The thought was suggested to me by the trend of his remarks, that the
Shah may not desire the withdrawal of the foreign troops now in Iran at
too early a date. If this interpretation is correct, (and it is not in
accord with the expressed wishes of the Foreign Minister, who says he is
anxious to see the troops depart as soon as possible) it may indicate a
fear on the Shah’s part that there would be danger of revolution if Iran
were left to its own devices at this moment. He may well feel that the
maintenance of his throne depends upon effecting an improvement of
conditions before the dissatisfaction of the people has a chance to
express itself freely in action as well as in words.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in
Iran (Ford)
[Tehran,] November 6, 1943.
Subject: The Moscow Conference as it Affected Iran;
General Situation in Iran.
| Participants: |
The Shah of Iran |
|
Chargé d’Affaires Richard Ford |
|
Mr. George V. Allen |
|
Mr. John D. Jernegan. |
Mr. Allen opened the conversation by saying that when Iran had been
mentioned at the meeting of American, Soviet and British foreign
ministers at Moscow, Mr. Molotov had referred to a recent call by
the Iranian Ambassador. Mr. Ahy had expressed the view of his
Government that Iran should be represented at any discussions
affecting it, basing this opinion upon the terms of the
Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance. Mr. Molotov said that the
Ambassador
[Page 409]
had been told
the Soviet Government agreed with this point of view but that no
decisions regarding Iran were expected to be taken at the
conference. Mr. Eden concurred, and said that he did not propose
that any decisions be taken. He felt, however, that any exchanges of
views could only redound to the benefit of Iran.
Mr. Allen went on to say that it seemed to him inevitable that there
should have been some informal conversations regarding Iran at a
meeting such as the one in Moscow, since Iran was the one place in
the world where the three nations concerned came most closely
together. He then said that he believed that the Iranian Government
had every reason to feel pleased with the outcome of the meeting. In
the first place, we had been able to determine that all three
governments fully intended to fulfill all their obligations to Iran;
this had been repeatedly stated, and very emphatically by the
Soviets. In the second place, the success of the conference in
general, the ability of the conferees to reach agreement on
fundamental matters, meant that they would not become embroiled in
the future and that Iran would not become involved in rivalries
between the Great Powers. If the meeting had been a failure, then
Iran might well have feared for the future.
The Shah expressed his agreement with Mr. Allen’s views. He said that
he himself felt it had been Iran’s misfortune that, in the past,
Great Britain and the Soviet Union had been rivals. He further said
that he had no serious worries about Iran’s foreign relations at the
present time. Specifically, he said that the Soviet attitude might
have caused some concern in the past, but that during the past two
months there had been a decided improvement in this respect, not
only in the provinces where Soviet troops were stationed but also in
Tehran.
The Shah emphasized that the great task facing Iran was on the home
front. The country, he said, must achieve national unity before the
end of the war and the consequent evacuation of the Allied troops.
Otherwise, its disorganization might provide a “pretext” for some
undesirable action. National unity was also necessary in order that
the Iranian delegates to the peace conference might speak with
authority for the entire nation.
The fundamental prerequisite for unity, the Shah felt, was social
reform. After the war, the world would move more and more toward
greater social benefits for the individual. In Iran, conditions were
very bad; the mass of the people lived in extreme poverty, while the
nation’s wealth was concentrated in the hands of a very few. There
must be a more even distribution of wealth. Every man must be able
to get food at prices he could pay, he must be educated, he must
have sanitary living conditions, he must be able to go back to a
decent, civilized, home after his day’s work.
[Page 410]
To accomplish these reforms would require Draconian measures, for the
Iranians were not accustomed to think in such terms. Iran must have
a strong Cabinet and a strong Majlis, the one to propose and put
into effect the proper measures and the other to enact the necessary
laws. The American advisers could help greatly, especially in the
field of finance. (The Shah remarked that he had always supported
the advisers and would continue to do so.) Security must be
reestablished through the disarming of the tribes. This would
require a strong army, which Iran did not have at the present time.
The army should be made so strong that the tribes would surrender
their weapons without a fight. Otherwise, “Iranian blood would flow”
in a long and difficult struggle to subdue them.
During the course of the conversation the Shah repeatedly stressed
the importance of setting Iran’s house in order, and he gave the
impression that he considered this a task for the Iranians
themselves, although he would welcome the assistance of the American
advisers. He asked few questions regarding American, British or
Soviet policy toward Iran, and most of his own remarks concerned
internal matters. One exception was a statement to the effect that
he would like to see American interest in Iran continue and grow, as
he believed it in his country’s interest to have three Great Powers,
rather than two, concerned with Iranian developments. Two or three
times he spoke of his conviction that the United States was
completely disinterested, having no contiguous frontiers and no
selfish ends to serve in Iran.
