230. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation in Lisbon1
366048. Subject: Approach to Soviets on Ethiopian Food Truce.
1. S—Entire text.
2. Summary and action requested. Dept has decided to make a demarche to the Soviets asking their support for greater free passage of food within Ethiopia. Paragraph 7 of this message contains talking points for use by Ambassador Hartman or DCM with highest available Soviet Foreign Ministry official. Paragraph 8 contains points to be used by Embassy Addis to inform the Ethiopians on our various approaches on this subject, including informing them of the Soviet demarche. End summary.
3. Background: Given increasingly dire humanitarian needs in Ethiopia and to ease refugee burdens in Sudan and persistent political obstacles to effective delivery of emergency assistance to affected population in Ethiopia, Dept believes it is necessary to investigate fully and urgently the possibility for some sort of a “safe passage” arrangement agreed on by both the Central Government and insurgents.
At least three million people, perhaps a majority of those affected by the current drought in Ethiopia, are behind rebel lines and have been receiving only marginal assistance through Ethiopian Government feeding centers and through unpublicized cross-border operations from Sudan. The situation has deteriorated rapidly, with as many as 1700 people in insurgent areas of Eritrea, Tigre and Welo dying each day. Mass migrations are underway, perhaps of several hundred thousand, to Sudan. Both sides appear to have taken actions, for political reasons, which impede the delivery of food to people in need. This is an extremely pressing issue. For example, there have been recent reports that Ethiopian MiGs strafed people migrating from insurgent areas to Sudan. It is essential to provide safe passage for people migrating to Sudan and those walking to feeding centers inside Ethiopia as well as for private voluntary organization (PVO) convoys and flights making deliveries in contested areas. We also need Ethiopian agreement not to impede additional, perhaps massive cross-border deliveries into insurgent areas from Sudan. Although Mengistu has said publicly he will not agree to negotiate with “bandits,” and the government has [Page 621] up to now formally objected to our cross-border feeding programs, both sides have already acceded to free passage by the ICRC and there have been some indications in private from both sides that they would not impede actual deliveries by other PVOs.
4. To help address this problem, we have underway a series of diplomatic actions designed to call the attention of the world community to the problem and to encourage the various parties in Ethiopia to enter into de facto safe passage arrangements. We anticipate that implementation would be left to a neutral party such as the ICRC and/or other PVOs. Our plan of action includes an initial approach to the ICRC, the Pope, and UNSYG, urging them to speak out both privately and publicly for a program of humanitarian safe passage and ultimately to involve other figures in the effort to bring pressure on both the Ethiopian Government and guerrilla forces.
5. Given the Soviet Union’s political influence with Chairman Mengistu, we want the Soviets to urge him to cooperate in more complete free passage of food. Mengistu’s planned December 13 visit to Moscow presents us a unique opportunity to urge Soviet cooperation. Dept recognizes that the Soviets would normally be unlikely to press re the Ethiopian leader. On the other hand, Chernenko’s statement in his November 16 interview with Marvin Kalb that one area for possible US-Soviet regional cooperation would be drought relief, at least provides us a handle to make an approach. The Soviets may have reasons (e.g. embarrassment at the dilemma of their client state and at the Soviet lack of capability to provide massive help) to encourage cooperation between the rebels and the government. An additional incentive for the Soviets could be our willingness to cooperate in more direct Soviet participation in the larger donor network headed by the UN. We are not interested in offering the Soviets a joint US–USSR effort in relief activities which would enable Moscow to piggyback on much larger Western response. But we are testing Moscow’s bona fides in asking their help on this key problem where they have clear influence.
6. We will inform the Ethiopians in advance of Mengistu’s trip that we are contacting numerous parties, including the Soviets, to gain international support for a safe passage arrangement. Informing the Ethiopians of our talks with the Soviets will prevent the latter from purposely distorting our approach in such a manner as to damage our efforts to pursue a broader political dialogue with Ethiopia. In short, we see cooperation with the Soviets in food relief as important given the situation on the ground, but do not want to enable the Soviets to use this to play a larger role in the Horn.
7. Following talking points for use by Ambassador Hartman or DCM on an urgent basis (we would like to get to the Soviets prior to Mengistu’s arrival in Moscow on the 13th).
[Page 622]—We are concerned that food relief efforts have been seriously hampered by hostilities, especially in the Eritrea and Tigre insurgent areas.
—There are continuing reports that the various political elements in Ethiopia, both government and anti-government, are for political reasons hindering in various ways the free movement of food, and of people seeking food.
