J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff1

secret
C.C.S. 135

Basic Strategic Concept for 1943

References: (a) ABC–12
(b) ABC–4/CS–1 (WW–1)3
(c) C.C.S. 914
(d) C.C.S. 945
(e) C.C.S. 97/66
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Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed, in the light of current developments, references (a) to (e), inclusive, covering the evolution of United Nations strategy, for the purpose of determining what adjustments, if any, are necessary or desirable at this time, in the basic strategic concept.

conclusions and recommendations

2. The present basic strategic concept of the United Nations, reduced to its simplest form, has been stated,

“To conduct the strategic offensive with maximum forces in the Atlantic-Western European theater at the earliest practicable date, and to maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters with appropriate forces.”

In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this concept, while basically sound, should be restated with a view to setting forth more exactly the strategic concept as regards the Pacific theater. The following statement is proposed:

“Conduct a strategic offensive in the Atlantic-Western European theater directly against Germany, employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining the accepted strategic concept in other theaters. Continue offensive and defensive operations in the Pacific and in Burma to break the Japanese hold on positions which threaten the security of our communications and positions. Maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters.

“It is well understood that the strategic concept contained herein is based on the strategic situation as it exists and can be foreseen at this time, and that it is subject to alteration in keeping with the changing situation.”

3. It is recommended that the following (see paragraph 4) be approved as the strategic objectives of the United Nations in support of the basic strategic concept as stated above. In arriving at its recommendations the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken note:

(a)
That Germany is our primary enemy;
(b)
That Russia is exerting great pressure on Germany and is absorbing the major part of her war effort;
(c)
That Russia’s continuance as a major factor in the war is of cardinal importance;
(d)
That timely and substantial support of Russia, directly by supplies and indirectly by offensive operations against Germany, must be a basic factor in our strategic policy.
(e)
That until such time as major offensive operations can be undertaken against Japan, we must prevent her from consolidating and exploiting her conquests by rendering all practicable support to China and by inflicting irreplaceable losses on Japanese naval, shipping, and air resources.
(f)
That a prerequisite to the successful accomplishment of the strategic concept for 1943 is an improvement in the present critical [Page 737] shipping situation by intensified and more effective anti-submarine warfare.

4. Strategic objectives:

(a) Western Hemisphere and United Kingdom.

Maintain the security, the productive capacity, and the essential communications of the Western Hemisphere and of the British Isles.

(b) Western Europe.

Insure that the primary effort of the United Nations is directed against Germany rather than against her satellite states by:

(1)
Conducting from bases in United Kingdom, Northern Africa, and as practicable from the Middle East, an integrated air offensive on the largest practicable scale against German production and resources, designed to achieve a progressive deterioration of her war effort.
(2)
Building up as rapidly as possible adequate balanced forces in the United Kingdom in preparation for a land offensive against Germany in 1943.

(c) North Africa.

Expel the Axis forces from North Africa, and thereafter:

(1)
Consolidate and hold that area with the forces adequate for its security, including the forces necessary to maintain our lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar against an Axis or Spanish effort;
(2)
Exploit the success of the North African operations by establishing large scale air installations in North Africa and by conducting intensive air operations against Germany and against Italy with a view to destroying Italian resources and morale, and eliminating her from the war;
(3)
Transfer any excess forces from North Africa to the U. K. for employment there as part of the build-up for the invasion of Western Europe in 1943.

(d) Russia.

Support Russia to the utmost, by supplying munitions, by rendering all practicable air assistance from the Middle East and by making the principal offensive effort of 1943 directly against Germany in Western Europe.

(e) Middle East.

(1)
Maintain Turkey in a state of neutrality favorable to the United Nations until such time as she can, aided by supplies and minimum specialized forces, insure the integrity of her territory and make it available for our use.
(2)
If Turkey can then be brought into the war, conduct offensive air operations from bases on her northern coast, in aid of Russia and against German controlled resources and transportation facilities in the Balkans.

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(f) Pacific.

Conduct such offensive and defensive operations as are necessary to secure Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and our lines of communications thereto, and to maintain the initiative in the Solomon-Bismarck-East New Guinea Area with a view to controlling that area as a base for further offensive operations and involving Japan in costly counter operations.

(g) Far East.

Conduct offensive operations in Burma with a view to reopening the supply routes to China, thereby encouraging China, and supplying her with munitions to continue her war effort and maintain, available to us, bases essential for eventual offensive operations against Japan proper.

  1. According to C.C.S. 140, January 8, 1943, post, p. 752, the British Chiefs of Staff suggested that the first meeting of the forthcoming staff conference be devoted to a discussion of this memorandum and the two related memoranda by the British Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 135/1, January 2, 1943, and C.C.S. 135/2, January 3, 1943, infra. The issues considered in all three of these memoranda were taken up by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their initial conference meeting on January 14, 1943; see ante, p. 536.
  2. ABC–1, Report of United States-British Staff Conversations, March 27, 1941, the joint strategic plan drawn up by American and British staff planners at meetings held in Washington during January-March 1941. ABC–1 is reproduced in Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 1st sess., pursuant to S. Cong. Res. 27 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), pt. 15, exhibit 49, pp. 1485–1542. For accounts of the American-British staff conferences of January–March 1941, see Matloff and Snell, pp. 32–41 and Morton, pp. 86–89.
  3. ABC–4/CS–1 (WW–1), December 31, 1941, memorandum by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff entitled “American-British Grand Strategy”, ante, p. 214.
  4. C.C.S. 91, July 14, 1942, a paper by the Combined Staff Planners entitled “Strategic Policy and Deployment of U.S. and British Forces”, not printed. For a brief account of the origin and disposition of C.C.S. 91, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 279–280.
  5. C.C.S. 94, July 24, 1942, memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled “Operations in 1942/1943”, not printed. For an account of the evolution of C.C.S. 94, see Matloff and Snell, pp. 279–282 and 295–297.
  6. Not printed.