File No. 793.94/397.
When it had been made known that an ultimatum would be delivered, the
Chinese officials were much perplexed as to whether it was wiser quietly
to await the delivery of the ultimatum or to attempt by further
concessions to placate the Japanese. During the six days from May 3 to
May 7 councils were held at the President’s residence almost daily. I
have been informed that on May 5, which is the diplomatic reception day
at the Foreign Office, the Ministers of Great Britain, Russia and France
took occasion to express to the Minister of Foreign Affairs their
opinion that it would be wise for China not to attempt armed resistance
to the demands of Japan. During May 6 certain conversations were held
between the Japanese Legation and the Foreign Office; I was informed
that the Counsellor of the Japanese Legation stated to the Vice Minister
for Foreign Affairs that if China had further proposals to make it might
be possible for the Legation to intercede. The Chinese Foreign Office,
presumably with the consent of the President, thereupon offered to make
further concessions on the points contained in Group V. Although the
Chinese fully realized that the Japanese Government had put itself in a
position where it could not urge the demands of Group V by force of
arms, they were so panic-stricken at the idea of an ultimatum that they
were willing to buy the assurance of peace by foregoing every tactical
advantage which they held in the negotiations. The Japanese Legation
then stated that the instructions of the Japanese Government left no
alternative but the presentation of the ultimatum, which was carried out
on May 7 at 3 p.m.
The Chinese were now astonished and chagrined to find that the demands of
Group V were not urged in the ultimatum; but their annoyance at having
unnecessarily committed themselves too far the day before was
compensated by a sense of relief because the terms of the ultimatum at
first sight seemed so moderate. In the first fullness of satisfaction
and relief the Chinese were inclined to understand the stipulation that
“The demands of Group V will be detached from the present negotiations
and discussed separately in the future” as an adroit manner of
abandoning those troublesome questions. They were, however, soon to
learn that this hopeful interpretation was not in accord with the ideas
of the Japanese Legation.
In the discussions preceding the delivery of the ultimatum there had been
a very strong party, in which the leading military men were included,
favoring resistance to the Japanese demands. Violent scenes are said to
have taken place in the council during these discussions. The party
favoring resistance argued that, while China was not prepared to wage
war successfully against Japan, submission would mean national
disintegration and would rob the Government of all authority and popular
support while resistance would rally national feeling and make it
possible to obstruct the Japanese
[Page 150]
advance until, with the ending of the European
war, help from abroad could be expected. The strongest representations
were made to the President to determine him toward this course of
action. When the ultimatum had been delivered, however, the military
party realized that it would be decidedly impolitic to offer resistance
in view of the fact that the most objectionable demands had been
postponed. They therefore assured the President of their support in the
disagreeable duty of accepting the ultimatum.
May 8 was taken up with the drafting of the Chinese reply to the
ultimatum. The Chinese Foreign Office realized that a certain advantage
could be gained by giving the answer a form which would imply the
abandonment of the demands under Group V. This would have been
accomplished by stating that the Chinese Government accepted the demands
of Group I, II, III and IV and was willing to make an exchange of notes
respecting Fukien; and that it trusted that in this way a settlement of
the pending questions had been effected. But the form chosen included
the phrase “with the exception of the five articles in the fifth group.”
The Japanese Legation had expressed a desire to see the answer before it
was formally submitted. When they saw the wording chosen by the Chinese
they insisted that after the clause as quoted there should be inserted
the words “which are to be discussed in the future.” In this way it was
made perfectly clear that the Japanese Government had no idea of
relinquishing the demands in Group V but that they had been given the
character of unfinished business to be taken up at a future date. The
tactical mistake of the Chinese Government was probably due to a desire
to appear explicitly to refuse certain concessions.
When the acceptance of the ultimatum was announced there came from all
parts of China many strong expressions of disapproval; but so far, with
the exception of slight anti-Japanese outbreaks at Hankow on May 14 and
at Chinkiang on May 16, no popular movements have been reported.
