Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff¹

secret
Enclosure to C.C.S. 303

[Washington,] 9 August 1943.

Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe

the problem

1. To develop a strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.

discussion

2. Axis Strategic Situation and United Nations Strategy. From the Axis point of view, objective evaluation of the events of the past year must present a discouraging picture. At sea, the effectiveness of the U–boat campaign has decreased sharply. In the air, the Axis has seen its enemies achieve varying degrees of superiority on all fronts. Meanwhile, the Combined Bomber Offensive accelerates. On the ground, the Axis has seen initial successes in both Egypt and Russia degenerate into a steady series of military reverses; El Alamein—Stalingrad—winter defeat in Russia—Tunisia—Belgorod—Sicily—and now Orel.

Due primarily to inadequate air power, the Axis now lacks the capability of destroying the Russian armed forces, particularly while engaged in containing or parrying the blows of the increasing Anglo-American sea, air, and ground forces in Western Europe. As long as the bulk of the German forces is contained on the Russian front, the Axis has very limited offensive capabilities, including invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, which is now considered unlikely.

It is difficult to believe that current Axis strategy still visualizes total victory, as once conceived. There are as yet no definite indications, but it is reasonable to suppose that the Axis leadership may now seek a satisfactory negotiated peace. Failing in this, an “honorable” surrender might be the next Axis objective. The Axis, however, still retains strong defensive power. A defensive strategy on the part of the Axis might develop into a protracted struggle and result in a stalemate on the Continent. It is imperative, therefore, that the Allied Powers penetrate to the heart of the fortress of Europe, come to grips with the enemy and thus bring about the early and decisive defeat of the Axis.

In the early stages of the present war, the United Nations of necessity pursued an opportunistic strategy forced upon them by their comparative weakness. However, the present rapidly improving position of the United Nations in relation to the Axis in Europe demands an abrogation of opportunistic strategy and requires the adoption of and adherence to sound strategic plans which envisage decisive military operations conducted at times and places of our choosing—not the enemy’s.

If present conditions justify our principal effort in the Mediterranean, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve plans:

a. That would require the concentration of our strength in that area, and concurrently

b. That would provide only sufficient forces in the British Isles to secure this important base and to make available opportunistic forces to cross the channel if a German collapse should occur.

However, conditions have not so changed as to justify on sound military grounds the renunciation of the Trident concept.² We must not jeopardize our sound over-all strategy simply to exploit local successes in a generally accepted secondary theater, the Mediterranean, where logistical and terrain difficulties preclude decisive and final operations designed to reach the heart of Germany.

A careful evaluation of the march of events in the world and particularly in the European–Mediterranean area indicates that the strategy enunciated in Trident is sound—specifically:

a. That Operation Overlord , carefully synchronized with the Combined Bomber offensive, if given whole-hearted and immediate support, would result in an early and decisive victory in Europe;

b. That continued operations in the Mediterranean should be conducted with available Allied resources as stipulated in Trident in order to cause the collapse of Italy, to create diversions of enemy forces and to destroy vital Axis installations on the Continent.

It is on this basis that the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe is developed in the present paper.

3. Operations in Russia

It is assumed that Russia will continue to exert increasing and eventually crushing pressure against the German armies massed against her. In the unlikely event of either a separate Russo-German armistice or peace, the strategy of the United Nations will require reexamination. In that case, the defeat of Japan would probably take priority over the defeat of Germany.

4. European Strategic Concept 1943–44. For the purposes of clarity and analysis, the concept of operations here recommended is outlined first in its entirety; thereafter, its component elements are discussed.

a. Operation Pointblank

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite to Overlord (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before Overlord can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

b. Operation Overlord

(1) This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. (Target date 1 May 1944.) After securing adequate Channel ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in France operations designed to strike at the heart of Germany and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

(2) Balanced ground and air force build-up for Overlord , and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

(3) As between the operation Overlord and operations in the Mediterranean, when there is a shortage of resources Overlord will have an overriding priority.

c. Operations in Italy

(1) First Phase. The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases at least as far north as the Rome area, and, if feasible, to include the Ancona area.

(2) Second Phase. Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.

(3) Third Phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in northern Italy, and the creation, with available Mediterranean forces, of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into southern France.

d. Operations in Southern France

Offensive operations against southern France, utilizing available Mediterranean forces (to include trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the Toulon–Marseilles area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with Overlord .

e. Air Operations

(1) Strategic bombing operations from central Mediterranean bases, complementing Pointblank .

(2) Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces.

(3) Development of an air ferry route through the Azores.

