862.20291/22
The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 1.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose single copies of three strictly confidential documents3 prepared by British security officials in Tehran giving details regarding the organization of the German fifth column in Iran. It is regretted that the pressure of work does not permit the typing of these documents, which the British were able to furnish the Legation only in single copy.
[Page 380]These documents should be read in connection with the Franz Mayer documents, enclosed with despatch No. 495, March 25, 1943,4 since both will form the main basic evidence in support of the arrests which the British are now pressing the Iranian Government to make. A fourth document containing case histories of 137 Iranians alleged to belong to the German fifth column organization in Iran was furnished the Legation in single copy by the British. This document is being retained because it will be very useful to the Legation in following the matter of the arrests. This general subject was discussed in a series of recent telegrams, the latest of which was No. 846, August 16.
The three enclosed documents, in my opinion, throw little light on the organization and functioning of the German fifth column in Iran. While they undoubtedly contain a great deal of fact, they are not particularly convincing evidence of the existence of a really effective fifth column organization in Iran. One gains the impression from these and the Mayer documents that the Iranians in question were at worst playing at espionage rather than working seriously in German interests. The fourth document containing case histories is full of vague accusations and expressions such as “is believed to have engaged” and “is suspected of”. It would seem to me, as I suggested in the despatch enclosing the Mayer documents, that the entire picture, while containing always a germ of fact and truth, has been built up and exaggerated. I do not mean by this remark to criticize the British, who, charged with responsibility for allied security in Iran, can hardly close their eyes to even such vague evidence. However, I should prefer to see better evidence of guilt produced in each individual case than was presented in the last lot of arrests which were made. The British case, as I suggested in telegram no. 846, has been strengthened by the arrest of Franz Mayer and it is possible that through him more convincing evidence of guilt will be obtained in many cases. The British, too, have fairly well established the fact that German parachutists were actually landed in Iran; and the British Minister informs me that two of them have been captured and are in British custody. Khosrow Khan Kashkai on his recent visit to Tehran, which I am covering by separate despatch,5 admits freely that he and his brother, Naser, have given refuge to a number of Germans, a few of whom are alleged to have been dropped by parachute. In view of these developments I do not see how we can oppose the series of arrests which are about to be made but we shall rather have to stress to the Iranians the military necessity of restraining any persons potentially harmful to the war effort. We should [Page 381] not, however, fail to watch the proceedings closely to make sure that the evidence of guilt in each case is authentic and convincing and that the arrests are not made a political instrument.
The British Legation is sending a note to the Iranian Prime Minister insisting that the arrest of some 137 Iranians be carried out at once because of the very real danger of the Iranian fifth column to the allied war effort. With regard to the arrest of deputy Nobakht, a matter discussed in telegram No. 818, August 7 [8], the Prime Minister has given the British Minister a half-hearted promise to ask the Majlis to waive Nobakht’s parliamentary immunity and then proceed with his arrest. The Prime Minister wishes to go slowly and take this action only after he has had a chance to answer Nobakht’s interpellation in the Majlis on the tribal question and obtain from the Majlis a vote of confidence on this score. The British Minister is not in a mood to submit to delays and will probably press the Prime Minister for immediate action. I will report the facts and their impact on Iranian-Allied relations promptly to the Department by telegraph and despatch.
Respectfully yours,