The Presidential mandate with respect to the non-alienation of places
along the coast represents the effort of the Chinese to solve this
question in such a way as not to commit themselves to the Japanese
Government as a protecting power.
[Inclosure 3.]
Japan’s Communiqué, issued by the Japanese
Government from Tokyo on May 7 and circulated by Renter’s
Telegraph Agency.
[From the Far Eastern Review of May 1915.]
The Imperial Government have, in the demands lately presented to the
Chinese Government, made it the main object to adjust matters to
meet the new situation created by the war between Japan and Germany
and to
[Page 152]
bring closer the
friendly relations subsisting between Japan and China and thus
insure the permanent peace of the Far East. In formulating these
demands, they have taken special care to avoid those which might
have been deemed to conflict with the principles of territorial
integrity, equal opportunity and the open door which Japan has from
time to time declared to the Powers in regard to China. Accordingly
these demands include among others those relating to the disposition
of German rights in Shantung, those relating to the recognition of
the special position and interests of Japan in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia, and those relating to the solution of
various questions which for many years have been pending between the
Japanese and Chinese Governments.
Group I contains demands relating to the
Province of Shantung.
The first article demands an engagement on the part of China to
consent to all matters which may be agreed upon between the Japanese
Government and the German Government with regard to the disposition
of all rights, interests and concessions which in virtue of treaties
or otherwise Germany possesses in relation to the Province of
Shantung.
The second article demands an engagement on the part of China not to
alienate, or lease to another Power the province of Shantung or any
portion of it or any island lying near the coast of the said
province.
Article 3. China shall grant to Japan the right of construction of a
railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkou with the Tsinanfu-Kiaochow
Railway.
Article 4. The Chinese Government shall open the principal cities of
the province of Shantung for the residence and trade of
foreigners.
Group II contains demands relating to
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
The first article demands the extension of the terms of lease of Port
Arthur and of the South Manchuria and Antung-Mukden Railways to a
period of ninety-nine years.
The second article demands that Japanese subjects shall be permitted
to lease or own land necessary either for erecting buildings of
various kinds for commercial and industrial uses or for agricultural
purposes.
The third article demands that Japanese subjects shall be permitted
to reside, travel and carry on business of various kinds,
commercial, industrial or otherwise.
The fourth article demands that Japanese subjects shall be granted
the mining rights of certain specified mines.
The fifth article demands that the consent of the Japanese Government
shall be obtained in advance when China proposed to grant a railway
concession to subjects of a third Power or to procure a supply of
capital from a third Power for the construction of a railway or to
raise a loan from such Power on the security of duties or taxes.
The sixth article demands that the Japanese Government shall be
consulted before the engaging of advisers or instructors regarding
political, financial or military matters.
Article 7 demands that the management and control of the
Kirin-Changchung Railway shall be transferred to Japan for the term
of ninety-nine years.
Group III contains demands relating to the
Hanyehping Company.
The first article demands that having regard to the close relations
between Japanese capitalists and this company, the Chinese
Government shall agree to the placing of the company under joint
Japanese and Chinese management and not to dispose or permit the
company to dispose, without the consent of Japan, any rights or
property belonging to the company.
The second article demands that owing to the necessity for the
protection of the interests of Japanese capitalists, the Chinese
Government shall engage not to permit, without the consent of the
company, any one other than the company to work the mines situated
in the neighborhood of those belonging to the company and also to
obtain previous consent in case it is proposed to take measures
which may be deemed to affect the company directly or
indirectly.
Group IV contains demands relating to the
non-alienation of the coast of China or islands off the coast.
The Chinese Government shall engage not to alienate or lease to a
third Power any ports or bays on, or islands off, the Coast of
China.
[Page 153]
Group V. Propositions relating to the
solution of pending questions and others.
- Article 1. The Central Chinese Government must engage
influential Japanese as political, financial and military
advisers.
- Article 2. The Chinese Government must recognize the right
of Japanese to land for building Japanese hospitals, temples
and schools in the interior of China.
- Article 3. The police in localities where such
arrangements are necessary must be placed under joint
Japanese and Chinese administration, or else Japanese must
be employed as police officers in such localities.
- Article 4. China must obtain from Japan a supply of a
certain quantity of arms, or else must establish arsenals in
China, under joint Japanese and Chinese management, and
these must be supplied with experts and material from
Japan.
- Article 5. Japan must be given the right to construct a
railway connecting Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line
and with the Nanchang-Hangchow railways.
- Article 6. In view of the relations between the Province
of Fukien and Formosa and the agreement respecting the
non-alienation of Fukien, Japan must be consulted whenever
foreign capital is needed in connection with railways, mines
and harbor works, including dockyards.
- Article 7. The Chinese Government must recognise the right
of preaching by the Japanese in China.
With regard to the Province of Shantung, China absolutely lacks, it
is clear in her present condition, the power to prevent Germany from
recovering her influence in that province and from becoming in
future again a source of disturbance in the Far East. It is,
therefore, natural that Japan, who has at great sacrifice driven
Germany out of Shantung, should present the above-mentioned demands,
in order to consider how the rights possessed by Germany should be
disposed of, and to take measures to prevent the recrudescence of
German influence.
Japan’s relations with Manchuria have always been especially close
geographically, politically and from the point of view of commercial
and industrial interests. Since those relations have been
strengthened by two successive wars the predominant position of
Japan in that region has been recognized both at home and
abroad.
The case is almost similar in regard to Eastern Inner Mongolia.
Further for the advancement of the intimate relations existing
between Japan and China, no effort should be spared to solve
definitely on this occasion all pending questions which are likely
to lead to difficulties with China and at the same time to make an
agreement with a view to prevent future misunderstandings. The
Japanese Government, fully expecting that the Chinese Government
would value the friendly sentiments existing between the two
countries and willingly accede to the Japanese proposals, urged them
to carry these matters into effect, whereas, in other matters
China’s consent was demanded by reason of treaty and other
rights.
With regard to the demands, which were formulated after careful and
mature consideration, on the basis of the principles above referred
to, the Chinese Government, in disregard of the understanding which
was made at the commencement of the negotiations to keep the
proceedings of the conferences strictly secret, made public the
Japanese proposals, in various exaggerated forms and endeavored to
stir up the feelings of the Powers against Japan. They caused the
matters discussed at the conferences to be published invariably in
the newspapers, with a view to hindering the progress of the
negotiations; by fabricating news detrimental to Japan and they
attempted to shake the confidence placed by her ally in-Japan. They
even demanded the unconditional retrocession of Kiaochow and an
indemnity for the damage caused by the war between Japan and
Germany, and thus they showed from the first a lack of a sincere
desire for a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations.
Moreover, although the Japanese Government fully showed its sincerity
by repeatedly explaining the motives of the demands and endeavored
to hear China’s unreserved views on the matter, it is an undeniable
fact that the Chinese authorities failed to appreciate the friendly
attitude of Japan and persisted in protracting the negotiations.
Twenty-five conferences were held in all, extending over more than
three months and throughout these conferences the Japanese
Government exhausted every means of arriving at a satisfactory
[Page 154]
solution, but the Chinese
Government, although they showed a disposition to agree to the
demands relating to the province of Shantung, yet with regard to
South Manchuria put various restrictions upon the most important
demands, namely those relating to the rights regarding land tenure
and objected to those relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia and various
questions enumerated under Group V on the ground that they were
derogatory to the sovereign rights of China or conflicted with
treaties with other Powers and, although the Japanese Minister
explained that such was not the case, they refused to listen.
But, recognizing that a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations
was most important for the maintenance of peace of the Far East, the
Japanese Government treated the Chinese contentions with every
consideration, making very great concessions. In a spirit of
conciliation they amended their proposals and presented their
revised draft to the Chinese Government on April 26. In the revised
draft the contentions put forward by the Chinese Government were
taken into consideration. In this draft, as regards Eastern Inner
Mongolia, the demands were confined, for the present, to absolutely
necessary matters; those relating to the Hanyehping Company were
confined to matters which had been admitted by the Chinese
Government at the conferences. As regards the demand respecting the
non-alienation of the coast, the form desired by the Chinese was
accepted. The proposals relating to advisers, ownership of land for
schools and hospitals, and the position of the Province of Fukien
were all altered in accordance with the views expressed by the
Chinese representatives at the conferences. As regards South China
railways, the relations with third parties especially were respected
and alterations were made accordingly. The question of the right of
preaching was reserved for future negotiation. Those relating to
police and the ownership of sites for temples were withdrawn.
The revised draft is therefore practically as follows:—
Group II. Eastern Inner Mongolia is
excluded from the proposals respecting South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia and the second and third articles are amended as
follows:
Article 2. Japanese subjects shall be permitted in the region of
South Manchuria to lease or buy land necessary for erecting
buildings of various kinds for commercial and industrial uses or for
agricultural purposes.
Article 3. Japanese subjects shall have liberty to enter, travel and
reside in the region of South Manchuria and carry on business of
various kinds, commercial, and industrial and otherwise.
The fourth article, referring to the preceding two provisions, says
that Japanese subjects shall produce before the Chinese local
authorities passports duly issued and registered by the said
authorities. They shall also observe Chinese police laws or
regulations approved by the Japanese consuls and pay to the Chinese
authorities taxes approved by the Japanese consuls. In civil,
original suits the Japanese consul, where a Japanese subject is
defendant, and a Chinese official, where a Chinese is defendant,
shall respectively try and decide the case, both the Japanese consul
and the Chinese official being permitted each to send an authorized
agent to attend the trial and watch proceedings, provided that in a
civil suit concerning land between Japanese and Chinese the case
shall be examined and decided jointly by the Japanese consul and a
Chinese official according to the laws and local customs of China,
provided further that in future when the judicial system in the said
region shall be completely reformed all civil and criminal suits
involving Japanese subjects shall be wholly tried and decided by
Chinese courts.
Proposals relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia:—
The first article demands that China shall permit joint enterprises
of Japanese and Chinese in agricultural and auxiliary industries,
the second that China shall consult Japan first in case China
contemplates contracting either railway loans or loans secured by
taxes, and the third that China shall increase the number of open
marts.
Group III. As regards the Hanyehping
Company the Chinese Government shall engage to approve of an
agreement that may be concluded in future between the company and
Japanese capitalists for a joint undertaking, and agrees not to
confiscate it nor to nationalize it without the consent of
interested Japanese capitalists and not to permit it to contract any
foreign loan with other than Japanese.
[Page 155]
Group IV. As regards the non-alienation of
Chinese coasts, the Japanese Government will be satisfied with the
declaration as suggested by the Chinese Government.
Group V. As to the other points the
following shall be kept on record:
- Article 1. That the Chinese Government will in case of
necessity in future employ Japanese advisers.
- Article 2. In case Japanese subjects desire to lease or
purchase land for the purpose of building schools or
hospitals in the interior, the Chinese Government will
permit them to do so.
- Article 3. The Chinese Government will some day in the
future send military officers to Japan in order to make
arrangements directly with the Japanese military authorities
either for the purchase of arms from Japan or for
establishing an arsenal [arsenals?] in China under
Sino-Japanese management.
- Article 4. The Chinese Government will grant Japan her
desired railway concession in South China in case it becomes
clear that there is no objection in this respect on the part
of any other Power, or that the Chinese Government will
refrain from entering into any agreement with any other
party concerning the railway lines in question until Japan
may, independently of the present negotiations with China,
reach an agreement with the party whose interests, in the
opinion of the Chinese Government, are opposed to the
proposed lines.
- Article 5. The question of freedom for preaching by
Japanese missionaries will be left over for future
discussion.
The proposal for joint administration of police is withdrawn.
As to Fukien Province the Chinese Government must engage in some form
that they will not grant to any other Power the right to build a
shipyard, coaling or naval stations, or any other military
establishment on or along the coast of Fukien Province, and further,
that the Chinese (government will not allow any such establishment
to be built with any foreign capital on the coast of the said
province.
