Office of the Historian

106. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)1

Washington, May 7, 1981

SUBJECT

  • C–130 Aircraft to Algeria (U)

Ray Tanter tells me you asked for a status report on the sale of C–130 aircraft to Algeria, an issue which is of very long standing. The basic facts, coordinated with Ray, are these:2

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State has agreed in principle to the sale, as a means of a) diversifying Algerian arms dependence (up to now they have dealt almost exclusively with the Soviet bloc); b) easing some of the disgruntlement the Algerians feel for what they perceive as a less than forthcoming attitude following their help on the hostage crisis; and c) demonstrating even-handedness in our regional North African policy. (S)
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However, State also feels that the sale can be used to promote some movement toward a political solution in the Western Sahara and want to test the Algerians on that score; (S)
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With the above in mind, Dick Walters met yesterday with Algerian Ambassador Malek, pressed him gently on two points:
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We would need assurances that the aircraft would not be used in support of Polisario operations in the Sahara;3 (C)
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We would like to see the Algerians take an initiative to resume bilateral talks with Morocco on a political settlement of the Saharan conflict (Dick handled this part with great tact, suggesting that since Morocco has greater need of a settlement, Algeria would be in a better position to provide a beau geste).4 (C)

Malek is relaying all of this to Algiers for instructions; pending any response, the ball remains in the Algerian court.5 (U)

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/22/1981–01/22/1982). Secret. Sent for information. An unknown hand initialed for Rentschler.↩
  2. Tanter wrote his initials in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩
  3. On May 4, Walters told Malek that the “U.S. would like to go forward” with the sale of C–130s to Algeria, “but wanted the planes to be for ‘Algerian purposes only.’ Malek said he assumed this meant ‘not in support of the Polisario’ and Walters confirmed this meaning.” (Telegram 115525 to Algiers, May 5; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N810004–0316)↩
  4. Walters told Malek that “the fact of the matter was that Morocco’s fate was at stake, and Algeria’s was not. A resumption of high-level contacts between Algeria and Morocco was desirable. The U.S. was looking for help from the Algerians” to settle the Western Sahara issue. (Ibid.)↩
  5. In the margin underneath this sentence, an unknown hand wrote: “Thank you 5/11.”↩