891.24/604a
The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
My Dear Admiral Leahy: The State Department is seriously concerned over a situation which has arisen in Iran and which appears to be due to lack of coordinated effort between the diplomatic, the military and the American-sponsored missions. The situation is precarious, and plainly needs prompt attention.
The Secretary sent a letter to the President on August 16, 1943, outlining the situation and I believe that it may have been referred to you for consideration. Since the letter was sent, conditions in Iran have continued to deteriorate.
A summary of the difficulties purely from the point of view of the State Department would of course be one-sided, and it is believed you will wish to ascertain the facts through your own channels. But the salient points appear to be these:
General Connolly considers his task to relate solely to the transport of supplies through Iran to the Soviet Government. Under this construction, the considerable force which he has is not available to do even elementary service such as protecting the American Legation in Tehran; as a result of which (the Iranian police being disorganized) [Page 395] the Legation has been repeatedly robbed. In contrast the British Legation is continuously guarded by a considerable contingent of British troops.
Security for the railway line is a British responsibility; but it is claimed that our forces are partial to the Russians. In any case, little consideration is shown the Iranians. In this situation, difficult at best, General Connolly’s command and the American Legation in Tehran appear to be so much at cross purposes that it is a matter of common knowledge in the Middle East. Naturally, we hear only the Legation side of this, but it is pretty impressive.
The American policy is to endeavor to hold Iran together if it can possibly be done. This task is difficult at best, and can only be performed if all American elements there work shoulder to shoulder supporting each other’s hand in every possible way.
The interest seems to the Department not merely diplomatic. Should Iran disintegrate into an anarchic mass of hostile population, warring tribes, and armed movements (a situation which has already begun in some parts of Iran), the task of transporting supplies to Russia through that country would be vastly more difficult. The long range results to American interests in the Middle East (among which may be noted the oil interests we have in Iraq and Arabia, and our relations with Turkey) might become extremely complicated.
I know that you have had this in mind and have been looking into the matter. It would seem some pretty drastic remedial action is necessary. The Department’s suggestion is that you review the facts independently, and thereafter, if you care to do so, confer with the Department as to possible reorganization of a dangerous situation.
Sincerely yours,