Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915
File No. 312.11/7153.
The Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State.
Washington, December 28, 1915.
Sir: I have the honor to forward herewith copy of a report of operations of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Mexican waters, dated December 11, 1915.
Very sincerely yours,
Admiral Winslow to the Secretary of the Navy.
Topolobampo, Sinaloa, December 11, 1915.
Report of operations: Embarking of expeditionary force of marines, and conditions at Topolobampo and vicinity.
1. In obedience to the Department’s order * * * the First Battalion of Marines, under command of Major John T. Myers, U. S. M. C., were embarked on board the U. S. S. San Diego at San Francisco, California, on November 25, 1915, and at 9.10 p.m. the same day I sailed from San Francisco for Topolobampo. * * *
3. The Flag arrived off Topolobampo November 30. * * *
4. On the following day, in order to make a thorough investigation of conditions and to receive first-hand information, * * * I proceeded to Los Mochis via Topolobampo. * * *
6. The tour of inspection included the property and buildings of the United Sugar Companies and outlying farms, and the following conditions were found to obtain:
a. All American settlers were refugees in Topolobampo and their houses and properties in Los Mochis and vicinity were found to have been temporarily abandoned.
b–k. [Descriptions of wanton destruction of the property of these settlers: crops, residences, factories, offices, etc.]
l–m. [Descriptions of looting.]
n. The Commander-in-chief, after an inspection of the outlying districts, met Lieutenant Colonel Gutierrez, the Carranza official commanding the Los Mochis garrison. He stated that he had 700 troops at Los Mochis and between 150 and 175 at Aguila, but had not garrisoned the pumping station as no instructions as to this had been received by him from General Muñoz.
7–9. Just before the inspection party returned to Los Mochis, an armored train unexpectedly arrived, bringing General Mateo Muñoz, the Commanding Officer of the Carranza forces in the State of Sinaloa, and Colonel Escobar. The Commander-in-chief immediately took up with Muñoz the question of affording adequate protection for American citizens. Muñoz stated that the * * * principal reason for withdrawing the Los Mochis garrison to San Bias was because it was known that the Villista General Juan Banderas had joined the Mayas and that the strength of the combined forces was estimated at 1800 men; such a detachment could easily defeat the Los Mochis garrison [Page 863] and it was therefore decided to withdraw to San Bias where there was a force of but 800.
This explanation was not convincing as there was no reason to believe that the Indians and Villistas had a force of such strength.
Prior to the raid of November 16 the Carrancistas maintained a garrison at Los Mochis of about 500 men under Colonel Escobar, but for some reason, not satisfactorily explained, the garrison was withdrawn on November 15 and remained inactive at San Bias until after the raids had been accomplished by the Indians, when the troops again entered Los Mochis and continued the looting.
As stated in his telegrams to Consul Alger at Mazatlan, General Muñoz delayed in sending troops to Los Mochis because armed forces had been landed from the Annapolis; but as Colonel Escobar had visited Los Mochis and Topolobampo on November 19, which was between the first and second raids, and was aware that no force had been landed, there was no apparent excuse for Muñoz not promptly sending troops to Los Mochis and thereby preventing the second and most serious raid. (See General Muñoz’s letter, translation appended.)
At this point the Department’s attention is invited to the telegraphic intercourse between the American Consul at Mazatlan, Mr. W. E. Alger, and General Muñoz, commanding the Carranza forces in the State of Sinaloa (copy appended) and to an explanatory letter written by General Muñoz to the Commander-in-chief with answer to the same (copies appended).
10. The Indians were undoubtedly urged by General Banderas to make the raid, because when Chief Bachomo of the Mayas entered Mr. Johnston’s house on the 16th and stole six rifles he informed the Americans present that Banderas had ordered him to get the arms. [Other reasons.]
11–14. The first raid was made on November 16. * * * The Maya Indians under Chief Bachomo were accompanied by a detachment of Villistas under General Juan Banderas. * * * The settlers immediately fled in automobiles to Topolobampo for refuge, so that when the Indians reentered the town on the 20th of November it was practically deserted.
15–17. [Entertainment of General Muñoz, General Sepulveda and fifteen other officers on board the flagship.]
18. The question of adequate protection was again taken up with Muñoz during this visit and all points clearly presented and emphasized, with the result that General Muñoz made the following promises:
(1) To maintain an adequate garrison at Los Mochis, Aguila, and at the pumping stations.
