suggestions contained in the British
telegram is already in Deane’s possession. I presume you have
briefed General Deane on the three points contained in numbered
paragraph 3. We do believe it advisable to give General Deane,
either [Page 196] through Ambassador
Harriman or otherwise, some indication of the importance of
communicating to the Russians the fact that the planning question
was conceived some time ago in order to dispel possible Russian
suspicions that it is something improvised overnight, so to speak,
as a counterweight to possible entry of Russian troops into northern
Norway.
If you will let me know your views1 on reading the
attached, I will be glad to see that immediate action, if desirable,
is taken.
Sincerely yours,
H. Freeman
Matthews
Deputy Director
Office of European Affairs
[Enclosure—Telegram]
The British Foreign Secretary
(Eden) to the British
Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr)
top
secret
[London, September 5, 1944.]
2874. As you may know, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have recently
instructed the American and British Military missions in Moscow
to discuss with the Russians the question of our plans for the
occupation of Norway.2 No conversations were to be initiated
prior to the return of General Burrows with whom we had
discussed the political background. Burrows does not expect to
be back for ten days, however, and United States Chiefs of Staff
are anxious to begin these discussions without further delay in
view of development of the Finnish situation. Chiefs of Staff
are agreeing that it is undesirable to postpone matters any
longer and have approved our suggestion that you should explain
to Brinckman political background which is as follows:
- 2.
- S.H.A.E.F. have for
some time past been under strong political pressure from
the Norwegians to send troops to northern Norway in the
event of German withdrawal because of their fears of a
possible Russian permanent occupation of that area. Such
fears are, in the Foreign Office view, exaggerated since
we have no evidence to support this idea and since the
Soviet Government have signed a Civil Affairs agreement
with the Norwegian Government similar to the
Anglo-Norwegian and American-Norwegian agreements.3 In point of fact [Page 197] it may be that
the Russians will be assisting the Finns in capture and
disarmament of German forces in northern Finland and the
course of events may make it more natural and easy for
the Russians to follow up German withdrawal from
northern Norway than that an expedition should be
despatched from this country. In these circumstances
S.H.A.E.F.’s
proposal to send such an expedition might well appear to
the Russians as designed mainly to forestall their own
forces. It was clearly important that this impression
should be avoided.
- 3.
- Chiefs of Staff suggested therefore to Combined Chiefs
of Staff that plans should be concerted with the
Russians and that it should be emphasized that S.C.A.E.F.’s proposal was
purely provisional and based on:—
- (1)
- Military necessity of harassing the enemy
during his withdrawal.
- (2)
- Advantage of stimulating Norwegian resistance
by sending in Norwegian forces as soon as possible
and,
- (3)
- Desirability of establishing a naval base for
escorts protecting convoys to Russia.
- We assume that instructions sent by Combined Chiefs of
Staff to heads of military missions have been drawn up
accordingly since United States Chiefs of Staff agreed.
It was felt that for the matter to be handled through
military channels as a purely military problem would
assist in avoiding appearance of political
motives.
- 4.
- The Russians may suspect that it is the Soviet-Finnish
armistice negotiations and consequent possible proximity
of the Russians to northern Norway that have made us
propose plan for occupation of Northern Norway by
Anglo-American-Norwegian forces at this juncture. In
order to dispel such a suspicion it might be well to
emphasize that plans have been ready for some time and
that it is (?precisely) (?the possibility)4 that
owing to the capitulation of Finland the Russians may
have forces in the neighbourhood of the Norwegian
frontier when the Germans start to withdraw that has
made it desirable to discuss plans with the Russians
now.
- 5.
- Please discuss the handling of the matter with
Brinckman. His Majesty’s Ambassador in Washington is
being instructed to suggest to the State Department that
your United States colleague might be sent similar
instructions.
