Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. This particular volume is comprised of five chapters—a chapter documenting the United States’ approach to the region as a whole, three chapters highlighting U.S. bilateral relations with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and a chapter on U.S. policy towards the disputed area of Western Sahara. Together, these chapters illustrate the Reagan administration’s conception of the region as it related to broader United States geopolitical goals and the administration’s attempts to address the wide, often interrelated, range of political, economic, and strategic challenges to the United States’ interests in the area.

The volume covers the administration’s bilateral and multilateral attempts to end the conflict between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO) and Morocco in the Western Sahara, and attempts by Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia to achieve Maghreb unity and contend with Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s belligerence, including brief interludes of “union” with Libya. Coverage of the Reagan administration’s policies toward Libya convey the administration’s concern that Libya’s support for terrorism could destabilize Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and that these nations might opt for loose “unions” with Libya in order to placate Qadhafi.

Other volumes in the Reagan subseries document the civil war in Chad, the Arab-Israeli dispute, U.S.-Franco cooperation in the region, hijacking and hostage-taking incidents involving United States citizens, the Soviet Union, and the administration’s attempts to work with the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) to end the war in Western Sahara. For documents related to the United States’ relations with Libya and the Reagan administration’s attempts to reduce Libyan involvement in the Chadian civil war, readers should consult Foreign Relations 1981–1988, Vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad. For documentation on the Middle East peace process and bilateral United States relations with Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, and Volume XVIII, Lebanon, 1981–1984, Part 1, April 1981-August 1982, and Part 2, September 1982–March 1984. For documentation on overall [Page X] U.S. relations with France, readers should consult Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volumes VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984, and VIII, Western Europe, 1985–1988. For the United States’ responses to the series of high-profile hijackings in the Middle East or involving groups from the region, as well as efforts to secure the release of United States and other kidnapped foreign nationals taken in Lebanon, readers should consult Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XLVII, Counterterrorism, Part 1, 1981–May 1985, and Part 2, June 1985–January 1989.

In addition, readers seeking further context for the Reagan administration’s policies in the Middle East and Africa should consult those Foreign Relations volumes that address other, geographically contiguous regions. Of particular relevance are the following: Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula; Volumes XXV, Southern Africa, 1981–1984, and XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988; Volume XXVII, Sub-Saharan Africa; and Volumes XXXIV, Afghanistan, 1981–October 1985, and XXXV, Afghanistan, November 1985–February 1989. Readers interested in the Reagan administration’s approach to the global energy market should see Volume XXXVI, Trade; Monetary Policy; Industrialized Country Cooperation, 1981–1984, and Volume XXXVII, Trade; Monetary Policy; Industrialized Country Cooperation, 1985–1988. For the administration’s approach to “global negotiations” and U.S. efforts to help alleviate the African famine, readers should consult Foreign Relations 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance, and Volume XLI, Global Issues II. For the administration’s policy toward the United Nations, see Foreign Relations 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues I. For documentation about how the global Cold War competition between the United States and Soviet Union applied to the Reagan administration’s North African policy, readers should see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983; Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985; Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986; and Volume VI, Soviet Union, November 1986-January 1989.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV

As with similar volumes in other Foreign Relations subseries, this volume documents both the United States’ approach to the region as a whole and its bilateral relations with individual North African countries. The volume begins by examining the North Africa region, where, in almost all respects, the Reagan administration faced the same challenges as, and continued the policies of, the Jimmy Carter administration, as documented in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa. In particular, the Reagan administration weighed [Page XI] many issues: the threats that Qadhafi posed to U.S. security and interests, the normalization of relations with Algeria, the divide between Mauritania and Morocco over Western Sahara, and the conclusion of the POLISARIO’s guerilla war.

Documentation includes cable traffic between posts and the Department of State; memoranda between principals, especially those from Secretaries of State Alexander M. Haig and George P. Shultz to Reagan; and analyses from members of the intelligence community. Together, this documentation illustrates how the Reagan administration viewed its long-time allies Morocco and Tunisia, and a potential new ally, Algeria; contended with Qadhafi’s radicalism, support for terrorism, and ever-expanding military power and ambitions; tried to alleviate the effects of the broader African famine on Mauritania; and explored various attempts at regional unity. Moreover, this volume documents the Reagan administration’s perception of U.S. interests in the region (along with adjacent areas of Africa and the Middle East), as well as the region’s broader importance as a theater of East-West competition in the global Cold War.

The volume uses chapters to cover the U.S. bilateral relationships with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Western Sahara. While bilateral relations with these nations were influenced to a significant extent by events elsewhere—such as the Middle East peace process, the civil war in Lebanon, and international terrorism, among others—strategic concerns, especially military supply issues, dominated the respective dialogues. Memoranda of conversation involving Secretaries of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Frank Carlucci, Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs Francis “Bing” West and Richard Armitage, and their Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian counterparts illuminate the political and defense relationships between the United States and its allies. The correspondence between, and memoranda of conversation of, personal meetings between Reagan and Vice President George H.W. Bush and Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, King Hassan II of Morocco, and Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba reflects the extent to which the administration valued close relationships with these leaders. Cable traffic between embassy officials in Algiers, Rabat, and Tunis to Washington conveyed the balance the administration needed to strike between maintaining the United States’ traditional alliances with Morocco and Tunisia while opening up a fruitful new relationship with Algeria—a difficult task given that each country was important to the United States for different reasons.

