891.00/2042a
The Secretary of State to
President Roosevelt
Washington, August 16,
1943.
My Dear Mr. President: I enclose herewith, for
your consideration, a summary statement of policy which has, in general,
served as the basis of the Department’s attitude towards Iran during the
past eight or nine months. I believe that you will agree with the
fundamental principles expressed therein.
During recent months, it has become apparent that the political and
economic situation in Iran is critical and may dissolve into chaos at
any moment. I feel, therefore, that the Department’s policy should be
implemented more actively than heretofore, but before taking further
steps along this line, I should like to have assurance that you are in
accord.
It is clear that this policy can be implemented effectively only if it is
followed by all interested agencies of this Government. In particular,
it is important to have the support of the War Department authorities in
Washington and of the American military commander in Iran. At the
present time, the instructions of the commander in Iran are understood
to confine him strictly to the transportation of supplies to the Soviet
Union. In consequence, he does not feel free to cooperate, even
informally, with the efforts of American civilian representatives and
agencies to solve the numerous, pressing, internal problems of Iran.
Accordingly, if you approve the course of action proposed in the enclosed
memorandum, I should like to suggest that it be presented to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. If they perceive no insuperable
military objection, I believe it would be well to have instructions
issued to the commander in Iran to lend such assistance as may be
practicable to the carrying out of the policy in question. I hope, also,
that following such consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the War
Department will feel free to lend its assistance in other ways, perhaps,
if need arises, through the provision of certain personnel and supplies
to assist the American advisers now in Iran.
Faithfully yours,
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[Enclosure]
American Policy in Iran
The historic ambitions of Great Britain and Russia in Iran have made
that country a diplomatic battleground for more than a century. The
geographical, political and economic bases of those ambitions remain
unchanged, and the present attitudes of the British and Soviet
Governments and their representatives in Iran give strong reason to
fear that their rivalry will break out again as soon as the military
situation permits. This danger is greatly increased by the existing
economic and political weakness of the Iranian Government and the
presence on Iranian soil of British and Soviet armed forces.
If events are allowed to run their course unchecked, it seems likely
that either Russia or Great Britain, or both, will be led to take
action which will seriously abridge, if not destroy, effective
Iranian independence. That such action would be contrary to the
principles of the Atlantic Charter is obvious. Its effect upon other
peoples of the Near East, and elsewhere, might well be disastrous to
our hopes for an equitable and lasting post-war settlement.
The best hope of avoiding such action lies in strengthening Iran to a
point at which she will be able to stand on her own feet, without
foreign control or “protection”, and in calling upon our associates,
when necessary, to respect their general commitments under the
Atlantic Charter and their specific commitments to Iran under the
Treaty of Alliance of 1942, the provisions of which were noted by
the President in a communication to the Shah of Iran.
The United States is the only nation in a position to render
effective aid to Iran, specifically through providing American
advisers and technicians and financial and other material support.
We are also the only nation in a position to exercise a restraining
influence upon the two great powers directly concerned.
Since this country has a vital interest in the fulfillment of the
principles of the Atlantic Charter and the establishment of
foundations for a lasting peace throughout the world, it is to the
advantage of the United States to exert itself to see that Iran’s
integrity and independence are maintained and that she becomes
prosperous and stable. Likewise, from a more directly selfish point
of view, it is to our interest that no great power be established on
the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum
development in Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, the United States should adopt a policy of positive action
in Iran, with a view to facilitating not only the war operations of
the United Nations in that country but also a sound post-war
development. We should take the lead, wherever possible, in
remedying internal difficulties, working as much as possible through
American
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administrators
freely employed by the Iranian Government. We should further
endeavor to lend timely diplomatic support to Iran, to prevent the
development of a situation in which an open threat to Iranian
integrity might be presented. In carrying out this policy, we should
enlist the support of all branches of the American Government.
The success of the proposed course of action is favored by the
exceptionally high regard in which this country is held by the
Iranian people. There is also reason to believe that the British
Government would acquiesce, or even lend its active support. The
attitude of the Soviet Government is doubtful, but this Government
should be in a position to exert considerable influence if occasion
should arise. It goes without saying that the safeguarding of
legitimate British and Soviet economic interests in Iran should be a
basic principle of American action.
