J. C. S. Files
Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff 1
C. C. S. 153/1
Situation To Be Created in the Eastern Theater (Pacific and Burma) in 1943
1. We have been instructed by the British Chiefs of Staff to comment on the paper by the Joint U. S. Staff Planners on the situation [Page 758] to be created in the Eastern Theater (Pacific and Burma) in 1943 (C.C.S. 153).2
2. Our comments are as follows:
Assumptions:
(a) Paragraph 1:
We feel that this should be reworded as follows:
“The Combined Planners assume that the ultimate objective of the basic global strategy is to bring the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest practicable date. The quickest way of achieving this will be to concentrate on defeating Germany first and then to concentrate our combined resources against Japan. Meanwhile such pressure must be maintained in Japan as will prevent her from damaging interests vital to the Allies, and will hinder her from consolidating her conquests.”
(b) Paragraph 2:
We concur.
Situation To Be Created:
(c) Paragraphs 3–10:
We agree in principle with this expression of the strategy required, provided always that its application does not prejudice the earliest possible defeat of Germany.
Operations:
(d) Paragraphs 11–12:
We suggest the following alternative:
The operations which are certainly required in 1943 to create and maintain the situation set forth above are:
- (a)
- Seizure of, and consolidation of United Nations forces in the Solomons, Eastern New Guinea up to the Lae-Salamaua peninsula, New Britain-New Ireland (Rabaul) area.
- (b)
- Burma—Limited operations during the present favorable
weather period:
- (1)
- To recapture and establish air forces at Akyab ( Cannibal ).
- (2)
- To establish a bridgehead in the Chindwin Valley so that, when an attack on Rangoon is made, simultaneous pressure can be exerted on Mandalay ( Ravenous ).
- (3)
- To construct the Hukawng Valley road from Ledo to Myitkyina and Lungling.
The additions to present forces in the Pacific theater required for these operations must depend upon the strength of Japanese dispositions but will be of the following general order:
- Ground forces . . . . . . . . . .
- Aircraft . . . . . . . . . .
- Navy . . . . . . . . . .
- Amphibious forces . . . . . . . . . .
- Shipping . . . . . . . . . .
No forces additional to those now present will be required in Burma.
12. With the successful completion of the operations outlined in the preceding paragraph, a new offensive will be necessary if we are to retain the initiative and thereby contain disposable Japanese strength.
Detailed plans for undertaking the following further operations, though not necessarily in the order given, should therefore be made; but, since the timing must depend upon the speed with which the earlier operations in the Rabaul–New Guinea area are concluded, a decision whether or not to launch these further operations should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff later in the year.
- (a)
- The seizure and occupation of Kiska-Agattu (Western Aleutians).
- (b)
- The seizure and occupation of the Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands up to and including Truk.
- (c)
- Extension of occupation of New Guinea up to approximately the Dutch border. This will be an extension of the Truk campaign.
For these operations the additional forces required will be of the order of:
- Ground forces . . . . . . . . . .
- Aircraft . . . . . . . . . .
- Navy . . . . . . . . . .
- Amphibious forces . . . . . . . . . .
- Shipping . . . . . . . . . .
13. Detailed plans for operations to reopen the Burma Road ( Anakim ) during the winter of 1943–44 will also be made. It is not possible at this stage to say by when the forces required for this operation could be provided without detracting seriously from the defeat of Germany. Orders for the completion of full administrative preparations by October 1, 1943, have, however, already been given and planning is proceeding in India.
The forces additional to those now in the theater required for this operation must depend upon enemy strength and dispositions at the time but will be of the following order:
| Ground forces | Nil |
| Aircraft | 18 squadrons |
| Naval forces | Covering forces as may be found
necessary in the light of the naval situation at the
time. As much as practicable would be found from British
resources. 6–8 Escort Carriers 40 Destroyers or Escort Vessels |
| Amphibious forces | Assault shipping and landing craft sufficient to lift 4 Inf. Brigade Groups and 1 Armored Brigade. |
| Shipping | 60 MT
ships 20 Personnel ships |
14. It is certain that the provision of the naval and amphibious forces required for simultaneous Truk and Anakim operations cannot but react adversely on the early defeat of Germany. It may be possible to carry out one of these operations without such a violation of our agreed strategy. The decision as to the right course of action should be taken later in the light of the development of the war.