Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum Prepared in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff ¹

secret

[ Washington ,] 8 August 1943.

Memorandum

Subject: Conduct of the War in Europe.

1. The United Nations have failed during the past year and a half to concentrate their forces and to hold to decisions. The violation of these basic principles has resulted in the assembly of a much smaller military force against the European Axis than would otherwise have been possible. Since April, 1942, the United States and Great Britain have maintained verbal adherence to the decision that the main and decisive effort would be a cross-channel operation and that forces and supplies would be built up in the U.K. for that purpose. The giving bit by bit of resources to the Mediterranean, which has always been regarded as a secondary theater, has resulted in a net decrease in the U.S. forces and resources which could have been brought to bear against the enemy. After deciding firmly to attack across channel and to build up the necessary forces in accordance with the Bolero plan, it was decided to do Torch . There was to be no change in the U.S.-British main decisive effort. A net result of the disruptions of personnel and cargo shipping caused by this shift, originally considered as temporary, and by the day to day allotment of men and resources for the Mediterranean was that by 1 April 1943 the U.S. had only approximately 452,000 men facing the European Axis from the U.K. and from the Mediterranean, instead of the 1,074,000 scheduled for the U.K. by 1 April 1943 in the original Bolero plan—a net loss in U.S. troop movements overseas of over 600,000 men prior to April 1943. We have every reason to believe that the figure of approximately 1,000,000 men in the U.K. by 1 April 1943 could have been attained. It was based on a careful investigation of possibilities by British as well as by American authorities. The British who worked on Bolero will doubtless agree that the project could have been carried out. The loss of 600,000 men can be attributed mainly to the movement of 150,000 U.S. and 250,000 British troops to North Africa from [the] U.K.; the delays caused by readjustment of shipping schedules in preparation for the North Africa move; the meager port capacities in North Africa which limited the number of ships that could be handled in each convoy from the U.S. to a troop list of about 40,000 during the early period of the occupation; the lack of sufficient naval escorts for convoys to the U.K. at the same time they were being run to North Africa.

2. The above is by no means a complete measure of the waste which has resulted from reversal of decisions and from day-to-day variations from programs established and accepted as the basis for training men, producing equipment and deploying these resources throughout the world. Included in this waste are: the loss in cargo lift due to the transshipment of hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies through the U.K. to North Africa rather than directly; the waste of U.S. manpower resulting from pressing at high speed the training and equipment of units for an agreed major operation which is continually postponed, while a series of secondary operations are undertaken for which they are either not required or unsuitable; the waste in moving units great distances into staging areas and then failing to ship them overseas because of sudden changes in plans; the uneconomic use of U.S. and British labor and production facilities in straining every effort to produce equipment and provide a base in time for a major scheduled operation which is not carried out according to plan. These disruptions are relatively much greater in the U.S. than in the U.K. The bulk of the supplies come from here. The great distances in the United States between depots, military camps and ports and the distances between bases serving theaters and sub-theaters of war must be kept always in mind when any change in a course of action is suggested. A diversion of any part of the flow of men and supplies once started towards a particular sub-theater results in delays and wastes which the United Nations cannot afford. Unsound practices such as those listed above, if continued, will certainly postpone victory, and may result in only a partial defeat of the Axis.

3. In showing the cost of the change from the Channel to Africa there is no intention to belittle the effects of Torch . Torch was successful and has brought great results. The Mediterranean has been opened, Italy is trembling in the balance, southern and eastern Germany have been placed under threat of air attack, the vitally important Ploeşti oil fields have been attacked. Much has been gained. Bolero was not carried out and any appraisal of what might have resulted can be questioned. However, this direct action was the one chance to end the war in Europe this year. If this had happened, all that has been gained would be insignificant in comparison. It is particularly pertinent now to note that if we can put our air far enough north in Italy to bomb southern Germany, all the major military gains to be gotten from the African operation will have been attained. Decisive military action against Germany cannot come from that area. We recognize that plans must be flexible. We do not advocate sticking blindly to a plan regardless of what happens. All military undertakings are uncertain. We cannot control what the enemy does nor predict definitely his reaction. Changes should and must be made. Minor changes can be made. What we are trying to bring out is that major changes are terribly destructive and wasteful.

4. Today the United States and Great Britain have two forces of limited size located in widely separated areas facing the European Axis. Neither of these forces nor their bases are at present adequate to launch an offensive which will bring victory, quick and complete. Furthermore, it is doubtful that they are now sufficient to take full advantage of an opportunity presented by a major weakening of Axis power. The price of variations and reversals in decisions is now and will continue to be the failure to economize in our use of resources and the failure to concentrate such resources in a way to assure complete victory. A firm decision with determination to stick to the agreed decision is now a “must.” Any variations, no matter how attractive, may endanger the entire program. Small diversions create grossly disproportionate disruptions and delays in preparations for the decisive effort. These may culminate in unforeseen demands for major portions of U.S.-British resources. The United States and Great Britain have now reached the crossroads in the war where perseverance in the practice of dispersing the limited resources and reversing or amending decisions, involves a grave danger that the war will become stalemated or that decisive action leading to complete victory will be indefinitely postponed.