(2) To begin active offensive operations against the Indians.
(3) To recover as much stolen property as possible and to return same to rightful owners.
(4) To have all animals belonging to foreigners returned as soon as recovered.
(5) To permit the American settlers to retain arms purchased from the American Consul at Hermosillo and carry same unmolested.
(6) To endeavor to establish a feeling of harmony between the garrisons and the settlers.
19. Muñoz was informed that the United States and Mexico were on friendly terms and that there was no desire on the part of the United States to land troops in Mexico, it being the wish that peace and prosperity be established throughout the country.
20. The following hypothetical case was then presented to General Muñoz: “Suppose there is no garrison at Los Mochis and that the lines of communication between San Bias and Los Mochis have been interrupted; and further suppose that I, as Commander-in-chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, having a strong expeditionary force anchored off Topolobampo ready to land at a moment’s notice in event of word reaching me that Los Mochis is being raided by Indians, receive information that an attack by savages is about to be made and that my countrymen are in danger of being murdered and my countrywomen in danger of being carried off by the savages (here we have a case where a band of barbarians are attacking an American colony of American men, women and children without protection)—What action would you expect me to take under the circumstances?”
21. After thinking over the problem, General Muñoz replied, “Under those circumstances, I believe you would be obliged to land and save them, and I believe the act would be considered unfriendly to Mexico. I see the point [Page 864] the same as you do and I wish to state that it was with profound indignation that I received information that the Indians had made their raid on the Mochis colony.”
22. After further deliberation and at the suggestion of General Sepulveda, Muñoz reconsidered his former statement, saying that he did not have authority to authorize landing for the purpose of protecting American lives and property, and, as he was subject to the orders of General Dieguez, permission would have to be obtained from that official.
23. I then impressed upon him that in case a raid was being made on Los Mochis there would not be time to get permission from higher authority or even from my own Government. “In that case,” replied General Muñoz, “you would have permission to land. I understand the situation, but, you see, I am under General Dieguez.”
24. I then informed him that I relied upon him by his future actions to prevent a situation which might cause possible friction between two friendly nations and that I hoped he would understand my point of view. He replied stating that he realized it and thoroughly agreed with me.
25. The representatives of the Sugar Companies and settlers who were present at this interview and at the interview at Los Mochis expressed themselves as thoroughly satisfied with the results and stated that they believed the situation would soon be satisfactorily cleared up.
26. It was not until after the arrival of the Commander-in-chief off Topolobampo and these same interviews held, that the Carrancista officials made any effort to cooperate with the settlers and garrison the outlying districts and pumping stations. The garrison at Los Mochis was lying inactive and merely aggravating conditions by looting the houses and property of,’ and commandeering animals belonging to, the Sugar Companies and the settlers.
27. On December 5, 1915, ten warrants were issued to the United Sugar Companies and ten to representative colonists, calling upon all military commanders in the State to assist in recovering stolen property and having it returned to the rightful owners. This work is now progressing, * * *
28–42. * * *
43. There can be little doubt that if the troops protecting American interests at Los Mochis or at other places are needed for military operations or are threatened by a large force of Indians they will be promptly withdrawn with little or no warning to settlers as to the impending danger, just as they were withdrawn at Los Mochis. For this reason I would strongly advise that permission be obtained from the Mexican Government to land our forces on Mexican territory in cases of great emergency when the lives of our own people are placed in serious jeopardy from threatened attack by hostile Indians. Unless action is taken in time, the raid will be accomplished, with resulting massacre. The Indians act too quickly to admit of the delay necessary to obtain permission as occasion arises to land a force.
[Untitled]
[This is the correspondence between Consul Alger and General Muñoz, referred to in paragraph 9 above, and printed ante as inclosures to Mr. Alger’s despatches of November 19, 23 and 26.]
General Muñoz to Admiral Winslow.
3d Division of the Northwest,
Camp at San Bias, December 7, 1915.
Sir: I have the honor of addressing you the following, as I consider terminated the operations on the Fuerte River and contiguous territory, thus giving full guaranties to the lives and interests of Mexicans and foreigners residing in this region. I wish to explain to you the reason for recent events in order to destroy whatever bad impressions may have remained on account of the injuries which American citizens suffered at Los Mochis on the occasion of the attack of the Indians and Villistas on said locality.
