Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

422. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

8157.

Tunis, October 19, 1984, 1506Z

Department repeat as desired. Subj: The Outlook for the OAU Summit: Conversation With Peter Onu.

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. Summary. In conversation with Ambassador, OAU SYG Peter Onu elaborated on his concerns that precipitous OAU Summit could well lead to OAU split of the type envisioned prior to Tripoli Summit collapse. Onu believes that various maneuvers being planned may lead more moderate states to join Morocco in walk out—thereby fragmenting organization.² He thinks current OAU Chairman is unlikely to seek compromise formula which might preserve OAU Unity. Onu has shared these perceptions with GOT (MFA Essebsi is going to Tripoli on October 18 and will visit Morocco in near future) and asked Bourguiba in role of elder statesman to contact other African heads of state to help avoid radical/moderate confrontation over SDAR issue. End summary.

3. I had 80 minutes evening October 17 in private with acting OAU SYG Peter Onu, whom I have known for about ten years. Following emerged.

4. Onu, in response to my questions, said that as date of summit approaches indications are growing that a number of OAU-member governments are getting worried about the outlook. He (Onu) had seen the Moroccans and Libyans (Treki) in UNNY. The Moroccans had told him the organization and its members should brace for a surprise. The Libyans had been unclear as to their intentions in conversation with him, but he (Onu) had pieced together indications of a scenario “which the Algerians would find it difficult to cope with.” One should never underestimate King Hassan, Onu mused.

5. Onu then said that there seemed to be a plan to introduce a “Moroccan” motion at the outset of the conference which would seek to define the attributes of a state (territory, control, sovereignty, etc.) which the Polisario/SDAR could not meet. This motion would fail. Upon its failure, another motion would be introduced which would raise the OAU Charter issue—the organization is to be open to states—in the light of the anticipated failure of the first motion (viz. if you are unwilling to pass a motion which describes the attributes of a state—seeking membership—in ways which would exclude the Polisario, what is it you are prepared to admit by seating the SDAR?). If the SDAR were subsequently seated, these motions would have laid the basis for a walkout different from that inherent in the Western Sahara conflict. That, Onu said, could in turn bring the walkout with Morocco of a far greater number of states.

6. In all of this, Onu pointed out, the Libyan attitude remains important. The Swazi representative had just told Onu that Libya had urged delay in convening the summit “since the issue of the Western Sahara is not yet ripe for settlement.” Libya had told the Swazi, waving a list of states allegedly ready to walk out that an untimely summit risked the fragmentation of the OAU. The Swazi had shared his fears for the organization’s future with Onu after hearing the Libyan warning. Onu had taken note—there were other such straws in the wind—but repeated that Treki had waffled in conversation with him.

7. Onu deplored the situation in which the organization now found itself. A premature summit which saw the SDAR seated would at best give Algiers a pyrrhic victory. Morocco having left the OAU, the problem would not merely remain unsolved on the ground—but the Nairobi resolution would become a scrap of paper. The excessive OAU focus on direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario had caused members to overlook certain key aspects of the Saharan conflict, viz. that Morocco had accepted a referendum “at any time” but the Polisario had not/not “ever” done so and that Morocco’s reservations on “direct negotiations” had been entered ab initio having been repeatedly cited since. Fragmentation of the OAU remains a very real possibility, Onu said, and would represent a loss to all of the members attached to the survival of the organization. Finally, the Chairman (Mengistu) is not likely to pick up a pilgrim’s staff to go to capitals to drum up support for a temporizing measure, e.g. a new set of Wisemen to replace the immobilized eroding Implementation Committee.

8. Comment: Onu is understandably afraid for the survival of the OAU. He believes that rising time pressures, uncertainties over Libya’s use of its link to Morocco and influence with clients, Moroccan maneuvering, Algerian intransigence and Mengistu’s rigidities may be steering the organization on the rocks. Right or wrong, he is far from sure that Morocco’s withdrawal “with one or two friends” is all that will happen if the SDAR is seated. It has penetrated that any Algerian summit success could comport a heavy price to OAU members without solving the problem in situ.

9. Onu has shared some of this with Tunisian FonMin Caid Essebsi who is going to Tripoli today—and reportedly to Morocco shortly—as well as with Bourguiba. Bourguiba has promised “as doyen d’age” of all of Africa’s leaders to write a letter to his peers urging them to avoid splitting the organization. We shall seek GOT’s reactions to Onu’s visit and report further as warranted.

Sebastian

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840669–0212. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Algiers, Cairo, Rabat, and USUN.
2. In telegram 4737 from Addis Ababa, October 16, the Embassy reported: “We have heard from a number of sources, including senior officers of the OAU, that the Polisario reps in Addis Ababa have advised their friends in the OAU Secretariat that they will take their seat at the OAU Summit in November. Polisario officials are saying that, if they are not seated at this summit, they will lose any chance of ever being seated. The Polisario reps are calling this ‘a do or die effort.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840660–0414)