File No. 319.1123 L25/9.
Minister Price to
the Secretary of State.
No. 545.]
American Legation,
Panama,
June 25, 1915.
Sir: Referring to the riot in Colon April
2 last, between our soldiers and police and civilians of Panama, I
have the honor to report that there was loaned to this Legation last
week by Brigadier General C. R. Edwards, Military Commander of the
Canal Zone, a copy of the report of Colonel J. L. Chamberlain,
Inspector General of the United States Army, made by him of an
investigation conducted under his supervision between the 2d and 8th
days of April.
[Page 1202]
I have had a copy made of said report and herewith enclose same.
The last of the five recommendations made by Colonel Chamberlain in
his report is as follows:
5. That, with as little delay as possible, the control of
Panama and Colon and their environments be taken over by the
Canal Zone authorities; such control to embrace regulation
of the sale of liquor and “dope”, as well as sanitation,
prostitution, and police.
Colonel Chamberlain returned to the States along with Major General
Leonard Wood on April 5 but since his departure the further
investigation of the riot has been under the charge of Lieut. R. C.
F. Goetz, Aide-de-camp on the Staff of Brigadier General Edwards. I
am informed that he has just recently written his report and that
same is being transmitted to the usual channels of the Department of
War.
I have [etc.]
[Inclosure—Extract.]
Colonel Chamberlain’s Report.
No. 642 IOED.]
Headquarters Eastern
Department,
Office of the Inspector,
New York City,
April 20, 1915.
investigation of disturbances, city of
colon, panama.
- 1.
- Report of investigation of trouble between enlisted men,
U. S. Army, and Panaman police, and native civilians, which
occurred in the city of Colon, Panama, on the afternoon of
April 2, 1915, made in compliance with letter of
instructions dated April 3, 1915.
- 2.
- Accompanying this report is the recorded testimony of
about 225 witnesses, of whom about 30 are civilians; the
remainder are officers and enlisted men of the U. S. Army.
In addition to these witnesses many other persons were
interviewed. * * *
conclusions.
- 1.
- The immediate cause of the trouble in the first instance,
which occurred at the corner of Cash and 10th Streets, was
an accident which, had it occurred in a town under American
control, would have amounted to nothing.
- 2.
- In the events which immediately followed, the enlisted men
were not blameless, nor was their conduct all that could
have been desired. Yet I believe that interference by the
Panaman police was, under the circumstances, uncalled for,
and resort to fire arms, resulting in the wounding of three
men, wholly unwarranted.
- 3.
- The trouble at the close of the ball game on Broadway
appears to have been brought about by one or more trifling
events in which both sides were obviously equally at fault.
That same became general in so short a time and assumed
serious proportions, must, in my belief, be attributed to
the intensely hostile feeling existing between the negroes
and Panamans on the one side, and American soldiers and
civilians on the other.
- 4.
- Resort to gunfire by the police, resulting in the killing
of one soldier and wounding of another, while unwarranted,
was under the conditions, a natural sequence of the events
of a few moments before and of the general conditions
already described.
- 5.
- The conduct of the soldiers at the ball park and about the
street of Colon, prior to the trouble at Cash and 10th
Streets, was excellent. After the trouble began, the prompt
and energetic action of the officers and noncommissioned
officers averted what might have been a disastrous fight.
The men many of whom were recruits, many of whom had been
drinking to a greater or lesser extent, and all of whom were
much wrought up because of the casualties, were quickly
gotten under complete control. This, together with the
[Page 1203]
self-restraint
of the armed patrols when under fire, evinces on the whole a
good state of discipline. The men are not angels, nor were
their actions blameless—far from it. Yet, all things
considered, it is believed that their conduct as a body was
not open to severe criticism. Individuals were at fault, but
there appear to be no instances calling for disciplinary
action, except as hereinafter noted.
- 6.
- As set forth at length in this report, the trouble at
Colon on April 2, as well as former troubles of a similar
character, were due primarily to the intensely hostile
feeling between American civilians and soldiers on the one
hand, and the colored and native Panamans on the other,
conditions which unless remedied, will lead to disastrous
results. * * *
recommendations.
- * * * 4.
- The policeman who first opened fire, and those policemen
whose shots resulted in the death of Corporal Langdon and in
the wounding of Privates Klimp, Richeson, and Deloughery,
should be duly punished by the Panaman authorities. Their
identity is doubtless already known to the Panaman
authorities, but as to their action in the matter I do not
venture an opinion, since it is, among Americans, generally
believed that the police, as a body, are political henchmen
of the governing authorities. The Commanding General U. S.
troops, C. Z., has this matter in charge, and pending his
report no action is recommended.
- 5.
- That, with as little delay as possible, the control of
Panama and Colon and their environments be taken over by the
Canal Zone authorities; such control to embrace regulation
of the sale of liquor and “dope,” as well as sanitation,
prostitution, and police.
