Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

378. Memorandum From Dennis Blair of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, June 23, 1981

SUBJECT

• Message from King Hassan of Morocco

Casey’s memo gives an accurate account of King Hassan’s gambit at the OAU summit. Although the idea of a referendum in the Western Sahara is in line with our policy, it is by no means clear that Hassan’s particular proposal will succeed in gaining majority support. There is considerable support in the OAU for the idea of recognizing the SDAR,² and if Hassan walks out, he may take only one or two more states with him. We need to involve the State Department in this issue, deciding how much public support we will give to Hassan, and at what level it will be expressed. This is not a matter which Casey and the President should be deciding alone without other input. (S)

Fred Wettering concurs, as does Geoff Kemp.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.³

Tab I

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan⁴

Washington, June 23, 1981

SUBJECT

• Message from King Hassan of Morocco (U)

Bill Casey has sent you a detailed memo on King Hassan’s plan for a Western Sahara referendum. The King intends to present his plan on June 25 at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Nairobi. He requests a message from you at that summit publicly supporting the plan. (S)

We have a few days to analyze the advisability of such a message to the King. A referendum in the Western Sahara is in line with our overall policy, however it is by no means clear that King Hassan’s plan will carry the day at the OAU. In addition, it is not clear whether you should personally send the letter to Hassan at the summit or it should be sent at a lower level. We should discuss the issue with State and reach a consensus position.⁵ (S)

Tab A

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan⁶

Washington, June 23, 1981

SUBJECT

• Re, King Hassan’s Western Sahara Peace Initiative at Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit

On my April visit to Morocco, King Hassan told me: he would make, in June at the OAU summit a peace initiative to settle the war with the Polisario in the Western Sahara. He said he would need the help of his friend and would provide details of the peace initiative as soon as he formulated it.

[8 paragraphs (28 lines) not declassified]

The King believes it would aid his cause greatly in Nairobi if you were, immediately following his speech, to send him a supportive public message congratulating him for his proposal. He stressed that this is not a “pressing request.” If you find it premature of [or?] inopportune, let it go. Nevertheless, when the King first told me about his proposed initiative back in April, he said he would want help from his friends and he clearly wants a gesture of support from the United States.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

The question is what should you do. He is very anxious that the formulation of his proposal not be disclosed before he makes it public and asked that his request be presented directly to you. [less than 1 line not declassified] The State Department will recommend to you whether a message should be sent and what it should say. Perhaps State should check with other countries when Hassan’s statement becomes public. Hassan would probably be satisfied by a statement that his proposal appears to be a hopeful first step down the road of a peaceful solution over the conflict of the Western Sahara.

As a matter of timing

— [1 line not declassified]

— Hassan will speak on Thursday.⁷

— State should advise on the response on Thursday.

— Stoessel and Veliotes are informed and will get papers as soon as they come in from Morocco.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (06/12/1981–07/21/1981). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2. In telegram 14164 from Nairobi, June 27, the Embassy reported: “All of the SDAR’s major supporters have endorsed King Hassan’s call for a referendum in the Western Sahara, although Libya has remained silent. A committee on implementation of the referendum began work as soon as it was appointed; the draft resolution it has prepared is certain to be controversial.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810303–0437) The text of the resolution is in telegram 14236 from Nairobi, June 29. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810304–0423)
3. Allen checked and initialed the “Approve” option on June 23. An unknown hand wrote: “Hand carried orig to Darman’s ofc.”
4. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
5. At the bottom of the memorandum, Reagan wrote: “I’m willing to do this unless there is some pressing reason why I shouldn’t. RR.” To the right of Reagan’s notation, an unknown hand wrote: “done—w/ [illegible] 7/1.”
6. Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.”
7. June 25.