Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

41. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Williams) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

S–0611/DIO

Washington, October 25, 1984

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Moroccan officials—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

(C) On 22 October I met with the Moroccan Ambassador, Mr. Maati Jorio, and his Defense Attaché, Colonel Mohammed al-Kostali.² Ambassador Jorio had requested the meeting, primarily to discuss Morocco’s rationale for the recent agreement with Libya. Throughout the meeting Ambassador Jorio emphasized his fervent belief that the Morocco-Libyan treaty should not change the close historic relationship between our two countries. In particular, he made a strong plea that our bilateral military programs continue as before.

(C) Jorio said he understood US concerns about Morocco’s alliance with Qadhafi. He added that, of all north African countries, “Morocco has been the most damaged by Libya.” After more than ten years of trouble with Qadhafi, King Hassan concluded that “dialog is better than confrontation” and thought the time had come to introduce Qadhafi into the circle of Arab moderates. Jorio acknowledged that Morocco may not succeed in influencing Qadhafi but thought it worth trying.

(C) Jorio did not advance economic considerations in support of the treaty with Libya, but the implication was clearly there. Both Jorio and Kostali were pessimistic about Morocco’s economy: high rate of population growth, five years of drought, and no real export potential besides phosphates (which are facing a shrinking world demand). Even a further reduction in oil prices will be of little help, according to Jorio, because any small savings in purchase price will be eroded by climbing dollar exchange rates.

(C/[distribution not declassified]) When asked about the impact of the Morocco-Libyan treaty on Algeria, Ambassador Jorio replied that President Bendjedid is “very upset.” He quoted Bendjedid as saying “No one can imagine a union of North African states without Algeria.” Recalling that I was the first US general officer to visit Algeria since independence, I suggested that the improvement in US-Algerian relations might enable the United States to play a helpful role in North Africa; however, the Moroccans were not very receptive to the idea. Kostali said [less than 1 line not declassified] Jorio and Kostali went on to express concern over the sale of C–130s to Algeria and their potential effectiveness in supporting the Polisario insurgency.³

(C) With regard to Western Sahara, the Moroccans seemed fairly optimistic over the military situation. Kostali thought the planned final extension of the berm will do much to cripple future Polisario raiding activity. He denied that Polisario units had succeeded in crossing the berm in their raid on 13 August; “all the wreckage was on the outside.” Jorio and Kostali thought the rubber ZODIAC boats used in three recent attacks on Moroccan fishing craft either came from Algeria or were launched from nearby ships, perhaps Soviet ships.

(C) On the diplomatic side, Jorio noted that Morocco’s position was unfavorable in that most African states were lining up in support of admitting the Polisario to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).⁴ Jorio did not directly relate the question of Polisario recognition to the Morocco-Libyan treaty. He implied, however, that Morocco was hoping Libya would help out on this issue in one of two ways: (a) by urging some of the more radical OAU members to accept Moroccan claims in Western Sahara; or (b) by supporting Morocco in an effort to shift the question of Western Sahara from the OAU to the Arab League, which is likely to prove a more sympathetic forum from Morocco’s standpoint.

(C/[distribution not declassified]) Of particular interest were Jorio’s comments on Libya, where he had previously served as ambassador. He described the difficulty of doing business in a country like Libya which in theory has no governmental structure, only committees, and does not recognize the governmental institutions of other countries. Nonetheless, Jorio opined that Qadhafi is neither crazy nor fanatical; rather, he is a very clever man who is “good at giving shows” when he wants to dramatize a point. Furthermore, Qadhafi, who lives simply and sleeps in a barracks or a tent, is not avaricious; he uses money solely to further his own brand of revolutionary Islam. Jorio downplayed the importance of any other Libyan figures such as former Prime Minister Jallud: “There is no number two man in Libya.”

(S/[distribution not declassified]) Comment: An experienced diplomat with previous government service at cabinet level, Ambassador Jorio carefully articulated the official Moroccan position on the alliance with Libya. Both in his generally unfavorable treatment of Algeria’s role and his more positive attitude toward Libya, he was clearly trying to put the best possible face on the Morocco-Libyan treaty. His portrayal of Qadhafi as role-player rather than madman is intriguing and probably valid up to a point; Qadhafi has shown the necessary flexibility and survival capacity to outlast all but four Arab heads of state. Nonetheless, Jorio has ignored (or chosen not to mention) other aspects of Qadhafi’s track record which do not suggest a lasting or productive relationship between the two countries: Qadhafi’s abrupt and sometimes erratic shifts in alliance; his propensity for suddenly turning against former allies (Sadat, Nimeiri, Bourguiba, and perhaps Assad); and his disregard for accepted rules of international behavior as demonstrated this year in London⁵ and—most likely—the Red Sea. King Hassan may be able to exert some temporary restraining influence on his new partner, but a long-term reformation is unlikely.

(U) Coordination within OSD is not required.

James Williams
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Director

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent for information. Drafted by [name not declassified]. Stamped notations at the top of the memorandum read: “1984 26 OCT 09:19 Office of the Secretary of Defense” and “SEC DEF HAS SEEN OCT 29 1984.” Copies were sent to Taft and Iklé.
2. No other record of the meeting has been found.
3. See footnote 3, Document 106.
4. See Document 422.
5. During an April 17 demonstration by Libyan dissidents in front of the Libyan People’s Bureau in London, shots were fired from a window of the building, wounding 11, including a British police officer who later died. British anti-terrorist forces later landed on the building, leading to a stand-off between British authorities and the Bureau. (Telegram 113541 to Instum Collective, April 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840255–0296) In telegram 9232 from London, April 23, the Embassy reported that the United Kingdom had broken relations with Libya. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840264–0240) Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.