[Page 865]For some time we have noted the necessity for a sufficient garrison in Los Mochis on account of its proximity to the region in which the rebels (bandits) referred to were operating, and with the object, moreover, of terminating in the least possible time the campaign which was going on, the mobilization of 500 men was ordered, which was sufficient to carry on the operations prepared by this headquarters; also to guarantee all interests in the region, although there was every reason to hope for prompt results, a group of rebels more or less numerous who came from the State of Chihuahua, compelled us to change our plans as they threatened to invade the State; and although they suffered a great defeat at the beginning in this district, they continued to be a menace to all the small garrisons which had been stationed in the vicinity of Los Mochis. To avoid the consequences and principally with the object of fighting them in their own localities, I was compelled to concentrate all these garrisons, principally that of Los Mochis, which was a good force, in order to reenforce the column which operated under my orders.
Now that this campaign has terminated with good results, I am pleased to inform you that in this region I have 3000 men, which will give guaranties to all the peaceful inhabitants; and as far as the interests of Americans are concerned, I have the greatest desire to furnish them the fullest guaranties, so much the more because such are the instructions which I have received from my superiors; and I have already established garrisons not only in Los Mochis but likewise, in the Hacienda del Aguila and Los Tastes. Moreover, the United Sugar Companies of Los Mochis will recover, if not all, then the greater part of whatever was lost, since already they are beginning to receive some property and I am aiding them in recovering animals and other property abandoned by the Indians and Villistas.
I have [etc.]
Admiral Winslow to General Muñoz.
Off Topolobampo, December 9, 1915.
My dear Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 8 [7] and in reply I have to state as follows:
On October 26 I was assured by General Dieguez, through the Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. New Orleans, that every protection would be afforded foreigners and their property in the Yaqui Valley and at Los Mochis, and that General Dieguez was in command of the district in which you are operating. After this assurance from the general in command of the military forces in the region in which Los Mochis and Yaqui Valley are situated, I had reason to believe that protection would be afforded our settlers and their property. The fact that General Carranza had recently been recognized by the Government of Mexico [sic] would seem to have made it more necessary to have carefully protected American citizens in Mexican territory, as such recognition must necessarily have created animosity on the part of those representing the Villista cause.
It appears that on the approach of a by no means large force under the Villista General Banderas, associated with a force of Indians under command of Bachomo, the forces stationed at Los Mochis, over which you had control, were suddenly withdrawn to San Bias, leaving the American settlers without any protection whatever for their lives and property. This withdrawal was made without warning as to their danger being given to the American settlers at Los Mochis, and without notification to the Commander of the U. S. S. Annapolis at Topolobampo, that you intended to withdraw or that you had withdrawn all military protection previously afforded lives and property of American citizens at Los Mochis.
Had you informed the Commander of the U. S. S. Annapolis in time, he could at least, without possible offense to the Mexican Government, have, directed his countrymen and their families to retreat to Topolobampo, where he could have afforded them safe asylum on board the Annapolis. That more, if not all, of the foreign residents at Los Mochis were not murdered when the place was [Page 866] raided by Villista forces and a lot of drunken Indians seems extraordinary, and the forbearance of the said Indians must be attributed to their lack of aversion to American settlers, due to the kindly treatment that has always been accorded the. Indians by the said settlers, and not to any protection afforded them by the forces under your command.
I cannot see that the conditions as I found them to be or as stated in your letter warrant me in believing that the American community at Los Mochis was afforded the protection which should have been given them, and which I was assured by General. Dieguez would be given them.
I am convinced, however, since receiving your letter, and since my personal conference with you, that you appreciate how serious the consequences might have been and that you are now doing what is in your power to render lives and property safe. This is particularly gratifying as it is probable that the Indians, having made two successful raids on Los Mochis, will have greater confidence in the future, and their depredations and outrages will, if not prevented, be correspondingly increased.
You must understand that the United Sugar Companies, as well as the settlers in the Mochis district, have lost a great deal of property, particularly livestock, which they must have returned to them to reestablish the industries of the valley and reemploy the poor Mexicans who depend for their sustenance on the wages which they receive from the American settlers. Some of the livestock has been restored, but only a small percentage of what has been taken away.
I thank you for your assurance that the greater part of whatever was lost will be returned; and since you have given me this assurance I confidently rely on you to have every effort made to cause the return to rightful owners of all property which can be identified as belonging to the settlers, especially animals, so that the industries of the valley may soon be in full working order; and I also accept with confidence your assurance that ample protection will be afforded in the future.
Believe me [etc.]