At the same time as the presentation of the revised draft, the
Japanese Government declared to the Chinese Government that if, at
any peace conference upon the conclusion of the present war, Japan
should be given the free disposal of Kiaochow which she acquired at
enormous sacrifice, she would return it to China subject to certain
conditions, of which the principal ones were as follows:
The opening of Kiaochow Bay as a commercial port.
The establishment of a Japanese concession in a locality designated
by the Japanese.
This establishment, if required by the Powers, of an international
settlement and arrangements between the Japanese and Chinese
Governments regarding the disposal of the German public structures
and properties.
Germany having after many years labor and heavy expenditure of money
converted Kiaochow into an important military and commercial port,
as the basis of her expansion in the East, German influence in this
part of China grew with the development of Kiaochow and became so
firmly established that it was utterly hopeless for China,
singlehanded, to regain possession of the leased territory. Japan
desiring to remove this source of danger, which might in future
again disturb the peace of the Far East, captured it at no small
cost of life and money, and now that it is in her hands, she is
almost at liberty to dispose of it at will. She is certainly under
no obligation to return it to China, but she offered of her own will
to return Kiaochow because she was anxious to promote friendly
relations with China and to maintain the general peace of the Far
East. The Chinese Government have, however, failed to reciprocate
Japan’s sentiment of accommodation and conciliation, and on May 1,
presented a counter-draft which they declared to be their final
answer.
In this counter-draft, the Chinese Government recognize with regard
to South Manchuria the right of residence, trade and leasing land by
Japanese subjects in the interior, but refuse to grant long
leases.
The Chinese Government also demand that Japanese subjects shall
submit to Chinese police laws and regulations, be liable to the same
taxes and duties as Chinese, and all actions arising out of land
disputes, whether between Japanese and Chinese, or between Japanese
themselves, shall come under the jurisdiction of Chinese courts.
[Page 156]
As regards Eastern Inner Mongolia, they put limitations on the extent
of that region and refuse to permit the main point of the Japanese
demand, which is the joint enterprise of Japanese and Chinese in
agriculture and auxiliary industries.
Further they demand at the same time the unconditional surrender of
the leased territory at Kiaochow, and the recognition of the right
of the Chinese Government to participate in the coming peace
negotiations between Japan and Germany.
Indemnification by Japan for all losses suffered by China in
consequence of the Japan-German war.
The immediate removal of various military establishments of the
Japanese army and the prompt evacuation of occupied territory.
They also refuse all the proposals contained in Group V of the
Japanese amended project except that relating to Fukien. In this
counter-draft the Chinese Government, still further in disregard of
responsible statements made by their representatives at the
conferences, revived in some cases articles which had already been
withdrawn and in others made alterations in matters which were
agreed to. Moreover, they make demands to which it is clearly
impossible for Japan to accede, such as those for the unconditional
surrender of Kiaochow and indemnification for losses incurred
through the Japan-German war.
Furthermore, the Chinese Government declare that their counter-draft
formulates their final decision. Accordingly, so long as Japan
refuses to accede to these demands, whatever agreement may have been
arrived at on other points must ultimately be abortive and the terms
offered by China prove illusory. The Japanese Government deeply
regret to perceive from the attitude of the Chinese Government that
it is no longer any use to continue the present negotiations.
Nevertheless, being desirous, with a view to the maintenance of
peace in the Far East, to make every effort to bring the
negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion and thus to avoid
complications in the situation, the Japanese Government, taking
fully into account the wishes of the Chinese Government, decided
with great forbearance, to leave out of the present negotiations and
reserve for future discussion all items specified in Group V of the
amended draft, except that relating to Fukien, about which an
agreement has been reached.
The Japanese Government instructed their Minister at Peking on May 6
that in conveying this decision to the Chinese Government he should
earnestly advise them to give due regard to Japan’s sentiment of
accommodation and conciliation and express after careful
consideration their assent without delay to the Japanese amended
draft; and at the same time announce that the Japanese Government
expect from the Chinese Government a satisfactory response to this
advice not later than 6 p.m. on May 9.
