Roosevelt Papers

Department of State Briefing Paper1

secret

The Polish Problem

Recent developments regarding Warsaw make it appear that Stalin may have decided that the Polish Government forces in Poland must be destroyed, despite possible unfortunate repercussions inside Poland and abroad and the inevitable lessening of the chances of an arrangement with Mikołajczyk, in order that the Soviet-sponsored Committee2 can gain the upper hand. This thesis is borne out by his persistent refusual to assist the British or ourselves in efforts to strengthen the Warsaw garrison.

He may have come to believe that the strength of the Polish Government forces both in Warsaw and elsewhere in Poland was such as to make it unlikely that his Polish Committee could control the situation if Mikołajczyk and a few of his ministers were allowed to form a government in Warsaw. The reversal of his decision to aid the insurgents may have been made in the thought that it would undermine the position and prestige of Mikołajczyk and minimize the possibility of the latter’s return to Warsaw.

In any event, the decision was clearly political and appears to indicate Stalin’s determination that the Soviet-sponsored Committee gain as full control as possible of the country.

Possible Results of These Developments

1.
The possibility of Mikołajczyk’s forming a coalition government in Warsaw is very small. He might be acceptable to the Soviet Government if he came as an individual to join the Committee, which he probably would be reluctant to do.
2.
When the refusal of the Red Army to give aid to Warsaw becomes known, it may cause many pro-Soviet Poles to change their attitude and force the Soviet Government to rule Poland more severely than it otherwise planned.
3.
Reactions abroad to the Russian methods used in settling the Polish problem may seriously affect United Nations conversations, including those on security.
4.
When the Red Army captures Warsaw, the Soviet propaganda machine will be turned on in full to convince the world that the War saw uprising was brought about by a small group of reactionaries and [Page 195] that the rest of the population is one hundred percent behind the Soviet-sponsored Committee.
5.
The Committee will be assisted by the Soviet authorities to hold elections and set up a Government as soon as practicable.

Possible American Policy

Until Stalin has definitely closed the door to any compromise solution with the Polish Government in London we should continue to urge upon him in every possible manner the necessity of some solution of the Polish question which would be acceptable to world opinion. We should at the same time support Mikołajczyk and his supporters in their efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement with Moscow. While any possibility remains of an agreement between the Polish Government and the Soviet-sponsored Committee, any indication on our part of a change of attitude toward the London Polish Government would lessen the already slim changes of agreement.

Should Stalin proceed, despite all our efforts and those of the British, to a unilateral and arbitrary solution of setting up his own group as the government of Poland, we will have to consider our policy in the light of developments as they occur. In any event we should move very slowly in extending any form of recognition to such a group.

  1. Annex 3 to Hull’s memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.
  2. A Polish Committee of National Liberation had been formed at Lublin on July 23, 1944.