Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

40. Letter From the Ambassador to Morocco (Reed) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Rabat, September 21, 1984

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This is a hard letter for me to write but, given your past interest in Morocco, I feel that I owe you my best assessment of where we stand in light of the Oujda Accord and of the long-term implications of King Hassan’s “Union” with Libya for the relationship with the United States. Frankly, my first reaction, as the President’s Envoy in Morocco, was that the Libyan Treaty, with one stroke, put at risk three years of steady progress in U.S.-Moroccan relations on which I have so often counted on you for support and counsel.

Now that I have had the opportunity, however, to discuss the Libyan Treaty during two lengthy audiences with King Hassan and to exchange views with virtually every Moroccan decision-maker during the recent five-day wedding festivities for the King’s eldest daughter,² I have a better sense of Moroccan thinking and objectives in this unlikely union. The road will not be easy for us, and Morocco’s alliance with Libya has clearly harmed Hassan’s improving image in the United States. We should recognize, however, as the King has repeatedly stressed to me, that the Treaty does not represent a formal union or federation, much less a merger of the two states.³ Despite regular dialogue with us on Libya, Hassan and Moroccans generally, also clearly underestimated the depth of U.S. reactions.

In my conversations here, I have left Moroccan officials in no doubt concerning U.S. opposition toward any steps giving legitimacy to the Libyan regime. They now understand our position clearly, and I believe that we should watch developments closely in the coming months. While it will not be a time for dramatic new U.S. projects, equally we must work to preserve what we have built up and put in place in Morocco.

The Kingdom remains a strategically located, moderate Arab state in a volatile region. Its command of the Straits of Gibraltar and location on flight paths to the Persian Gulf will continue to make it a valuable partner, although not one we can take for granted. In political terms, Morocco remains chairman of the major Arab and Islamic organizations and will inevitably be important to the United States. It was King Hassan who worked behind-the-scenes to set up Anwar Sadat’s historic journey to Jerusalem⁴ and who, last January at Casablanca, worked to end Egypt’s isolation from the Islamic Conference.⁵ With the largest Jewish population in the Arab World, King Hassan has also set an example of harmony for his divided region, hosting a conference of Moroccan Jewish communities in Rabat last May, attended by members of the Israeli Knesset and world Jewish leaders. In the economic field, Morocco’s current liberalization policy and increasing reliance on the free market process hold promise of long-term stability and reflect precisely the policies which we are urging the developing world to follow.

Given these long-term interests, I believe that both in personal contacts with key Moroccans and in our overall policy toward the Kingdom we should strike a careful balance between recrimination and acceptance of a fait accompli. After signature of the Treaty with Libya and its approval by 99.9 percent of the population in a national referendum, it would be hard to disavow without loss of face in the short term. There are also tactical reasons which impelled Morocco toward Libya. Among them I would cite:

— Pressure on Algeria to offset the recent Algerian/Tunisian/Mauritanian Agreement.

— Libyan support on the Western Sahara and agreement to cut off its flow of Soviet arms to the Polisario.

— Possible improvement of Morocco’s diplomatic situation in the OAU by neutralizing Qadhafi’s proteges (Ethiopia, Bourkina Fasso, Madagascar, etc.) and offering weary Africans an alternative Arab or Maghreb forum for the Western Sahara.

— Libyan financial support at a moment of acute austerity.

— Access to Libya’s one-half million foreign workforce for Moroccans and potentially troublesome Moroccan returnees from Europe.

— Increased Moroccan bargaining power to strike a subsequent deal with Algeria, Saudi Arabia and others.

As Hassan measures these possible advantages against adverse reaction from the United States and others, I suspect that there will be a period of trial and error in the union with Libya. In the longer run, I believe that political “unions”—and even for that matter Qadhafis—come and go in the Arab World, but that the ties forged over two centuries between the United States and Morocco are likely to prove more lasting.

I wanted particularly to share these preliminary thoughts with you and know that I can count on your support for basic United States interests in Morocco and your continuing interest during the difficult period ahead.⁶

With every best wish,

Joseph

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco. No classification marking. A stamped notation at the top of the letter reads: “1984 SEP 28 PM 1:47 Office of the Secretary of Defense.”
2. In telegram 8038 from Rabat, September 15, Reed summarized his meetings with Hassan, Karim-Lamrani, and “a number of Moroccans within the King’s inner circle. I conclude that, while the treaty is signed and was approved in a referendum by 99.9 percent of the population, there are serious private doubts and divisions within the palace and government over the relationship with Libya.” (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1984 (09/07/1984–09/20/1984))
3. In a September 11 letter to Reagan, Hassan wrote in part: “We are anxious to assure you that the new Treaty affects and modifies in no way the nature of our relations.” He continued: “We made a point of it to inform Colonel Kaddafi beforehand of all there is between the U.S. and Morocco and to express to him clearly our firm determination not to modify any of it.” (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1984 (09/31/1984–11/19/1984))
4. Reference is to Sadat’s November 1977 visit to Jerusalem, during which he addressed the Israeli Knesset. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 147, 149, 150, 152, and 153.
5. Reference is to the Arab leaders summit held in January during which the Arab League voted to allow Egypt to rejoin the organization. Egypt was suspended in 1979 after it signed a peace treaty with Israel brokered by President Carter. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition, footnote 3, Document 248.
6. In an October 22 letter to Reed, Weinberger wrote: “Thank you for your assessment of the Oujda Accord.” He continued: “An interagency group is studying our future policy in the area to see what limitations or constraints the Oujda Union has placed on current or future plans and programs. Personally I hope the ‘Union’ ends very shortly.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco)