PR 10 “Foreign Relations of U.S.”/9–1069

Memorandum Prepared in the British Foreign Office1

Memorandum of General Principles for Guidance of British Representatives in Discussing With Representatives of Euro-pean Allied Governments Arrangements for the Civil Administration of Liberated Allied Territory

1.
It is the policy of His Majesty’s Government to give each Allied Government every opportunity at as early a stage as possible to reestablish [Page 514] its authority in its own country, since it will be in the interests of military operations that the Commander-in-Chief of the liberating expeditionary force shall be able to co-operate with, and count upon, a friendly local administration. The moment at which responsibility for the civil administration can be transferred from the military commander-in-chief to the Allied Government must be decided by the commander-in-chief acting in consultation with the United Kingdom Government and/or United States Government as the case may be and cannot be fixed in advance. It will, however, be desirable to keep in touch with the Allied Government in regard to the conduct of civil administration during the first, military, phase when the British commander’s authority is paramount, and, as account will have to be taken of representations which the Allied Government may wish to make on the subject, it will be desirable to consult them as far as possible on major issues, and in general to associate them with the administration so far as military considerations permit. It will in particular be necessary to consult them as regards the initiation of the second phase by the transfer of responsibility to an Allied administration.
2.
During the first, military, phase, while the supreme responsibility rests solely with the commander-in-chief, it will be advisable, and no doubt expedient, for a measure of administrative power to be entrusted by the commander-in-chief to the Allied local authorities. The extent to which this can be done must also be governed by the circumstances existing at the time and which may well vary from district to district. Here again the decision will lie with the commander-in-chief, acting where possible in consultation with the United Kingdom Government and/or United States Government as the case may be.
3.
It is important that the exercise of administrative authority by the commander-in-chief shall receive the formal support of the Allied Sovereign or Government and that compliance with his orders shall be enjoined by them upon the population. This is one of the objects which it is hoped to attain by preliminary negotiations with the Allied Government.
4.
In order to reach agreement with the Allied Government and in pursuance of the general political policy referred to in paragraph 1 above, it will be necessary to associate the Allied Government in an advisory capacity with the civil administration during the first, military, phase, without however, impugning the paramount authority and sole responsibility of the commander-in-chief. This can best be done by agreeing with the Allied Government upon the inclusion of liaison officers on all aspects of the civil administration in a Military Mission which the Allied Government will be invited to appoint to the commander-in-chief’s [Page 515] staff, the Mission being drawn from Allied personnel in free territory. During the first phase relations between the commander-in-chief and any civilian holding a political appointment from the Allied Government would be the subject of special arrangements between the Governments. (As regards judges etc., see paragraph 8.)
5.
While thus giving each Allied Government all reasonable facilities and assistance it is not however the policy of His Majesty’s Government to impose any such Government on an unwilling people or to maintain it in power against the wish of the people. To that extent our policy towards each Government will have to be decided according to circumstances when the process of liberation has been carried sufficiently far to enable us to judge of the capacity of the Government on the one hand and the feelings of the liberated people on the other.
6.
Most of the Allied Governments already feel that they are so out of touch with their people that they have decided to resign as soon as they return to their country. This will be all to the good in those cases where the executive power, e.g. the Sovereign or President, is strong enough to form at once a new Government on a broader and more representative basis. But there may be cases where he or she will not have sufficient authority to rally the leaders of public opinion, or the state of the country owing either to military operations or to internal chaos may be such as to make it impossible to constitute a new Government during the early phase of liberation. In such cases it may be necessary to insist upon the old government’s remaining in power until circumstances make it possible to change it without detriment to military operations.
7.
In every case the returning Government will naturally wish to remove from office as many officials belonging to the quisling régime as possible, and in general it will be in our interests that this should be done, but it would be dangerous for us to commit ourselves during negotiations to any hard and fast rule on this subject, or to undertake to instal in office any particular persons whom the Government have already in mind for certain posts. The Allied Government must be allowed, however, to represent its views concerning the replacement or appointment of individuals through its advisers and liaison officers on the commander-in-chief’s staff and the views of the Allied Government should be respected as far as possible as serious difficulties are likely to arise in practice if individuals whom the Allied Government regard as unsuitable, either on account of their association with the enemy or for other reasons, are maintained or placed in office.
8.
It is desirable as far as possible to allow jurisdiction over criminal offences by the civilian population to be exercised by Allied national [Page 516] courts, and the preliminary negotiations with the Allied Government should be on this basis. This could be done in the first phase either by the commander-in-chief’s licensing local Allied courts, in consultation with the appropriate adviser of the Allied Government on his staff, or by allowing the Allied Government to set up its national military courts, composed of officers from the Allied contingent, who will probably be included in the expeditionary force, or by a combination of both methods, subject to due safeguards for the adequate repression of offences against the members[,] property and security of the expeditionary force.
9.
Certain territories may be liberated not by British military action but merely as a result of the withdrawal of enemy forces. If in such territory the Allied Government is able to establish its authority either in person or through a local organisation it should be our policy to recognise the authority of that Government in that territory and to give it all assistance and facilities.
10.
The case of France must be completely separate and any negotiations with the National Committee must be restricted by the mere fact that we do not recognise the Committee as the future government of France or even as the body through whom the local administration will be carried on daring military operations. At the outset of any negotiations with the French National Committee it will be essential to lay down the limits within which we desire their collaboration or assistance, and at this stage it will be impossible to enter into any commitments with them as regards the exercise of governmental functions in any part of France which may be liberated by Allied military action. If possible, we should put off discussing these matters with the French National Committee, in the hope that we may be able shortly to deal with a unified French organisation, composed of the Fighting French and General Giraud’s supporters.
  1. Not found in United States files; printed from a copy obtained by the editors from the British Foreign Office. This memorandum, which had been drafted in the Foreign Office before the First Quebec Conference, was “produced” by Eden during his meeting with Hull at 9 p.m., August 21, 1943. See post, p. 923.