Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

891.00/2055

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)

Sir Ronald Campbell⁶ left with me on the 28th of August this note on Persia. Mr. Eden spoke to the Secretary at Quebec⁷ and the Secretary said he would be glad to have a memo on the subject.

J[ames] C. D[unn]

[ Washington ,] August 30, 1943.

[Washington,] August 30, 1943.

[Annex]

Situation in Persia

Our views on Persia are as follows:—

The most pressing problem is security. Tribes near Shiraz have been largely out of hand since their recent success against a Persian army detachment and although the Shiraz Road is no longer used for aid to Russia disorders may spread. The Germans, who are planning a sabotage campaign in all Middle Eastern countries, are naturally exploiting the situation and have dropped parachutists with the immediate object of increasing disorder and diverting our troops, and with the probable ultimate object of damaging the oil installations and the railway. Both H.M. Minister in Tehran and we wished to see British troops stationed at Shiraz as the best means of keeping the situation under control, but with the forces at his disposal the Commander-in-Chief cannot agree to this. We must therefore concentrate on (a) efforts to improve local Persian administration and (b) drastic measures against Persian pro-Axis plotters.

As regards (a) H.M. Minister has with difficulty induced the Persian Government to appoint as Governor-General of Shiraz a reliable Persian of local tribal origin. His appointment will encourage those tribes which have not yet joined the rebels to remain loyal. As to (b) we are naturally anxious to act jointly with the Russians if possible and we have done all we can to get them into line. But time presses and we cannot wait indefinitely for the Soviet representative to receive instructions from Moscow. H.M. Minister was recently authorized to present to the Persian Government our demands for the arrests of Persian suspects if necessary without waiting for Russian support and in the last resort to have the arrests effected by British security authorities. Since then one particularly dangerous German who has organised a widespread plot with the assistance of prominent Persians and two newly-arrived German parachutists have been captured by our security authorities, and a mass of new evidence against Persian suspects has come into our hands.

It is now a fortnight since H.M. Minister gave the Persian Prime Minister our evidence against the most dangerous of Persian Axis sympathisers but the Persian Government have still taken no action. It is therefore likely that H.M. Minister may soon have to have recourse to direct arrests by British forces.

Meanwhile the political situation is unsatisfactory and continues to deteriorate. Soheily, the Persian Prime Minister, is ineffective. The Persian Government command no confidence and have little authority in the country as a whole. The financial situation is also bad and likely to get worse. In spite of a large harvest administrative inefficiency may again result in shortages.

We should certainly welcome closer co-operation with the United States Government in Persian affairs. The most important thing at present is to have United States support for our action on security questions. We have not asked the United States Government to act jointly with us, as security is not their responsibility, though we have kept them generally informed of our intentions except as regards possible direct arrests by ourselves. But we are entitled to hope that the United States Government will present a common front with us to the Persians and in case of need make it clear to all concerned that they are at one with us as regards the vital importance of checking the activities of hostile Persians which would assist the German threat to supply routes. If the United States Government for their part, in the light of the experience gained by the American adviser, have any suggestions for improving Persian administration we shall of course gladly do our best to help.

It has been suggested that the situation might be eased if reasonable quantities of consumer goods could be imported into Iran. Probably two shiploads would suffice, and this would cause only a small retardation of the increase of supplies to Russia. It is hoped that the United States Government will give this question their benevolent consideration.

Quebec, 25 August, 1943.

6. British Minister in the United States, at this time Chargé.
7. Conference between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, at Quebec, Canada, August 17–24, 1943; documentation on this Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations.