File No. 793.94/376.
Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State.
Peking, May 4, 1915.
Sir: In continuation of my despatch No. 597 of April 5, I have the honor to report on the progress of the negotiations between China and Japan:
[Page 138]The slow progress of the negotiations is partly due to the inherent difficulty and complexity of the interests and enterprises which form the subject-matter of the demands. It cannot be justly charged that the Chinese Government followed a policy of obstruction and delay; on the contrary, there has probably never been a negotiation in China in which questions of such vast scope were disposed of with similar expedition. At the beginning of April the far-reaching concessions regarding South Manchuria and Shantung, as well as the coastal non-alienation agreement, had practically been settled. The Manchurian question was kept open upon the matter of jurisdiction in police and land cases involving Japanese settlers in the interior. A copy of a memorandum of the Chinese Government was forwarded in my despatch No. 598 of the 5th ultimo; and a copy of a subsequent memorandum, handed to the Japanese Minister by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 15, is transmitted herewith. It was suspected that the action of the Japanese Government in again and again adjourning the discussion of this matter in detail was probably due to a desire to keep the question of South Manchuria open in order to afford an opportunity of further committing the Chinese Government on the demands contained in Group V.
On these latter demands the Chinese Government throughout consistently took the position that they could not be considered since they involve action inconsistent with the administrative integrity and independence of China, or with treaty obligations to foreign powers, or both. Yielding to the insistent pressure of the Japanese, Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, consented informally to discuss some of the reasons why the Chinese Government could not make these grants; in the course of this conversation the Japanese Minister repeatedly attempted to treat the statements of the Minister for Foreign Affairs as admissions to be made part of the protocol. As an example of this, I may give the conversation concerning Buddhist missionary rights in China. The Japanese Minister queried on what general principle Buddhist missionaries from Japan should be excluded while Christian missionaries from Western countries were admitted. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, after alluding to the fact that as China was herself a Buddhist country it was natural that special arrangements might be made with respect to the representatives of some other religion, stated that this would not apply to Buddhists from neighboring countries; and further pointed out that the continuance of extraterritoriality would bring about many difficulties in connection with the free admission of Japanese Buddhist propagandists. He then stated that as far as any general principle was concerned, his Government had, of course, none to urge against Buddhist religious work; but that in this particular matter the difficulties which might arise would be rather of a local nature, as a special situation existed in each of the provinces or localities in China. The Japanese Minister then immediately asked that the statement that the Chinese Government had no objection on general principle to the admission of Japanese Buddhist missionaries be embodied in the formal protocol. The Minister for Foreign Affairs declined to allow this to be done, stating that the Chinese Government could not make any formal admissions in this [Page 139] matter; that his statements must be taken in the spirit of the general conversation as explaining the difficulties which his Government would experience should it give up its liberty of action in this matter. Nevertheless, the Japanese Minister insisted upon this part of the minutes being initialed by the secretaries.
At the conference of May 1 the Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that the phraseology in certain of the demands of Group V in the revised list of Japan was based on expressions which he had employed in the course of conversations when he was explaining the reasons why it was impossible for China to negotiate this particular group; and he again insistently emphasized, as had been done at the time, that these conversations were in no way to be considered as implying a formal discussion and possibly involving admissions of principle, but that they had been entered into with the explicit declaration that no such admissions could be made and that the conversations should be considered as an informal explanation by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the necessities under which the Chinese Government acted.
During the discussion of the demand relating to the Province of Fukien very pointed references were made to a “certain Power,” understood by all present as referring to the United States of America. It was stated that it was of equal importance to China and to Japan to have a complete assurance that any efforts of this “certain Power” to obtain a foothold in Fukien Province through getting control, directly or indirectly, of any of the naval bases there should be frustrated. It was urged that the time was favorable for the making of an arrangement by which this “certain Power” would be excluded from the possibility of obtaining such a foothold; the present administration was stated to be favorable to the withdrawal of American pretensions, but that it was uncertain whether such pretensions would not again be taken up by some future administration.
When the demand for railway grants south of the Yangtze River was under discussion, the Japanese Minister insisted that if concessions which had in the past been asked for by Japanese had actually been granted to another Power, this of itself constituted a proof of the unfriendliness of China towards Japan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that negotiations had never been seriously taken up with any Japanese concerning these railway lines. Thereupon the Japanese Minister advanced the proposal that China should grant these railway concessions to Japan and leave it to the latter to come to an agreement with Great Britain concerning any conflicting claims which might arise.
On April 26, after an intermission of one week in the negotiations, the Japanese Minister handed to the Chinese Government a revised list of demands which is reported in my telegram of April 27, 8 p.m. The statement regarding the Han-yeh-ping Company was later modified, as a mistake had been made in the decoding of the instructions to the Japanese Legation. As it now stands, it would involve a declaration favorable to the formation of a joint company with Japan, the Chinese Government binding itself not to transform the [Page 140] company into a state-owned concern nor to allow the company to borrow money abroad for the repayment of the debts owing to Japan.
The formal “withdrawal” of Group V is accompanied by a restatement of the principles therein contained which, in the view of the Chinese Government, would render such concessions no less fatal to Chinese independence and administrative integrity. The appointment of Japanese advisers in administrative and military affairs, the purchase of war supplies, the conduct of arsenals, and railway concessions south of the Yangtze River, are demands which are retained under a slightly modified form, but none the less dangerous to China’s independence. The Chinese Government has therefore decided to continue its unqualified refusal to entertain these demands. Nor did the formal return of Tsingtau, coupled with conditions which render it of no concrete value to the Chinese Government, appear to be an offer which could be considered a valid quid pro quo for any important concessions on the part of China.
After deliberating throughout the week and taking the counsel of all his Ministers and important advisers, the President decided to adhere to his original position that, after making unprecedented concessions with respect to Manchuria, Eastern Mongolia, Shantung, and the Han-yeh-ping Company, it would be impossible for the Chinese Government to grant the still more general rights and privileges asked for in Group V. Being extremely desirous to maintain the best of relations with Japan, the Chinese Government nevertheless was convinced that, if Japan was acting in good faith as a friend of China, the far-reaching concessions now offered would be satisfactory to her; but that if it were the desire of the Japanese Government to exceed these limits and to follow a policy of subjugating China, then the attempt to buy peace by making further concessions inconsistent with the independence of China would be futile, because it was to be foreseen that in such a case concessions would not buy immunity but would tend to encourage further exactions. The Chinese Government is convinced that on account of its desire to befriend and satisfy Japan, too much rather than too little has already been granted, from the point of view of China’s national interest; and that it would be impossible for the Chinese Government to assume, in the face of the Chinese people whose rights it holds in trust, the responsibility for yet more extensive concessions which would permanently shackle her freedom of national development.
As is probably known to the Department, the English version of the full text of the Japanese demands, including Group V, was published late in April in the Japan Mail, the semi-official Tokyo paper. During the recent past, high Chinese officials have frequently stated to me that it is their great desire that the American people should be fully informed of the facts regarding the attack now being made upon China’s liberties, because they have the conviction that the public opinion of the world, and especially of the United States, is a great force which will in the long run operate to defeat any policy of injustice.
I have [etc.]