5. In order to clinch at the earliest practicable moment, the victory now in sight the United States and Great Britain must decide on a main effort, must stick to that decision, must concentrate overwhelming air, sea, and land power for that main effort, must launch the main effort with skillful and explosive force, and must assign to all other efforts the task of preparation for and support of the decisive blow. A failure to adopt this overall policy will imperil the final victory.

6. The United States and Great Britian must, at Quadrant , choose between attempting a decisive effort from the Mediterranean and reaffirming again the decision taken in London in April 1942 and affirmed at Anfa and Trident Conferences ² to launch a decisive main effort across the channel. The choice made must be supported by a strong resolution to carry out the decision with completely adequate resources and without variation or delay.

7. The allocation of additional forces to the Mediterranean is uneconomical and assists Germany to create a strategic stalemate in Europe. The returns which can be foreseen from such commitments are based upon speculative political considerations. The terrain and communications systems prevent [the] United States and Great Britain from effectively using large forces and enable the Germans to effect a stalemate in the rugged areas bordering the Mediterranean using comparatively small forces which may be little more than present garrisons. The quantity and effectiveness of aid or opposition to be expected from Turks, Bulgars, Rumanians, Hungarians, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs and Greeks cannot be assessed. The area of operations is distant from major United Nations bases, particularly those suitable for supporting the first and critical phases of an amphibious assault.

8. In short, the Mediterranean does not offer an opportunity for decisive military action against Germany, does not present an opportunity to draw continually increasing forces from Russia, and does not provide the opportunity to place effectively in combat the ground forces of the United States and Britain. Furthermore, operations in the Mediterranean do not contribute to the defeat of the submarine and do not force Germany to expose her air force to the destructive losses inherent in a defense against a decisive U.S.-British air-ground offensive.

9. A cross-channel offensive contributes directly and with ever-increasing impact toward the essentials of military victory over the Axis. It can be launched from the U.K. which is the only U.S.-British base capable of unleashing a mass explosive air, sea and land attack directly against the German army. It will destroy or neutralize the most important German submarine bases. It will bring on an air battle which will result in the destruction of the German air force. It will bring our forces to grips with the German army in an area where all available British and U.S. air and ground forces can be used effectively and decisively. Germany must then choose between a retreat which will allow the assault forces to seize decisive land areas, and the transfer of divisions from the Russian front and other areas. Such transfers must quickly lead to the crumbling of her defenses and the attainment by the United Nations of complete victory.

10. The choice between Mediterranean operations and a decisive cross-channel operation is a decision between:

a. Trusting that the Germans and Russians will continue to weaken and destroy each other while the U.S. and Great Britain succeed in crumbling the internal support of the German war machine by raids, limited operations, propaganda, sabotage, strategic bombardment and political disintegration and

b. Accepting that Germany cannot be defeated without bringing to bear against the German army the maximum military power of the U.S., Britain and Russia with the objective of defeating the German army by coordinated offensive air-ground action across the channel and from the Eastern front.

An expansion of operations in the Mediterranean is consistent with the first course of action. This area offers only an opportunity for gambling that victory can be achieved as a primary result of psychological and political pressure. The estimates governing the detailed course of action and the appraisal of the likelihood of success must be based primarily on political speculations and hopes concerning the weaknesses of our enemies and strengths of our allies. Military action is not and will not be the decisive factor. On the other hand a cross-channel operation is consistent with the second course of action set forth above. The opposition to be overcome and the cost in men and resources can be appraised in terms of military action. Men, guns and planes and not political and psychological imponderables, determine ultimate success or failure.

11. It is very doubtful that the Russian Army supplemented by the effects of strategic bombardment will, unaided by a major U.S.-British air-ground operation, be sufficient to destroy the fighting power of Axis ground forces. It is certain that dependence upon the Russian army alone for major ground operations will result in a protracted European war and may lead to unilateral action culminating in peace short of complete victory. Such a course of action is unacceptable.

12. It is clear that the soundest course of action is to mass air, sea and land power in the U.K. for a cross-channel assault. But even more vital to the achievement of victory than the particular course of action chosen, is the pressing necessity of deciding what that course of action shall be and then sticking vigorously and wholeheartedly to that decision.

1. Copies of this memorandum were sent to Roosevelt and to each United States officer designated to attend the Quebec Conference. See Matloff, p. 176.
2. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 796, and ante, p. 365.