Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J.C.S. Files

Report by the United States Joint Staff Planners¹

secret
C.C.S. 153 (Revised)

[Casablanca,] January 17, 1943.

Situation To Be Created in the Eastern Theater (Namely Pacific and Burma) in 1943

Assumptions:

1. The Combined Planners assume

that the ultimate objective of the basic global strategy is to bring the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest practicable date;

that in gaining this objective efforts must be made toward the destruction of the economic and military power of all our adversaries at a rate exceeding their power of replacement;

that Germany is recognized as the primary or most powerful and pressing enemy;

and that the major portion of the forces of the United Nations are to be directed against Germany insofar as it is consistent with the overall objective of bringing the war to an early conclusion at the earliest possible date.

2. Tentative assumptions are made

that the present situation as between Russia and Japan will continue,

and that the Chinese will continue in the war if sufficient support is furnished by Great Britain and the United States in the way of supplies and equipment.

Situation To Be Created:

3. We consider that the accomplishment of the over-all objective, as well as the maintenance of the security of our position in the Pacific, requires that the Japanese be kept under continual pressure sufficient in power and extent to absorb the disposable Japanese military effort.

4. The United Nations’ positions in the Pacific are extended over a line roughly 12,000 miles long—from the Bering Sea, through the Hawaiian Islands, Samoa, Fiji, New Guinea and Northwest Australia, to Singapore. The Japanese, strongly established, occupy interior lines which permit offensive action by their mobile forces against any of the Allied positions—unless these mobile forces are denied freedom of action.

5. The United Nations’ positions have depth at certain points, as in Alaska, Hawaii, and New Caledonia, New Guinea. The positions between Hawaii and New Caledonia have little depth and are susceptible to successful enemy attack, if these attacking forces are free to move. Some of the United Nations’ positions (i.e., on the larger islands) are capable of strong defensive establishments. Other positions such as the smaller islands, like Canton, cannot be strongly defended. Economy in defensive strength of the larger islands, and security of the smaller islands, require that we maintain the initiative by offensive action. This offensive action must be directed against Japanese objectives of sufficient importance to the Japanese as to cause Japanese counteraction; they must be sufficient in power to combat successfully this Japanese counteraction.

6. By this process we intend to prevent the Japanese the opportunity for consolidating (digging in), thus strengthening their positions, to an extent that would permit them to initiate offensive action at times and places of their choosing.

7. We consider that Japanese power in respect to shipping and aircraft has been getting progressively weaker; that our attacks against shipping, particularly by submarines, should be pushed to the maximum extent possible; and that our offensive action should be designed to effect a continuing decrease in Japanese naval and air power.

8. To maintain the security of our possessions in the Pacific and to contain in the Pacific area the Japanese Fleet, it is necessary to continue in that area the major portion of the United States Fleet. To give full implementation to this naval force, it is necessary that sufficient mobile ground forces, air forces, and shipping be available in that area to undertake continuing limited offensives against Japanese possessions. The character of these offensive actions envisaged for 1943 are set forth in subsequent paragraphs.

9. In planning these offensive operations in the Pacific, we take note that the ability of the United Nations to project military actions against the enemy in all areas is limited by shipping. In the Atlantic there is a further serious limitation caused by the lack of adequate numbers of escorts. Until the escort problem is improved, the amount of shipping which can be moved in the Atlantic is definitely limited. This same consideration of limitation of escort capacity does not at present apply to the Pacific, because of comparative absence of submarine menace in that area at this time.

10. The adverse situation in regard to the number of escorts available in comparison to the number of submarine packs operating in the Atlantic, and to the convoy needs in the Atlantic, will not begin to show relative improvement before October.

Operations:

11. The prospective operations to create and maintain the situation in 1943 set forth above are:

(a) Seizure and consolidation of United Nations forces in the Solomon Islands, Eastern New Guinea up to Lae Salamaua peninsula, New Britain-New Ireland (Rabaul) area.

(b) Seizure and occupation of Kiska-Agattu (Western Aleutians).

(c) Seizure and occupation of Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands, up to and including Truk. It is planned that these operations will be undertaken subsequent to Rabaul.

(d) Extension of occupation of New Guinea up to approximately the Dutch border. This will be an extension of the Truk campaign for the second part.

(3) [e?] Burma campaign. Limited operations during present favorable weather conditions such as to permit improvement of communications from India to China, to be followed by more extended operations towards the end of the year with the objective of reestablishing the communications along the lower Burma Road. The objective of this campaign is to strengthen forces in China with the view to keeping China in the war, keeping pressure on the Japanese in this area, and to the establishment and operation of air strength on Japanese shipping in Chinese and Indo-China ports as well as on the flank of Japanese sea communications along the China coast.

12. The increase of forces in the Pacific–Burma area in 1943 for the operations listed above will depend largely on the strength of Japanese dispositions. They will be of this general order:

• Ground Forces, including air personnel—250,000 troops
• U. S. and U. K.—500 airplanes
• Navy—The major portion of additions (by new construction) to the U. S. Fleet, while maintaining in the Atlantic present large ship strength and increasing destroyer and antisubmarine escort in the Atlantic.
• Increase in strength of the British Eastern fleet sufficient to support operations against Burma.
• Shipping 1,250,000 tons

1. Circulated under a covering note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (not printed) which observed that this paper was a “partial report” prepared in pursuance of the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (at their meeting on January 14, ante, p. 556) to the Combined Staff Planners “to report on the basis that Germany is the primary enemy, what situation do we wish to establish in the Eastern Theater (i.e., the Pacific and Burma) in 1943 and what forces will be necessary to establish this situation”.

   This paper was discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on January 18, 1943, ante, p. 617, following a postponement of such a discussion at the meeting of January 17, 1943, ante, p. 601.