—In order to avert further mass starvation, we believe it might be possible to arrive at some sort of temporary modus vivendi among the parties which would allow free passage of food and other humanitarian relief to all areas of the country and all segments of the population.
—It is not only the United States which is concerned and which sees the need for some sort of safe passage arrangement. International organizations, private voluntary agencies and other donor nations share this view.
—The Soviet Union is in a unique position, considering its interests in Ethiopia and its role in the Ethiopian relief effort to use its influence with the PMGSE in favor of such an agreement. We note that Chairman Mengistu will soon be visiting the Soviet Union. In this context, we note that Chairman Chernenko, in his November 16 NBC interview with Marvin Kalb, suggested drought relief as a potential area of U.S.-Soviet regional cooperation.
—We recognize that neither side in the conflict will likely accede to a general cease-fire. We hope, therefore, that the Ethiopian Government will agree to a de facto safe passage arrangement, whereby food deliveries and people in search of food are not hindered and that food can be delivered in the most direct and efficient manner including from Sudan. We would expect that deliveries would be conducted by apolitical private voluntary organizations to be agreed to by all parties.
—The United States interest in safe passage is humanitarian. Our only role in this matter is support for this concept, which has been espoused by several international leaders and the media.
—The PMGSE is aware of our concerns and the need to facilitate food distribution, and we are in touch with other interested parties.
—The United States encourages the Soviet Union, in addition to continuing its deliveries of food within Ethiopia, to participate more directly with the donor community in Ethiopia and with the efforts of United Nations Secretary General Special Representative in Ethiopia Kurt Jannson.
8. For Addis: Charge should use following points with MFA and RRC Commissioner Dawit prior to Mengistu’s departure for Moscow:
—The United States notes the considerable mention being made by the media and international leaders such as Willy Brandt of the [Page 623] need for a “safe passage” arrangement for food deliveries and for people looking for food.
—We feel that some sort of arrangement needs to be made by the Ethiopian parties to facilitate the dispersing of food to all areas and to permit safe passage as well to people in search of food.
[The United States?] recognizes and supports the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. We have no desire to interfere with Ethiopia’s internal affairs.
—We are aware of Chairman Mengistu’s desire not to enter into negotiations with insurgents. This does not preclude, however, an informal or de facto arrangement whereby each side agrees not to impede the flow of drought victims in search of food or food deliveries. We recall Commissioner Dawit’s agreement in the November 2 government-to-government agreement to additional efforts to make food available to all parts of Ethiopia.2
—The United States, for its part, maintains its policy of delinking food from politics. Our interest has been and remains assisting Ethiopians in need. We and other donors are concerned that large numbers of Ethiopians in northern area of fighting are not being reached. This problem is of such major concern that it is rapidly becoming the number one problem in Ethiopia and in the concern of the media.
—We applaud the Government of Ethiopia’s efforts to assist the drought and famine situation, coordinating with donors, and improving logistics. In that same spirit, we would appreciate any ideas or suggestions by the PMGSE as to how a safe passage arrangement can be obtained to get food to insurgent as well as government-controlled areas. We need to consider de facto agreements to safe passage of food, free movement of people seeking food, and agreement on new routes for delivering food.
—This problem needs to be addressed urgently in light of the increasingly desperate situation in unreachable parts of northern Ethiopia, recent reports of innocent drought victims being caught in the crossfire, and charges that political considerations are involved by various parties to the fighting in food delivery or non-delivery.
—In view of the role the Soviets are playing in the relief effort, we are also raising this with them as well as with the UN, other donors, and humanitarian leaders and organizations.
9. For Geneva: You should draw on paras 3 and 4 to alert ICRC that we are approaching the Soviets and Ethiopians. You should underscore the need for strict confidentiality.
[Page 624]10. For London, Rome and Ottawa: On strict FYI basis only, you should inform host government of our approaches to Soviets and Ethiopians on this matter.
11. For USUN: Please brief the Secretary General on our plans to approach the Soviets and Ethiopians.
12. For Vatican: Septel will follow,3 asking Ambassador Walters to brief the Pope on food truce issue and requesting his support for safe passage related to food relief. This cable is for Ambassador Walters background.
- Source: Department of State, Subject Files, Edward J. Derwinski, 1982–1985, Lot 87D258, Famine Relief in Africa. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by LeCocq; cleared in AF/E, AF/RA, AF, EUR/SOV, EUR, C, P, and AID; and approved by Armacost. Sent to Moscow, USUN, Addis Ababa, London, Rome, Ottawa, and Khartoum.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Not found.↩