Whether to sign a letter (Tab A) to King Hassan of Morocco.
Your response (Tab A) candidly explains our political, legal and security
concerns related to the Moroccan Union with Libya. You express
disappointment and apprehension regarding Qadhafi’s intentions. As you know, an interagency review
of our policy toward North Africa is underway, and we plan to make
policy recommendations regarding U.S.-Moroccan relations in mid-November
for your consideration. Your letter does not address our future
relationship.
Tab A
Letter From President Reagan to King Hassan
II4
Washington, November 17, 1984
Your Majesty:
I was pleased to receive your letter of September 11; I read it with
care. I have discussed with Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, Director Casey, and National Security
Advisor McFarlane the
conversations they held with your trusted adviser, Royal
Counselor—Reda Guedira. I am sure that he has conveyed to you the
essential points and issues covered during his discussions here in
Washington. My views and concerns have also been communicated to you
directly by Ambassadors Reed
and Walters.
The friendship which historically has bound our two governments and
peoples is both important and enduring just as is my great and
continuing personal regard for Your Majesty. With this foremost in
mind, I am compelled to express my disappointment and apprehension
concerning the step which you have taken with the Libyan regime.
I appreciate your assurances that Libya will not derive benefits from
existing or future agreements between our two countries. In
particular, I am encouraged by your solemn pledge that sensitive
items will not be shared with Libya. The possibility that material
may be obtained by the Libyans is still worrisome, and we must
strive to prevent this.
U.S. foreign policy is conditioned and influenced by Congressional
action and open to public scrutiny and criticism. I know you are
well aware of this basic characteristic of the American system.
We are dealing presently with both of these aspects, but we are faced
with mounting pressures in both fora to consider the impact of your
new union, and future actions which ensue from it, on our bilateral
relations.
Equally important to these considerations are my continued
apprehensions about what this agreement may portend. My concern is
deep because I feel so strongly about the strength and importance of
the relationship which we have forged together over the past four
years. This relationship must be preserved and safeguarded insofar
as possible from interference and harm.
Your Majesty, you understand better than most the true nature of the
Qadhafi regime. The
record establishes that he is not a man to be trusted. In his 15
years of turbulent and erratic rule, there have been times when
Qadhafi has tried to
appear both reasonable and
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responsible. Whether in the Arab, African or global context, these
periods, regrettably, have been all too brief. The record confirms
that episodes of “good behavior” are short-lived and, if the past is
repeated, Qadhafi’s real
nature as an inveterate troublemaker and enemy of the West and of moderate governments
such as yours will soon re-emerge with the dangerous and
unacceptable behavior which is a trademark of his rule. This is why
I am so deeply troubled by the prospect that he will betray Your
Majesty as he has other governments with whom he has made such
arrangements in the past.
I know that you have set yourself the noble goal of reforming the
Libyan leader. You are a wise, honorable and skillful leader as has
been so often and amply demonstrated. Yet, in this instance I must
express to you my conviction that nothing of real or lasting value
can come from your association with Qadhafi. Failure to achieve your stated goal could
entail significant costs, and I fear that your great and richly
deserved reputation may be tarnished by the efforts on which you
have embarked.
Your Majesty, I speak with a heavy heart and out of deep friendship.
In the interest of preserving and enhancing the friendship and
cooperation between our countries, it is my earnest hope that a way
can be found to dispel quickly the pall cast on our relationship by
your treaty with Qadhafi.
I remain your sincere friend,
Sincerely,
