232. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1

15828. Subject: Approach to Soviets on Ethiopian Food Truce. Ref: State 366048.2

1. Secret entire text.

2. In accordance with instructions reftel, DCM and Emboff called on MFA Third African Department Deputy Chief Sinitsyn December 13 to request that the Soviets use their influence with Mengistu to expedite famine relief in Ethiopia. On the Soviet side, Sector Chief for Horn Countries V. Tokin and Ethiopia Desk Officer E. Terekhim participated in the meeting.

3. DCM began by referring to Chernenko’s reference in his NBC interview3 to the desirability of US-Soviet cooperation in the “battle against hunger”. Noting reports of an imminent visit by Mengistu to the USSR,4 DCM said that we wanted to take the opportunity to urge that the Soviet Union and Ethiopia expedite relief efforts. DCM underscored that the US had no intention of interfering in Ethiopia’s internal affairs and we fully realized the complexities of the current situation on the ground. Nevertheless, there had been reports that persons in need of emergency assistance had been hindered by both the government and its opponents in their efforts to obtain food and other assistance.5 This was reportedly taking a devastating toll of lives in Ethiopia, and we wished to urge again that all sides redouble their efforts to expedite relief.

4. Sinitsyn replied that the situation on the ground in Ethiopia was indeed complex and that, as the US side knew, the USSR was extending emergency assistance to the Ethiopian Government “to the extent of its capabilities”. Sinitsyn added, however, that relief assistance must be provided on a humanitarian basis and not with the objective of interfering in Ethiopia’s internal affairs. It was the Soviet view that all relief assistance issues should be decided by the Ethiopian Government as this was the only practice consistent with Ethiopian sovereignty. [Page 627] Sinitsyn asserted that this was the “principled position” of the Soviet Government.

5. Sinitsyn added that “certain circles” had used the situation in Ethiopia to achieve political objectives. This had complicated efforts by the Ethiopian Government to stabilize the situation. As regards further relief efforts, Sinitsyn noted that the UN Secretary General would soon convene a conference in New York on African relief problems, including the crisis in Ethiopia.6

6. In response to Sinitsyn, DCM reiterated that we had no wish to interfere in Ethiopia’s internal affairs: our interest was a humanitarian one. We sought to solve practical problems associated with delivery of relief supplies. We were in constant consultation with the UN and other relief agencies and would be approaching the Ethiopian Government to express our concerns about food deliveries by PVO’s and difficulties encountered by refugees moving about the country in search of assistance.

7. Sinitsyn claimed that it was unlikely the Ethiopian Government would impede its own citizens’ efforts to obtain relief. According to Sinitsyn, there had, however, been reports of harassment of refugees by anti-government elements.7 DCM mentioned reports that government aircraft had attacked refugees who tried to cross from Ethiopia into Sudan. At this point, Tokin interjected that these reports seemed questionable, since the Ethiopia/Sudan border was far from the areas of central Ethiopia hardest hit by the drought. He added that it was very difficult to differentiate anti-government guerrillas from refugees in the area.

8. DCM said that we were well aware of the “principled” Soviet position on the situation in Ethiopia. But wanted nonetheless to underscore our concerns on the eve of the Mengistu visit. Sinitsyn asked whether we had already been in contact with the Ethiopian Government, and DCM replied that our Mission in Addis Ababa was instructed to make an approach. Sinitsyn closed the meeting by saying that he would convey the substance of our approach to the appropriate levels of the Soviet Government.

9. DCM left with Sinitsyn non-paper containing talking points in para 7 reftel.8

10. Department repeat as desired.

Hartman
  1. Source: Department of State, Subject Files, Edward J. Derwinski, 1982–1985, Lot 87D258, Famine Relief in Africa. Secret; Nodis; Immediate.
  2. See Document 230.
  3. See Bernard Gwertzman, “Chernenko Urges Reagan to Return to Era of Détente,” New York Times, November 17, 1984, p. A1.
  4. See Document 231.
  5. See Document 229.
  6. See footnote 2, Document 226.
  7. In telegram 356260 to Addis Ababa and Khartoum, December 4, the Department reported on harassment of cross-border refugees. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840772–0464)
  8. Not found.