(4) Air supply of Balkan guerrillas (see g below).

f. Operations at Sea

(1) Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the Azores.

(2) Security of our sea communications.

(3) Continued disruption of Axis sea communications.

(4) Support of amphibious operations.

g. Operations in the Balkans

Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport, and to the bombing of Ploeşti and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

h. Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the Mediterranean

Defensive garrison commitments (Appendix “A”) in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the Iberian Peninsula.

5. Operation Overlord

This is the main U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. In consonance with the decisions made at Trident and reaffirmed for Quadrant (par. 5, Section III, Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept), maximum resources will be concentrated in the U.K. “as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.” Target date for execution of plans now being prepared by COSSAC is 1 May 1944. After a firm lodgment has been established and adequate channel and Atlantic ports secured, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

By Trident decisions, Overlord will consist of 29 divisions of which seven are to be Husky veterans withdrawn from the Mediterranean. If only three of these divisions were moved to the U.K., enough personnel shipping would be available to move four additional U.S. divisions to the U.K., and thus our strength in the Mediterranean would be increased by four divisions without decrease in the planned number for Overlord . However, there would then be only three instead of seven battle-tested divisions for Overlord , a disadvantage which cannot be accepted. The maximum support should be given the main effort. Hence, the Trident decision to move seven divisions to the U.K. should not be changed.

6. Operations in Italy and Her Possessions

a. General Objectives. Our immediate objective ( Trident ) in the Mediterranean is to knock Italy out of the war. This will open the door to the accomplishment of many other important objectives. These are:

(1) The progressive establishment of air bases in Italy, at least as far north as the Ancona area, and the initiation of a strategic bombing offensive therefrom against the Reich and the Balkans, coordinated with and complementing Pointblank .

(2) The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy, and the creation, with available Mediterranean forces, of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army, into Southern France.

(3) The final elimination of the Italian fleet as a military factor in the war.

(4) The acquisition of the Italian merchant fleet.

(5) The occupation of Sardinia and Corsica.

b. Specific Operations. The elimination of Italy as a belligerent does not necessarily mean that the Germans will withdraw behind the Alps. The more likely German reaction will be to defend on the Rimini–Pisa line. Regardless of where Germany may defend in Italy, our strategy must contemplate maintaining steady pressure against her forces. In our view, however, the mere maintenance of pressure on German forces remaining in Italy does not constitute an adequate mission for the powerful forces we will have in the Mediterranean after Italy is knocked out of the war. Including the French, there will be approximately 4,500 combat aircraft and at least 24 offensive divisions above and beyond garrison and security requirements. Our strategy must provide an appropriate task for these forces in the Mediterranean. Such a task should, if possible, lend support to our main effort across the Channel. Broadly speaking, there are but three places where the ground element of these forces could be utilized: The Balkans, the Trieste–Vienna region, or in Southern France. Each of these warrants brief discussion:

(1) Balkans. The Balkans are unsuitable for large scale offensive operations, due to terrain and communication difficulties. This course, therefore, is rejected. (We do recommend special operations in the Balkans. These are discussed in paragraph 9 below).

(2) Trieste–Vienna. Offensive operations, either limited or unlimited in their scope and objective, along the Trieste–Vienna line would strike directly at the German heartland. Consequently, such operations would insure a swift and positive German reaction. The nature of the terrain, however, is such that great German forces would not be required to halt our advance. There is no reason to believe that a limited-objective operation in this area would contribute materially to Overlord success by drawing significant German forces out of France. The establishment of a new front, moreover, in this area would undoubtedly guarantee the continuous separation of our forces between the Mediterranean and Western France for the duration of the war. Lastly, and by no means of least importance, the French Army wants to fight in France and will have little stomach for operations in the Trieste-Vienna region. Consequently this course is also rejected.

(3) Southern France. Southern France is retained as being the only suitable area in which ultimately to utilize the forces that will be available in the Mediterranean after Italy is knocked out of the war. Our concept for the eventual operations in Southern France is developed in paragraph 7, below.

c. Elimination of the Italian Fleet. The final elimination of the Italian fleet as a military factor in the war will release the larger units of the British fleet for use in other theaters.

d. Italian Merchant Fleet. The acquisition of the Italian merchant fleet will be of assistance to the United Nations in the rehabilitation of Italy.

e. Occupation of Sardinia and Corsica. Our forward advance on the mainland of Italy, before Italy is knocked out of the war, need not be restricted by continuing Axis occupation of Sardinia and Corsica. These two islands are very likely to fall when Italy goes out of the war. If not, their reduction and occupation must be accomplished, before operations in Southern France are undertaken.

