740.0011 European War 1939/30684: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
5356. The sub-committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee has prepared for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff a highly secret report on German plans and intentions during the second half of 1943. (The paper’s number is JIC 43 (324) Final and it is dated August 3rd.)
In the introduction, the report states that it is very difficult to make an estimate of Germany’s intentions at the present time, as the initiative has passed to the Allies in every theatre of war and Germany can have no planned strategy in a broad sense other than to counter Allied strategy.
The introduction goes on to say that the Germans are probably in somewhat the same state of mind as was Great Britain after the collapse of France, and that the Germans may be still hoping that the Italian Government may be coerced into some form of continued resistance. The Allies must therefore be prepared to see a limited number of additional German troops being moved into Northern Italy. This, however, would be a temporary phase, and German plans must be based on the inevitability of Italian capitulation in the near future and Allied occupation of Italy.
The second point made in the introduction is that a major crisis may be brought about in Germany because of the growing air offensive and the possibility that this threat may be developed soon against southeast Germany, plus a major setback in the U-boat campaign and military reverses on all fronts.
The conclusions of the report are as follows:
The Germans were taken by surprise by the speed with which events moved in Italy, and are resigned to Italy’s early capitulation. In the face of this situation, Germany’s general strategy would be to remain strictly on the defensive on all fronts and hope to meet Allied threats as they develop.
When Italy has capitulated Germany will have to withdraw her forces from the south of Italy and may, though in British opinion it would be unsound strategy, try with inadequate resources to hold a line from Pisa to Rimini, or the line of the Po River. It is most likely [Page 513] that she will withdraw to the Maritime Alps and to positions covering Venetia and the Tyrol.
The breaches following Italy’s defection must be filled, and, as Germany has no general reserve, she must draw on other fronts to do so. Perhaps nine divisions might be taken from France and the low countries, and three divisions from Norway and Denmark. It is, however, doubtful if any forces will be released from the Russian front, unless the Allies are threatening area vital to the safety of Germany herself or the lines of communication of her armies in Russia. Such withdrawals from the Russian front will only be made if there is no risk of disaster involved in Russia. A threat to the Maritime Alps and the positions covering Venetia and the Tyrol might result in reinforcements from the Russian front.
Germany will attempt to hold substantially the present front in Russia, and the security of this front will remain her principal preoccupation to the end.
Germany will continue to hold France, and the low countries, Norway, and Denmark, but will reduce her garrisons there in order to strengthen her southern front.
Germany will attempt to hold the Balkans and make the reinforcement of this area a primary charge on her available resources.
It is unlikely that Germany and Russia will conclude a separate peace, but Germany might attempt to negotiate a compromise peace with the United States and Great Britain.
Finally, the report states that if at any stage the authorities in control in Germany recognize that they no longer have sufficient forces to hold the fronts both in Russia and in southern and western Europe, they might abandon the latter, preferring the occupation of Germany by Anglo-American rather than by Russian forces.