Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff¹

secret
C.C.S. 135/1

January 2, 1943.

Basic Strategic Concept for 1943—The European Theater

1. We have considered the Memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their recommendations for a Basic Strategic Concept for 1943 as set out in C.C.S. 135. We had ourselves prepared a paper on somewhat similar lines setting out our conception of what should be the American-British strategy in 1943. This is being circulated separately as C.C.S. 135/2.² On most issues we are in agreement with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The main point of difference between us is that we advocate a policy of following up “ Torch” vigorously, accompanied by as large a “ Bolero” build-up as possible, while the U. S. Chiefs of Staff favor putting our main effort into “Round-Up” while adopting a holding policy in the Mediterranean, other than in the air. We therefore submit the following comments on the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with particular reference to strategy in the European theater.

2. In support of our arguments we have divided our examination into two parts:

(a) What is the largest Anglo-American Force that can be assembled in the United Kingdom by August 1943 for re-entering France, and what would be the effect of assembling this force on operations in other theaters.

(b) What can we expect to achieve if we follow up “ Torch” by offensive operations in the Mediterranean, and what forces can then be assembled in the United Kingdom for re-entering France.

Maximum “ Bolero”.

3. If we go for the maximum “ Bolero” we calculate that the strongest land force, which we can assemble in the United Kingdom in August for an attack upon Northern France, will be—British 13 Divisions, United States 12 Divisions (at the very most).

4. Of the above, 6 divisions (4 British and 2 United States) is the maximum which could be organized as assault forces with the shipping and landing craft which can be made available, assuming that the highest priority is given to combined operational manning, training and repair requirements—possibly at the expense of the fleet.

5. The assembly of the above forces would have the following effects:—

On the Axis.

(a) We should have to accept only a small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy from now onwards. This would be due to giving a higher priority to the passage of United States soldiers across the Atlantic and to the need for bringing over a larger proportion of Army cooperation type United States aircraft, i.e., fighters and light bombers.

(b) The abandonment of “ Brimstone” and “ Husky” and any amphibious operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On Turkey.

(c) There would be enough Divisions left over in the Mediterranean and Middle East area to support Turkey but these could not be used for offensive amphibious operations owing to lack of shipping and assault craft. Turkey could not fail to notice an easement of the pressure on Italy.

On China.

(d) We could not do “ Anakim” in 1943 because all available landing craft would be wanted in the United Kingdom.

6. We emphasize that even if we accepted the above curtailment of our activities in other theaters, we should still be unable to stage an expedition on an adequate scale to overcome strong German resistance. The scale of “Round-Up” as originally planned was a total of 48 British and American Divisions. In the meanwhile the defenses on the French coast have been greatly strengthened. It is also to be noted that we cannot carry out even this reduced “Round-Up” until August. In other words Russia would get no relief for mother 7 or 8 months and the Axis would have a similar period to recuperate.

The “ Torch” Follow-Up.

7. If, on the other hand, we decide to exploit “ Torch” during the spring of 1943 we consider that the effects would be as follows:—

On the Axis.

(a) We should have a good chance of knocking out Italy by a combination of amphibious operations (such as “ Brimstone” and “ Husky” and consequential assaults on the mainland of Italy), and an air offensive on the largest scale.

(b) We can ensure bringing the Axis air force to battle in the Mediterranean but, without surface operations, this cannot be guaranteed.

(c) We can greatly increase the number of Bombers arriving in the United Kingdom “for offensive action against the Axis.

(d) German forces will be pinned in Northwest Europe by the build-up of the reduced “ Bolero.” (See paragraph 8 below.) Even though this build-up would be at a slower rate owing to other activities the enemy will not dare to relax their state of readiness to meet invasion.

On Turkey.

(e) We shall have some Divisions, air squadrons and aircraft to spare to help Turkey. Turkey is much more likely to come into the war on our side if she sees us putting Italy out as we should hope to do during 1943. With Turkey on our side we should be well placed for offensive operations against Crete and the Dodecanese, and possibly also the Balkans.

On China.

(f) We can probably do “ Anakim” in the winter of 1943.

8. We calculate that if we adopt the above policy it would still be possible to assemble in the United Kingdom a force of some 21 British and United States Divisions by the late summer to take advantage of any opportunity which may occur for reentering France. To do this it would be necessary to decide by the first of May at the expense of further amphibious operations.

Relief to Russia.

9. Our Intelligence Staffs have made an assessment^* which brings out the relief to Russia which an offensive Mediterranean policy might achieve. This shows that if we force Italy out of the war and the Germans try to maintain their line in Russia at its present length they will be some 54 divisions and 2,200 aircraft short of what they need on all fronts. This forecast is of course highly speculative but if the defection of Italy were to be followed by that of the other satellite nations the German deficiency would be still further increased.

10. Whether we adopt a maximum “ Bolero” or concentrate on the “ Torch” follow-up, we should be able to run a limited number of convoys to Russia.

The Axis Oil Situation.

11. The strongest argument against allowing Germany any respite in the near future is that during the next five months her oil situation will be critical. Any measures therefore that force her to go on using up her oil stocks may have a profound effect on her ability to prosecute the war.

Conclusions.

12. To sum up we consider that our policy should be—

(a) To exploit “ Torch” as vigorously as possible with a view to

(1) Knocking Italy out of the war.

(2) Bringing Turkey into the war, and

(3) Giving the Axis no respite for recuperation.

(b) Increased bombing of Germany.

(c) Maintenance of supplies to Russia.

(d) The build-up of “ Bolero” on the greatest scale that the above operations permit in order that we may be ready to reenter the Continent with about 21 Divisions in August or September 1943, if the conditions are such that there is a good prospect of success. We believe that this policy will afford earlier and greater relief both direct and indirect to Russia than if we were to concentrate on “ Bolero” to the exclusion of all other operations, observing that at the best we could not put a force of more than 25 Divisions on to the Continent in late summer of 1943.

1. Regarding the disposition of this memorandum, see footnote 1, ante, p. 735.
2. Infra.
3. Has been despatched from London by air. As soon as it is received in Washington will be circulated as an annex to this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]