7. Operations in Southern France

a. After Italy is eliminated and the Germans are forced back into Northern Italy, France becomes a vulnerable salient to Germany. At first glance, this salient appears most formidable, bounded as it is on the three exposed sides by heavily-defended seacoasts and neutral Spanish territory. If, however, Russian pressure continues undiminished, the intensity of Pointblank is augmented from bases in Italy, our pressure in Italy remains steady, and appropriate political and economic measures are taken with regard to Spain, the adequate defense by the Axis of the French salient will have become a confounding problem. Exposed to steady and increasing pressure, Germany will not have the air power required to adequately maintain her perimeter and internal defense. The German air force will be stretched some 3,000 to 4,000 miles around three sides of the continent of Europe. In view of present estimates that the over-all German strategic situation will continue to deteriorate, we believe that operations for the conquest of France can be initiated in the spring of 1944.

b. On the assumption that conditions are substantially as stated in paragraph a above, operations in Southern France coordinated with Overlord are believed feasible with the first objective the establishment of a firm lodgment in the Marseilles area. The sequence of operations is envisaged as follows:

(1) Holding attack with strong ground forces in Northern Italy.

(2) Amphibious invasion of Southern France, under carrier and land-based air support, with relatively small forces. Due to the distances involved, only limited land-based air support can be expected for this operation.

(3) Security of the lodgment by rapid introduction of strong reinforcements, overland if feasible, from Northern Italy, and by sea within the limits of available shipping.

(4) Exploitation to secure the Port of Marseilles, and airfields in the area.

(5) Offensive operations designed to assist Overlord by containing maximum German forces.

c. For available means see Appendices “A” and “B.” Exclusive of garrison and security requirements in the Mediterranean area and the seven divisions transferred to the United Kingdom for Overlord , and assuming that 10 divisions will be adequate to maintain pressure against the Germans in Northern Italy, it is estimated that the following forces will be available for offensive operations against Southern France:

• 10 U.S. and British divisions.
• 4 French divisions.
• 4,500 U.S. and British combat aircraft.

Approximately enough amphibious lift for at least two reinforced divisions (44,000). (If LCM’s can be used, the lift can be increased to three divisions.)

Adequate Naval escort vessels are now allocated for Mediterranean operations.

8. Air Operations

a. The main effort of our Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom progresses and should accomplish the expected results in the destruction of German air power, air defenses, war-making resources, and general morale. This bomber offensive will be carefully integrated with Overlord and should be directed so as to reach its greatest effectiveness in the spring of 1944 and thereby create conditions favorable for the Overlord operation.

b. A strategic bombing offensive from Italian air bases as far north as Ancona and from other Mediterranean air bases would complement the Pointblank offensive. With our Mediterranean air power advanced to bases in the Ancona area of Italy, many critical Axis war industries and resources, including fighter aircraft and oil production, would be within operating radius of our medium as well as heavy bombers.

c. Provision for air support of surface operations requires careful and timely planning. Carrier-borne air cover will probably be required in support of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean beyond the radius of action of land-based fighters.

d. The necessity for air staging points and anti-submarine bases in the Azores was recognized at Trident .³ Reduced flying time and better weather along this route would result in combat units in the European, Mediterranean, and Far East theaters receiving initial and replacement equipment more expeditiously and in better condition. Anti-submarine bases would complete the air and surface coverage of the central and north Atlantic. Hence, air and naval bases in the Azores should be secured as early as possible.

9. Operations in the Balkans

The Balkans are unsuitable for large-scale offensive operations, due to terrain and communication difficulties. Nevertheless, as long as Germans occupy the Balkans there remains a problem as to how to deal with them. It is our view that our strategy is best served if Germany should continue to hold the Balkans, provided Germany can be forced to garrison heavily and be made to pay a high price in attrition of personnel and matériel.

Therefore, our strategy should be to supply the Balkan guerrillas by air and sea, with the object of enabling them to compel the Germans to maintain not only present forces of 12 divisions in that region, but also to provide additional divisions to replace the 30 Italian divisions now there.

10. Policy Toward Spain and Turkey

a. Spain

Spain is assisting the Axis with her economic resources and even with armed forces. The United Nations have endured Spanish official approval of Axis war aims and denunciation of our own with an attitude of conciliation. At the present moment we find Spanish troops defensively disposed against us, with little or no disposition facing our enemy. We are forced by this disposition to maintain large forces ready to protect our lifeline through the Straits of Gibraltar and constantly to plan for immediate provision of additional forces to hold Gibraltar should Spain permit a German offensive through her territory. Indications are that Franco is realizing the final United Nations’ victory and is tending toward a position of real neutrality.

The time is now ripe to take full advantage of our present position and adopt a stern and frankly demanding policy toward Spain. The United Nations should require Spain, for the price of wartime economic assistance and postwar friendship, to:

(1) Shift the bulk of her defensive forces from Morocco and Southern Spain to Northern Spain.

(2) Cease military and economic aid to Germany.

b. Turkey

To date, the United Nations have devoted—and, by Trident ,⁴ are continuing to devote—considerable effort toward bringing Turkey into the war as an ally. This effort takes the form of very sizeable economic aid and involves a United Nations military commitment of considerable proportions. This policy toward Turkey has not been fruitful. The current estimate is that the Turkish attitude is unlikely to change. It is believed, therefore, that the continuation of aid to Turkey, at the present scale, is not warranted.

11. Relations With Patriot Forces in Europe. Within the limits of available means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces, everywhere within enemy-occupied territory in Europe, should be furnished supplies to enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence, and guerrilla warfare. Since our strategy contemplates the conquest of France, the French underground can be expected to make a very Important and direct contribution to the U.S. and British effort in Western Europe. The supply of the French underground, and the development of plans for the use of these Patriot Forces, therefore, should have a relatively high priority in our program.

12. Operations in Liberated Areas. Should Germany, of her own volition, withdraw her forces from Norway or the Southern Balkans, our policy will be limited to the economic and military supply of the liberated nations to the extent of our capabilities without prejudice to military operations in more vital areas. The advisability of conducting military operations in and from Norway, in the event of German withdrawal therefrom, will be assessed in the light of the then-existing over-all strategic situation.

Appendix “A”

Suggested Deployment of Ground Forces in the Mediterranean After the Conquest of Italy

	British & Others	U.S.	French	Total
Available in divs. and equivalent divs	28	9	5	42
Garrisons and Commitments
Sicily and So. Italy	2			2
Central Italy	2			2
Sardinia	1			1
Corsica			1	1
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica	1			1
Egypt and Palestine	2			2
Syria and Cyprus	1			1
North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and French Morocco)		1	*	1*
Recommended commitment to Overlord	3	4		7
	12	5	1*	18*
Available for operation in North Italy and Southern France	16	4	4	24

Appendix “B”

Deployment of Air Forces in Mediterranean

Unit equipment and total airplanes available as of August 2, 1943:

	U.S.		R.A.F.		French
Types	UE	Total	UE	Total	UE	Total
Heavy Bombers (D)	262	393	—	—	—	—
Heavy Bombers (N)	—	—	48	72	—	—
Medium Bombers (D)	389	588	—	—	—	—
Medium Bombers (N)	—	—	183	275	—	—
Light Bombers	57	86	384	576	—	—
SEF, TEF, Ftr Bombers	1,069	1,604	942	1,413	60	90
TEF (N)	24	36	120	180	—	—
Keen and Photo	78	116	72	108	3	3
T/C	364	546	—	—	—	—
Torpedo Bombers	—	—	160	240	3	3
Totals	2,246	3,369	1,909	2,864	66	96
Grand Totals—Unit Equipment					4,221
Total Airplanes					6,329
Less for garrison and security in Mediterranean (fighters only):†			Unit equipment			1,164
			Total Airplanes			1,747
Balance remaining for offensive operations:			Unit equipment			3,057
			Total Airplanes			4,582

Notes:	a.	Total R.A.F. strength is figured as follows: Number of squadrons × authorized strength plus 50% reserve. There is not a definite figure set as a reserve but 50% is known to be very conservative as far as fighters are concerned.
	b.	It is contemplated that the number of U.S. planes will be reduced 365 by Jan. 1944 if proposed planning is carried out.
	c.	Reductions or additions in R.A.F. strength not included.

1. Circulated under cover of a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 303), August 9, 1943, presenting the enclosure to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. For the discussion of this paper at the 108th, 109th, and 110th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 15, 16, and 17, 1943, see post, pp. 864, 870, 875.
2. The various Trident decisions referred to in this paper are recorded in C.C.S. 242/6, ante, p. 364.
3. See ante, p. 366.
4. See ante, p. 371.
5. Six additional French divisions, begin [being] equipped and trained in North Africa. [Footnote in the source text.
6. Six additional French divisions, begin [being] equipped and trained in North Africa. [Footnote in the source text.
7. Six additional French divisions, begin [being] equipped and trained in North Africa. [Footnote in the source text.
8. Six additional French divisions, begin [being] equipped and trained in North Africa. [Footnote in the source text.
9. Figures based on Trident Estimates. [Footnote in the source text.]