From 1979 through 1981, Bendjedid and members of his government had helped to mediate the resolution of the Iran hostage crisis; Bendjedid also exhibited a far less suspicious view of the United States than his predecessor, Houari Boumédiène. The Reagan administration [Page XII] wished to capitalize on this new dynamic and worked to resolve contentious bilateral issues with Algeria, such as the continued U.S. purchase of liquefied natural gas from Algeria, as the Algerian Government considered the successful conclusion of these sales emblematic of the new and improved relationship between the two countries. Tensions, however, existed over Bendjedid’s support for the UN’s “Global Negotiations” on the international economy, which the Reagan administration ultimately opposed. The administration also had to balance Algeria’s support for, and training of, Palestine Liberation Organization members with its willingness to become a key player in Washington’s attempts to secure the release of U.S. hostages taken both in Lebanon and during the numerous airplane hijacking and other terrorist incidents that occurred during the 1980s.

Long-time allies Morocco and Tunisia offered opportunities for, and challenges to, the Reagan administration. Both Hassan and Bourguiba, suspicious of the Soviet Union and concerned about Qadhafi’s adventurism, sought to maintain the strong defense relationships that their respective countries had enjoyed with the United States for decades. They also considered themselves leaders of the “moderate” Arab bloc and practitioners of international diplomacy, and sought to leverage these defense relationships with the United States to influence the Reagan administration’s policies regarding the Middle East peace process, the civil war in Angola, and the Namibian conflict. The relationship between the Reagan administration and King Hassan had its ups and downs. For example, while the 1984 “Union” between Morocco and Libya angered Washington, Hassan’s July 1986 meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres was warmly received there. The close relationship between the United States and Israel affected the Reagan administration’s relationship with Tunisia. Israel’s October 1985 attack on the Palestine Liberation Organization’s headquarters in Tunis, for example, temporarily threatened to disrupt U.S.-Tunisian relations. Tunisia was later beset by food riots and external crises, such as Qadhafi’s expulsion of thousands of Tunisian oil workers from Libya, which exacerbated Tunisia’s internal divisions. These crises compelled Bourguiba to request more economic aid from Reagan. In 1987, Bourguiba was removed from office and replaced by Zine Ben Ali, who quickly assured the Reagan administration that he wished to reinvigorate U.S.-Tunisia relations.

The final chapter of the volume documents U.S. policy toward Western Sahara. Like its predecessor, the Reagan administration tried to end the war in Western Sahara. While it worked with the UN and OAU to mediate an end to the conflict, it acknowledged that Algeria’s and Libya’s material support for the POLISARIO guerillas, Morocco’s continued use of U.S. arms in the conflict, and Morocco’s contentious relationship with Mauritania, including charges that the latter allowed POLISARIO [Page XIII] guerillas safe haven, all complicated its efforts and prevented a settlement of the conflict. The conflict also significantly hampered the efforts to encourage Maghreb unity explored in the regional compilation. Reporting telegrams and intelligence memoranda show how the divide between Algeria and Morocco and Mauritania and Morocco hampered the conclusion of a settlement of the Western Saharan war, particularly when the Algerian and Mauritanian governments complained that Morocco was using U.S. military equipment against the POLISARIO.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to thank officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, especially Lisa Magana and Cate Sewell, for facilitating research in the files of the Reagan White House and National Security Council staff, and Simon Staats at the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, who copied relevant documents from the George H.W. Bush Vice Presidential Papers that proved crucial to the completion of this volume. Thanks are also due to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for arranging access to Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archives Capture declassification project. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence at the CIA was accommodating in arranging full access to CIA files, as was Vincent Kenney, who provided access to records from the Department of Defense. Special thanks are due to the Department of State’s Information Programs and Services staff, in particular Ambassador Paul Hare and Kathleen Allegrone of the Senior Foreign Service, for coordinating the review of this volume within the Department of State. The editor also wishes to acknowledge the late Ambassador Harmon E. Kirby, Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d’Affairs in Morocco from 1984 until 1987, who, after his retirement from the Foreign Service, coordinated the review of dozens of Foreign Relations volumes during his years of service in the Department of State’s Office of Information Programs and Services. The editor is also grateful to the staff at the Records and Declassification Division, Washington Headquarters Service, Department of Defense, for their help in declassifying some of the documents included in this volume.

The Office of the Historian wishes to thank the interagency declassification personnel who conducted the review of this volume, including those at the Department of State, Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS), the FRUS Coordination Team at the Central Intelligence Agency, the OSD, Records and Declassification Division (RDD) at the Department of Defense, and the Directorate of Records, Access and Information Security Management at the National Security Council.

Chris Tudda conducted the research for this volume and selected and annotated the documentation under the supervision of Myra Burton, [Page XIV] then Chief of the Africa and the Americas Division, and Kristin L. Ahlberg, Assistant General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Team Lead of the Declassification Coordination Team. Stephanie Eckroth and Nicole Orphanides did the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Team Lead of the Editing and Publishing Team. Both declassification review and technical editing were coordinated by John Powers, Director of the Declassification Coordination, Publishing, and Digital Initiatives Division.