Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff¹

secret
Enclosure to C.C.S. 300/1

[Washington,] 7 August 1943.

Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1943–1944, European Area

(As of 30 July 1943)

Note: In view of very recent developments in Italy, the ultimate consequences of which are as yet unpredictable, related paragraphs of this paper must be regarded as tentative.

1. Basic Factors in the European Situation.

a. Predominance of Germany. The enemy situation in Europe must be estimated in terms of the German situation. Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland are merely satellites of Germany and, to a considerable degree, prisoners of circumstances. None of them could offer prolonged resistance without effective German support; any of them would now dissociate itself from Germany if it could do so without fear of Germany or of the U.S.S.R. Italy’s special position as a nominally equal partner with Germany would, however, make her surrender more impressive than that of any of the others.

b. Germany’s Basic Task is now to defend “Festung Europa,”^* with such assistance as she can extort from satellite and occupied countries. Although she may no longer expect to impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States in combination, she can still hope to avert surrender and even to gain an advantageous negotiated peace by dividing her enemies politically (in particular, by dividing the U.S.S.R. from Great Britain and the United States), by beating off their attacks, or by making her defeat so costly as to dissuade them from the task. This hope, as long as it persists, will justify and support a determined resistance.

c. “Festung Europa.” Germany now controls, directly or indirectly all of continental Europe west of the Russian front, except the territories of five neutral states (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey). This control extends to include the Baltic, Adriatic, and Aegean Seas and the Mediterranean islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Crete and Rhodes. This whole area is encircled by blockade, but contains within itself the requisites of a practical military self-sufficiency.

The western and southern faces of this position are subject to invasion only by difficult amphibious attack (assuming the continued neutrality of Spain and Turkey). The western face has been strengthened by extensive fortification; the southern face is backed by formidable mountainous terrain. Major industrial areas in western territory under German control, however, are subject to heavy aerial attack.

The eastern face of “Festung Europa” is without clear natural definition. For that reason, and because of the immense forces deployed by the U.S.S.R., the eastern front must continue to be Germany’s chief preoccupation in land operations.

Despite the best efforts of German propaganda, the inhabitants of “Festung Europa” are not united in its defense. That fact entails not only the employment of considerable occupational forces, but also the necessity of bolstering wavering allies.

2. The Existing Overall Situation.

a. Ground Forces. The Axis armies are now all at or near peak strength in number of combat divisions—German, 311; Italian, 74; Rumanian, 27; Hungarian, 21; Bulgarian, 20; Croat, 8; Slovak, 4; total, 465. The German Army in particular has been brought to such strength only by lowering physical standards, combing out industrial personnel hitherto deferred, and enlisting considerable numbers of non-Germans. In consequence, the average quality of German divisions has declined and war production will be adversely affected. Replacement of future losses will augment those tendencies and may be inadequate to maintain existing strength.

b. Air Forces. We estimate that the total first-line strength of the German Air Force (as of 31 July 1943) is approximately 4,600 aircraft. Of these, approximately 1,500 are on the Western Front, 1950 in the Russian Front and 1125 in the Mediterranean. In addition, approximately 450 are in Germany for refitting. In structure the German Air Force lacks strength in depth because it has no substantial Stored Reserves of aircraft to back up the first-line units. Opposed upon all fronts by United Nations air forces greatly superior in numbers and in offensive power, the German Air Force has been forced to adopt a defensive role but this defensive role is rendered even more difficult due to its extended commitments. In an effort to meet this situation its defensive strength has been increased by concentration upon production of fighter types at the expense of other categories. Because of the comparative ease of manufacture of the fighter type, this has resulted in a slight upward trend in total production and has improved the defensive power of the German Air Force while the offensive power has further deteriorated. Due largely to the shortage of trained crews, the efficiency of the long-range bomber force is at its lowest point since the beginning of the war. In equipment some improvement in present types is noted, but no important production of radically new types is expected.

We estimate that the total first line strength of the Italian Air Force (as of 31 July 1943) is approximately 1,400 aircraft, of which 1,050 are disposed in the Central Mediterranean and 350 in the Eastern. In addition approximately 250 are in Italy for refitting. During the past year this air force has been deteriorating in numerical strength, in rate of new production, in pilot and crew training, and in combat efficiency. Due to these factors the figures given should be discounted by at least 30% for purposes of comparing the fighting effectiveness of the Italian Air Force with that of the German. Under existing conditions continuance of this downward trend in overall effectiveness is to be expected.

c. Naval Forces.

(1) Submarines. As of 27 July 1943, the estimated numbers of European Axis submarines were 436 German and 74 Italian. Of these 211 German and 45 Italian were operational and were in the Atlantic or Mediterranean or in waters accessible to those areas, 43 German were used only for training purposes, and 176 German were undergoing trials, training, or repairs in the Baltic. The average rates of completion of new submarines are estimated to be 25 German a month, or possibly a few more, and between one and two Italian (if construction still continues).

(2) Surface Vessels. As of 27 July, all effective German major units (2 B 4 CA, and 4 CL) were divided between the Baltic and Norwegian waters. All effective German light forces (40 DD and perhaps 150 P were in waters from the Bay of Biscay northward, except for perhaps 45 PT in the Mediterranean. It is possible that the experienced personnel have been largely transferred from the major units other than Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Luetzow (the three in northern Norwegian waters) to the submarine service and that the newly completed aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin has been laid up. Subject to that, the effectiveness of both the major units and light forces, especially the latter, is believed to be high. The new construction of combatant surface vessels is believed to be confined to about 21 DD and a large but uncertain number of PT.

As of 27 July, the larger portion of the effective Italian surface forces (consisting of 2/3 B 1 CA, 5 CL, 15/20 DD and perhaps 40 P were in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean. Except for a few motor torpedo boats in the Black Sea, the rest (consisting of 3/4 B 1 CL, 15/20 DD and perhaps 60 P were in the Eastern Basin. The effectiveness of the major units is believed to be low. The effectiveness of the light forces, especially the motor torpedo boats, is believed to be fairly high. Repair work on combatant surface vessels and new construction (if still continuing) is believed to cover 0/1 B 1 CA, 3 CV (under conversion from other types), and 1 CL—all in the Western Basin; 1/2 BB and 2/3 CL—all in the Eastern Basin; and an uncertain number of DD and PT in each basin.

d. Munitions Production. There is no reason to believe that decline in munitions production has as yet affected German tactical efficiency. However, labor shortage and bomb damage have more than balanced German progress in organizing the exploitation of non-German labor and facilities. Even with further civilian sacrifices, output of finished munitions may have declined about five percent net from the 1941–42 peak. The capacity of the area integrated under German control would have permitted a substantial expansion of output if the manpower shortage and bomb damage had not interfered.

A scale of military activity involving attrition at 1942 rates could be maintained only by drawing on stocks of most major items. Output of fighter aircraft, however, is increasing and has been well in excess of wastage in recent months. Fighter wastage could increase by one-third to one-half during the coming year without occasioning a decline in fighter strength.

e. German Morale. The two big factors in German morale are the attitude towards (1) the outcome of the war and (2) the treatment of Germany in the event of her defeat. There is evidence that a considerable part of German military personnel still believe that Germany will not be defeated, but belief in total victory seems to be fading. Civilian morale is undoubtedly lower than military morale, but has demonstrated no positive tendency toward defeatism. Morale is supported by the widespread conviction that Germany would be ruined if defeated and German propaganda zealously engenders this belief. In consequence, most German civilians appear reconciled to the prevailing standard of living, which is far from intolerable, for as long as is necessary to secure an acceptable peace. Morale is being increasingly affected by air attack. There are indications of growing uneasiness over the presence of so many foreign workmen and prisoners of war in Germany. Continuation of reverses may weaken German morale further by spreading conviction of inevitable defeat.

3. The Situation by Fronts.

a. The Russian Front. Since early spring two-thirds of Germany’s ground strength (203 divisions) has been on the Russian front, with very heavy offensive concentrations near Orel and Belgorod. It is believed that the Germans planned an early operation to pinch off the Kursk salient at least, but that it was suspended on account of the sudden collapse in Tunisia. On 5 July, the Germans launched a violent attack northward and eastward from Belgorod, which failed, apparently with severe losses. A complementary attack southward from Orel made no headway. The Russians seized the initiative and launched a heavy converging attack on Orel, where the German position now appears to be precarious. This situation, if not preliminary to more extensive operations (as was the Russian Kharkov offensive in the spring of 1942), marks a new phase in the war in the east, with the Russians conducting a mid-summer offensive and the Germans professing to welcome a positional battle of attrition.

On the whole front, Russian ground strength is to the German as three to two. The superiority of German communications, staff work, and fighting skill may yet compensate for this disparity. Russian staff planning, however, has improved since 1941–42.

Germany has, on the Russian front, some 2,000 aircraft, of which 1, 170 are bombers of all types. Available information indicates that the U.S.S.R. air strength is numerically superior in the ratio of approximately two to one. But due to a large proportion of obsolescent aircraft and to a low rate of serviceability its overall effectiveness has until recently been low. As a result, the Germans have been able to prevent the U.S.S.R. from establishing effective air superiority in any large sector. This advantage is rapidly being lost as the proportion of first-line aircraft is increased and combat efficiency improved.

b. Mediterranean Front. The Axis forces available for the defense of this front are for the most part Italian, although Germany has recently sent ground reinforcements to both Italy and the Balkans. Axis ground strength in this area is believed to be disposed as follows (28 July):

	Italian divisions		German divisions	Bulgarian divisions
	Field	Coastal
French Coast	5	2	6	—
Corsica	2	2	—	—
Sardinia	3	2	1	—
Sicily	5†	2‡	3½	—
Italy	11	6	3	—
Balkans–Aegean	31	—	18§	20

Axis air strength in this area was approximately as follows (24 July):

	Italian Total	(Fighter)	German Total	(Fighters)
Central Med.	1050	(475)	945	(320)
Eastern Med.	350	(100)	180	(45)

The Italian battleships and cruisers seem likely to continue inactive. Naval defense will depend primarily on Italian and German submarines, motor torpedo boats, and possibly destroyers.

Movement of German ground forces into and within Italy has hitherto indicated an intention to defend the peninsula. Twelve additional divisions are available in France for reinforcement. However, the apparent reluctance of the Italians to fight, and the instability of the internal situation in Italy brings the capability into question. The repercussions of an Italian collapse would be particularly serious in the Balkans.

c. Western Front. Germany has fortified the coast from Hendaye to Petsamo and can offer formidable resistance to any attempted landing. She cannot, however, prevent heavy aerial bombardment of the industrial bases of her military power in western Germany.

The coastal defenses are particularly strong and in depth from Brittany to Holland (the area in which a landing could be supported by land-based fighters) and are backed by two interior defensive zones in advance of the reversed Maginot Line and the West Wall. There are in France and the Low Countries 44 German divisions, 14 more than the estimated defensive minimum.

In Norway (exclusive of the Kirkenes area) there are 12 German divisions supported by approximately 200 aircraft. German defensive capabilities are enhanced by the presence of major naval units (Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, and Luetzow).

d. The Bomber Offensive. The scale of bombing attacks on Germany’s vital centers is steadily increasing. Due to improvements in equipment and bombing technique the weight of bombs now being dropped monthly is more than three times that of a year ago. Far greater precision, penetration and saturation of targets is being achieved. This rising scale of effectiveness must be considered in any assessment based upon past results.

In the Ruhr, where German heavy industry is principally concentrated, the bomber offensive has effected a reduction of about 30% in normal production. In Axis Europe as a whole, it is believed to have effected a gross reduction in mine and manufacturing output of between 5 and 10%. Due to the fact that the reduction in industrial production to date has been largely confined to primary and semi-fabricated materials, its effect upon the military potential cannot be expected to be immediate and direct. However, since no considerable relocation of vital war industries is practicable, and since the range of bombing flights is increasing, the results so far achieved justify the expectation that the long-range effects of bombing attacks, if continued and intensified, will seriously impair the ability of the Axis to equip and supply its forces in the field.

The possibility of offsetting production losses in part by utilizing spare capacity exists in the coke and iron and steel industries as well as certain branches of the chemical industry; cuts in non-military consumption of some chemical products can be made without serious sacrifice.

Of great importance in a general assessment of the results of the offensive, is the consideration of the imponderable effects upon the civil population. Increasing casualties, extensive destruction of housing (about 16% of the population of the Ruhr have already been made homeless), disruption of transportation and public services with consequent food and water shortages, constant fear and nights of sleeplessness, have greatly increased the strain upon the people. With no prospect of relief from continuous and more intense bombing, and with hope of ultimate victory waning, further deterioration in morale may be expected.

e. The War Against Shipping. The destruction of shipping by the European Axis, after rising to almost two million G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1942 and continuing near that level during the two remaining quarters of the year, dropped sharply to 1.3 million G.R.T. during the first quarter of 1943 and to 0.6 million during the second. Attacks by German and Italian submarines accounted during each of these periods for 80 to 95% of the destruction of tonnage by the European Axis—90% or more during the last three—and for 70 to 80% of the combined destruction of tonnage by the European Axis and by Japan.

The net results of all efforts at destruction by the European Axis and by Japan, of the losses of vessels from all other causes, and of new construction, on the tonnage available to the United Nations have been approximately as follows:

(1) The tanker tonnage available on 1 July 1943 was less by 700,000 G.R.T. than at the beginning of 1942, but was greater by 400,000 G.R.T. than at its low points reached during that year. This tonnage increased 300,000 G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new construction of 470,000 less losses of 170,000 G.R.T.).

(2) The non-tanker tonnage available was greater by nearly four million G.R.T. on 1 July; 1943 than at the beginning of 1942. This tonnage increased 2.6 million G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new construction of 3.3 less losses of 0.7 million G.R.T.).

A great increase has unquestionably occurred during the past year or more in the difficulties and hazards experienced by Axis submarines in locating and attacking suitable shipping targets. This has resulted not only in a marked downward trend in the rate of destruction of shipping, but also in a marked upward trend in the rate of loss of submarines. During May, June, and July of this year the losses of German submarines may have equalled their average rate of production; and the losses of Italian submarines probably exceeded theirs. Another result in evidence during July has been a marked shift of German and Italian submarines from the main convoy routes to other areas where targets, though fewer, tend to be less well protected by anti-submarine forces.

No marked drop in the morale of German submarine personnel can be said to have occurred, though there have been various indications of some degree of deterioration, especially in security consciousness. There are many indications of a shortage of well trained personnel.

Whatever steps Germany may now take to overcome her loss of headway in the war against shipping must be taken in face of large increases in the advantage and momentum gained by the United Nations and in face of the persistent tendency of technical developments to be more favorable to the anti-submarine forces than to the submarine. But by continuing her submarine warfare against shipping Germany can at least prevent the United Nations from diverting to other channels the huge amounts of manpower, energy, and materials which they must then devote to countermeasures.

4. The Situation in the Satellite Countries.

a. Italy. The fall of Mussolini is indicative of the unstable situation in Italy. The immediate purpose of Badoglio’s appointment appears to have been to arrest serious internal disintegration. Although he may succeed in rallying the Italians for the time being, increased resistance, even with German reinforcement, cannot now protect Italy from the ravages of war, and so offers no escape from the predicament which produced the internal crisis. On the other hand, the presence of German forces and absence from the peninsula of the greater portion of the Italian Army (45 out of 57 firstline divisions) may prevent Badoglio from escape by negotiation with the United Nations. If effective relief from Allied attack is not soon obtained, the internal situation will continue to disintegrate.

b. Hungary anal Rumania. Because of the vital importance to her of Rumanian oil and of Hungarian communications and oil, Germany will maintain a firm grip on both countries as long as she is able, but each would be glad to escape (unless the tide turns toward Germany). Both fear the U.S.S.R. Each is hostile toward the other. Each would seek terms guaranteeing protection against the other and against the U.S.S.R. as well as against Germany.

c. Bulgaria has undertaken no more than the defense of her sphere of interest in the Balkans (including Greek and Yugoslav territory) and particularly has insisted on maintaining diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

d. Finland is bound to Germany by her fear of the U.S.S.R., her dependence on Germany for essential supplies, and the presence of German troops. She would willingly withdraw from the war if these problems could be solved. She maintains contact with the United Nations through continued relations with the United States.

5. The Situation in Occupied Countries.

a. Norway. Strong undercover resistance to German occupation continues unabated.

b. Denmark. Although Denmark has been set up as a model for the “New Order,” receiving exceptionally mild treatment, anti-German sentiment continues in relatively passive form.

c. The Low Countries. Hostility toward Germany exists in both countries, although less bitter in Belgium than in Holland.

d. France. Although the puppet regime at Vichy is being forced into closer collaboration, hostility toward Germany is general and underground resistance appears to be well organized.

e. Poland. Although an effective national underground organization exists, the situation is complicated by a boundary dispute with the U.S.S.R. and the presence of Russian guerrillas and various Russian-influenced underground organizations independent of the Polish government in London.

f. Yugoslavia. German and Italian forces have conducted extensive operations to eliminate guerrilla activity, but such resistance continues on a reduced scale. Although guerrilla forces which recognize the government-in-exile and others which are influenced by the U.S.S.R. have clashed, latest reports indicate that some degree of coordination between them may have been established.

g. Greece. Some underground and guerrilla activity exists, but the country is so exhausted that little effective military assistance can be expected. There is considerable opposition to a restoration of the government of King George II.

h. Occupied Russia. Considerable guerrilla activity continues behind the German lines. German efforts to organize anti-Communist Russian forces have had only limited success.

6. The Attitudes of European Neutrals.

a. Sweden is firm in her neutrality and is taking a stronger attitude than formerly in her relations with Germany. Public expression of sympathy with the United Nations, especially with Norway, is increasingly permitted.

b. Switzerland. Despite their isolation, the Swiss have succeeded in maintaining a firmly neutral attitude.

c. Spain. The steadily mounting show of power of the Western United Nations in the Mediterranean area has impressed the high command of the Spanish Army that Franco’s past alignment was wrong. The Falange is very unpopular with the people in Spain. Liberals and conservatives including those elements in favor of a restoration of the monarchy have been estranged by Franco pronouncements and it is now clear that the Army holds the key to the Spanish situation.

Franco himself has given no indication of abandoning his proposed belief in the Spanish types of totalitarianism which he has rechristened “Unitarianism” and which he claims is peculiarly suited to the Spanish people. He has maintained that all nations, including the United Nations, will emerge from the war with some form of totalitarianism. Whether these beliefs arise from sincere conviction or whether it is that he has been so sheltered and isolated that he has recently been unable to gauge the sentiments and strength of the United Nations or the feeling of his own people cannot be ascertained.

The Army high command, convinced of the change in the international and domestic situation, have let it be known that they intend to confront Franco with the true picture, and call for an immediate restoration of the monarchy with a liberalized constitution before it is too late.

Franco has said that he would resist any invasion of Spanish soil, whether by the Western United Nations or by the Axis, and it is generally believed that he would keep his word. A junta of generals representing the most popular element in the army are reported to have agreed that they would resist any such invasion, irrespective of Franco’s decision, and would depose him if he declined to take the leadership or showed signs of aligning himself more closely with the Axis.

It is therefore considered possible that under increasing pressure of events, Franco may, in order to hold his position, seek United Nations support.

d. Portugal. Although remaining neutral, Portugal now leans toward the United Nations.

e. Turkey. Although well disposed toward Great Britain and the United States, Turkey is not apt to make an early departure from her position of neutrality. Her fear of Soviet domination of the Balkans, however, will probably lead her to active participation in the war, when it can be done at minimum cost, in order to obtain a voice in the peace settlement.

7. Summary of the Existing Situation.

The situation of the European Axis has definitely deteriorated during the past year. The war against shipping, which was to prevent effective support of United Nations operations from overseas, has failed to accomplish that purpose. German air strength has proved insufficient to meet all defensive requirements; in particular, the G.A.F. has been unable to challenge Allied air superiority in the Mediterranean or to prevent devastating aerial bombardment of western Germany. Although the German Army has been brought to peak strength by scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel, it has not been able, at that strength, to eliminate the Russian threat in time to gain for Germany freedom of action in dealing with attack from the west and south. As a result of aerial bombardment and manpower shortage, German war production has begun to decline. Italy is reeling under direct attack, and the other satellites cannot be relied upon in similar circumstances.

Although Germany cannot now impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States in combination, the High Command, the armed forces, and the German people still hope to gain an acceptable and even advantageous negotiated peace by stubborn resistance and by diplomacy.

8. Courses of Action Open to Germany, 1943–44.

a. To Continue the War Against Shipping. Germany will follow this course to the end, to the best of her ability, regardless of what other courses she may adopt.

b. To Seek a Decision in Russia. Only by the destruction of the Soviet armies can Germany completely free herself of her huge commitment in the east in order to concentrate her forces against her enemies in the west. The lateness of the season and the course of operations around Kursk would seem to indicate that she cannot accomplish this in 1943. In 1944 she will have less force available for the purpose.

c. To Seek During 1943 To Improve Her Defensive Position in the U.S.S.R. and To Impair or Destroy Soviet Offensive Capabilities. This would be the best alternative to b as a means of reducing her commitment in the east in order to meet attack in the west in 1944. It may be the object of current German operations in Russia. So far the Germans have failed to straighten their Russian front by the recapture of Kursk. They may hope that the battle of attrition at Orel will significantly impair Soviet strength. Attrition, however, is double-edged.

e. To Undertake Offensive Operations in the West or South. Such a course would sacrifice her advantage of position and expose the forces engaged to destruction. Moreover, she lacks the requisite air and naval strength to conduct such an operation. The present deployment of the German Army indicates that this course has been discarded for 1943. It will be even less feasible in 1944.

Since an invasion of Spain is the only overland operation which Germany can undertake in this direction, we examine that capability in greater detail.

By crossing the Pyrenees, where the rail net changes to a different gauge from that standard in central Europe, and where both road and rail communications are subject to interdiction by aerial attack, any forces so committed are subject to denial of supply and reinforcement.

At present Germany is believed to have 186 operational aircraft (mostly long-range bombers) now disposed in Southern France. Any build-up of air support for an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula at this time could be made only by a transfer of operational aircraft from other theaters where German air strength is inadequate to meet, successfully, its commitments. The Germans have the capability of increasing the strength now in Southern France to from 500 to 600 aircraft by withdrawals from Italy and the Western front. In the event such an undertaking were accepted as a calculated risk, the complications of supply and maintenance will reduce effectiveness to below 30% by the end of the first month. Germany could presumably divert 250 transport aircraft (Ju–52) to this zone of operations within a week, from her strength of 1250 transports (of which 40% are non-operational in Central Germany), and possibly another 250, including 25 Me 323’s, within two weeks; but this would leave her practically without transport aircraft on other fronts. The Ju–52 has a range of about 780 miles, which would enable it to be flown from southern France (Bayonne) to Madrid and return without refueling. It is not believed that, except for limited offensive strikes, the German Air Force could advance through a hostile Spain any more rapidly than the ground force, owing to logistical problems and inability to protect advanced airdromes. The available airdromes, though scattered, are believed to be adequate for such aircraft as might be used, apart from logistical considerations.

It is estimated that 12 German divisions will be required in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. Seven divisions have actually been identified in those areas and there are indications that an additional five are “ear marked” for Italy. In France, where we believe the German strategic reserve to be stationed, there will then remain 11 divisions available for use in Spain above what we believe to be the minimum defensive commitment there. To these could be added one division from Germany and another from Denmark. We believe that none of these 13 divisions are up to pre-Stalingrad standards in training and combat efficiency. We further believe that to successfully accomplish an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, even with no Spanish resistance, would require 12 German divisions. We believe that the Spanish will not cooperate. We believe that to accomplish this mission at least 20 German divisions would be required against Spanish resistance augmented by United Nations forces as they become available. We believe that such an operation would originate from Southern France where, along the Spanish border there are now only two divisions disposed.

The German comb-out and call-up of the fall of 1942 has we believe, extracted practically all available German man-power except oncoming classes. If casualties continue at approximately the same rate as 1941 and 1942, Germany will not be able to maintain existing Army strength. As the Western United Nations continue to expand their capabilities in England and the Mediterranean, German defensive commitments will increase and in consequence less force will be available in 1944 for such an invasion.

Such a course of action might, in desperation, be adopted by Germany, in order to create a situation for the negotiation of an acceptable peace with the United States and Great Britain. The poorly equipped Spanish ground forces, with practically no air support, are not presently deployed to resist Axis penetration. Even if the military successes or diplomatic pressure of the United Nations should bring about the redisposition of these Spanish forces essentially to block the Pyrenees, German forces would probably still be capable of occupying strategic areas threatening the Straits of Gibraltar unless United Nations’ forces intervene. From bases in southern Spain, the German Air Force might temporarily interrupt the passage of our convoys through the Straits of Gibraltar. Should the United Nations increase their commitments in the Central Mediterranean and penetrate deeper into the Axis Citadel from this area, the temptation to interdict their vital artery of communication correspondingly increases.

e. To Stand on the Strategic Defensive. This is the present German attitude in the west and south and may be forced upon Germany in the east as well. It is a negative course which cannot bring victory, but may serve to avert complete defeat. Its adoption would not preclude counter-offensive action to destroy or expel any United Nations force which gained a lodgment on the continent.

f. To Abandon Outlying Territory (e.g., Norway, France, Italy, Greece, portions of Russia, Finland) in order to conserve and concentrate strength. The consequent impairment of her military, economic, political, or psychological situation will not permit Germany to adopt this course voluntarily.

g. To Sue for Peace. Germany is probably already willing to accept a negotiated peace, but is unable to obtain acceptable terms from the United Nations. In this situation, if she cannot conduct a successful defense on all fronts, she will seek to divide her enemies and obtain an acceptable negotiated peace with one party in order to concentrate against the other. Although a separate peace with Great Britain and the United States might be preferable to her, one with the U.S.S.R. might be more practicable and might appear to be advantageous.

Actual or virtual surrender will remain unacceptable so long as there is hope of achieving a stalemate or a negotiated peace. Should the High Command conclude that surrender is inevitable, it may try to yield to the U.S.S.R. or to Great Britain and the United States separately, whichever course offers the better prospect at that time, meanwhile trying to hold off the other party.

9. Germany’s Most Probable Courses of Action, 1943–1944.

a. To continue the war against shipping.

b. To endeavor, during 1943, to improve her defensive position in Russia and to impair Soviet offensive capabilities by attrition.

c. To stand on the strategic defensive in the west and south during 1943 and on all fronts during 1944.

d. To abandon outlying territory only under compulsion.

e. If surrender becomes inevitable, to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or to Great Britain and the United States, whichever course offers the better prospect at that time.

10. Forecast for 1943–1944.

a. The German war against shipping will continue, but probably with diminishing effect.

b. The bomber offensive against Germany will have cumulative effect destructive of the German industrial potential, the G.A.F. fighter force, the air defenses, and morale. It may create conditions within the country which will facilitate and hasten complete military defeat.

c. Germany will continue to resist as long as hope persists that thereby she may gain a negotiated peace. When surrender becomes inevitable, she may seek to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or Great Britain and the United States, whichever course offers the better prospect to her at that time.

d. The German satellites (Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland) will collapse or come to terms whenever forced to bear the brunt of direct and sustained attack or whenever relieved of fear of Germany and of the U.S.S.R.

1. Circulated as an enclosure to the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (300/1), August 7, 1943: “The enclosure is submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quadrant Conference.”
2. As herein conceived, “Festung Europa” consists of an essential core (roughly Germany itself, most of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania), surrounded by outer defensive and auxiliary areas. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Four badly depleted. One fresh regiment has arrived. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Three others have disintegrated. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Six defensive. [Footnote in the source text.]