Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

393. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

302.

Algiers, January 24, 1982, 1610Z

For Deputy Secretary Designate Stoessel from Ambassador. Subject: Western Sahara: Encouragement of Negotiations. Ref: A) Rabat 474,² B) State 18162.³

1. S—Entire text.

2. We would like to comment briefly on a few points in reftels from the perspective of Algiers.

3. In para 8 of ref A, it is stated that Morocco has accepted the OAU resolution and Algeria is seeking to reinterpret it.⁴ Without going into a detailed examination of the respective positions (which are laid out in the cable traffic), we would simply like to say that it is natural, in a negotiating situation, that each side will interpret a basic text in a way favorable to itself. While Algeria pressed a UN resolution which called for direct negotiations in order to demonstrate international support for the Polisario position, Morocco has as yet shown little inclination to accept a fair referendum, as called for by the OAU. In any case, these differences are matters to be resolved in future negotiations.

4. Para 8 of ref A states that “Algiers must be persuaded that prolonging war by postponing a settlement will be resisted by Morocco to point of unpredictable repercussions, which could prove dangerous and damaging to Algeria itself”. If we use this language with Algerian leaders, it will seem to them a threat to escalate the war through greater U.S. assistance to Morocco, perhaps even through U.S. intervention, unless the conflict is settled on Morocco’s terms. Since we have little leverage with Algeria, such a threat would not help resolve the conflict and would only worsen U.S.-Algerian relations to no purpose. On the other hand, we certainly have no objection to repeating our exhortations to Algeria to work for a peaceful solution which would enhance regional stability, and will continue to encourage Algeria in this direction at every opportunity. We must be very careful in the language we use with Algeria, particularly since in the Algerian view it is Morocco which is refusing to settle the war through organization of a fair referendum.

5. Our recent exchange of messages indicated that for the time being neither Morocco nor Algeria can settle on terms acceptable to the other side. We therefore need a U.S. position which will be viable for a considerable period of time, pending political changes in Morocco or Algeria which will make a peaceful solution possible. Current U.S. policy strikes us as right for the long term: Limited assistance to Morocco to help the King, neutrality on the final outcome, support for the principle of self-determination, and encouragement of all to seek a peaceful solution (which at present means support for the OAU resolutions). It is dangerous to believe that any particular U.S. action, such as pressure on Algeria (or on Morocco) can resolve the problem quickly. Should diplomatic activities in the OAU context and bilateral Algeria-Morocco discussions bring the sides closer together, there will be time enough to consider how the U.S. can use its leverage to close the gap.

6. In para 6 of ref B Royal Counselor Guedira is cited as stating that Morocco’s desire for a close alliance with the U.S. has nothing to do with the Western Sahara problem. Whatever judgement one might make as to Guedira’s sincerity, we would note that Algeria would certainly view a U.S.-Moroccan alliance in the light of the Western Sahara conflict.

7. Department repeat as desired.

Newlin

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 474 from Rabat, January 19, the Embassy commented that Hassan’s decision “to undertake an unprecedented alignment with the US stems from his increasingly pessimistic appraisal of Morocco’s problems. The course of developments in Europe and the Maghreb, together with Morocco’s own socio-economic conditions, have induced him to table the option of a break with the Kingdom’s traditional non-aligned stance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N820001–0487)
3. In telegram 18162 to Rabat, January 23, the Department provided a summary of Guedira’s January 21 meeting with Stoessel, noting: “King Hassan wants to examine carefully the possibility of an alliance relationship with the U.S. either bilaterally or in an inter-regional context. He would like a discussion with Secretary Haig in Morocco to further prepare for a dramatic move to result from his visit to Washington.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820039–0699) Haig and Hassan discussed this on February 11. See Document 199.
4. See footnote 2, Document 378.