J.C.S. Files
Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of
Staff1
secret
C.C.S. 272/1
[Washington,] 12 August
1943.
Logistic Organization To Improve Mobility of
Anti-Submarine Squadrons
Reference: a. C.C.S. 101st Meeting,2 Item 5
- 1.
- There is transmitted herewith the report of the Allied
Anti-Submarine Board submitted in obedience to conclusion a of reference a.
- 2.
- It is noted that the Board has so far concerned itself almost
wholly with U.S. sea frontiers.
- 3.
- The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the Board
should complete its directive by appropriate survey and
recommendations as to transfer of anti-submarine air units
between the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, N.W. Africa, W. Africa,
etc.
- 4.
- The U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggest that the services concerned
(British, Canadian, U.S.) should take appropriate steps to
implement, where applicable and not already in force, the
recommendations of paragraph 22 of the report pending the survey
and recommendations indicated in paragraph 3 above.
- 5.
- As to paragraph 23 of the report, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are
in accord with the view that if each service concerned plans and
perfects its own supply and maintenance organization and
promulgates this information to other services, all will have
been accomplished that conclusion b of
reference a was calculated to achieve,
and they therefore recommend the cancellation of conclusion b.
Enclosure
The Allied Anti-Submarine
Survey Board to the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet (King)
secret
[Washington,] 6 August
1943.
Serial: 0010
Subject: Logistic Organization to Improve
Mobility of Anti-Submarine Squadrons.
Reference: (a) CominCh Secret Serial 001425 of
15 July 1943.3
1. In accordance with the reference the Allied Anti-Submarine
Survey Board have considered conclusion (a) of the reference which is quoted:
“Agreed to refer this problem to the Allied
Anti-Submarine Survey Committee (Kauffman-Mansfield
Committee) for study and recommendation as to the
mobility requirements for anti-submarine
squadrons.”4
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22. The following recommendations are made:
- (a)
- That definite and immediate steps be taken to rectify
the existing deplorable situation in regard to aircraft
spare parts at the expense, if necessary, of curtailing
new production.
- (b)
- That only types of aircraft in common use in various
services be considered mobile, namely Liberator, Venturas, Catalinas and Mariners.
- (c)
- That Frontier Commanders designate the air fields in
their commands best suited to handle emergency
reinforcements.
- (d)
- That all Frontier Commanders prepare plans immediately
for the handling of additional aircraft at each of these
air fields in an emergency.
- (e)
- That the normal and emergency capacity of all air
fields operating A/S
squadrons should be generally promulgated.
- (f)
- That operating authorities consider delays consequent
on climatic conditions when planning movement of A/S squadrons on short
notice.
- (g)
- That one air field be established in each Frontier as
a “Strategic Supply Center.”
- (h)
- That the desirability of allocating a few U.S. Navy
transport planes for the sole purpose of ferrying
aircraft spares, etc., to and from outlying A/S air bases should be
taken note of.
- (i)
- That orders be issued with a view to achieving better
standardization in modification of A/S aircraft after they
leave the production line.
- (j)
- That all B–24 aircraft
for A/S squadrons should
come from one production line; namely from the
Consolidated Aircraft Company.
- (k)
- That all squadrons engaged in A/S Warfare be maintained on a mobile basis
and that plans to achieve this be drawn up by individual
squadron and base commanders now.
- (l)
- That whenever possible the movements of A/S squadrons be confined
within their own service areas and bases.
23. With reference to conclusion (b) which
reads as follows:
“Agreed that upon approval of the recommendations
received as a result of sub-paragraph (a) above this Committee would be directed to
study and submit recommendations concerning the
logistical requirements necessary to attain the desired
mobility.”
While this Board can make recommendations of a very general
character, it is desired to point out that detailed
recommendations on the logistics side of mobility can only be
given by technical experts which it would be necessary to call
from the U.S. Navy, R.A.F.
(Coastal Command), R.C.A.F. and
the supply organization of the three countries. Moreover it is
the Board’s considered opinion that even with all the technical
experts necessary it is unlikely that any common answer which
would be satisfactory to all services could be arrived at. The
only solution appears to be for the various services to
[Page 512]
plan and perfect their
own individual supply and maintenance organization and to
promulgate the results to all concerned.
J. M. Mansfield
Rear Admiral, R.N.
J. L. Kauffman
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
