Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kenya¹

6618.

Washington, January 9, 1982, 2316Z

SUBJECT

• Western Sahara Status of Negotiations: Implementation Committee Meeting.

Refs:

• (A) 81 State 300474,²
• (B) 81 State 314187.³

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Department is in process of evaluating where the OAU’s Western Sahara peace initiative stands and how we might be helpful. As part of this process, we believe it would be useful to solicit in a frank exchange of views President Moi’s thoughts on what he sees as the next steps in the OAU’s peace efforts in the Western Sahara. At the same time, we could share with him our assessment of Algerian and Moroccan positions—as we currently understand them—on resolution of the Western Saharan conflict which may be valuable to him as he focuses on an agenda and strategy for the reported January OAU Implementation Committee meeting. We could also take this opportunity to reiterate our desire that there be progress in the OAU’s efforts in the Western Sahara and that the modalities of a cease-fire and referendum be well established before the OAU chairmanship is scheduled to be taken up by Qadhafi this summer.

3. You should seek a meeting with Moi to share with him our assessment of the Moroccan and Algerian positions on resolution of the Western conflict as outlined paragraph four. Ref B outlines U.S. position. You should also solicit Moi’s views on what he hopes to accomplish at the January Implementation Committee meeting. Will the focus on the meeting be on provisions for a cease-fire and groundwork for a referendum? In this context, we would be interested in the outcome of his consultations with the UN SecGen. Does he think the consensus decision is enough to move ahead and fulfill the Nairobi II resolution? Finally, how does President Moi see the Western Saharan peace process unfolding in the next six months? Does he think it can be sufficiently in place to prevent interference by Qadhafi when he is scheduled to assume the OAU chairmanship next summer?

4. Post should draw on paragraph 3 the following talking points and reftels for meeting with Moi:

• Assessment of Moroccan and Algerian positions on Western Sahara:

  — We are aware of high-level contacts between the Moroccans and Algerians before, during and after the Fez Summit.⁴ We understand that the Western Sahara was discussed within the context of regional stability and cooperation. These series of bilateral contacts now seem to have been suspended, but it may have contributed to an improvement in bilateral relations.

  — Both the Moroccans and the Algerians have emphasized to us their continuing support for the OAU peace process. There are serious differences on thorny issues related to the modalities of the proposed referendum. While not minimizing these differences, it is reassuring that a commitment to the process remains despite the escalation of fighting last October.

  — Both parties seem concerned that a solution be achieved over the next six months while the Implementation Committee is led by Kenya. Both parties seem to believe that useful negotiations might continue under the auspices of the Implementation Committee.

• U.S. concerns:

  — We agree with Moroccans and Algerians that the interests of all parties are served by continuing progress of the OAU Implementation Committee’s peace initiative in the Western Sahara.

  — In this regard, we believe that progress in the next six months is crucial in order to ensure (a) the interested parties do not opt out of the peace process and decide to pursue their goals through renewed fighting and (b) the modalities of a cease-fire and referendum are well established to minimize interference by Qadhafi.

5. FYI for Ambassador Harrop. You will receive septel⁵ instructing you to emphasize to Moi the continuing importance of Chad in the OAU framework. This message will be in response to your conversation with Biwott (Nairobi 28825).⁶ We realize Moi faces a formidable task of dealing simultaneously with two issues of critical importance to the OAU, Africa and the international community. We continue to believe we should press him to remain active on both fronts.⁷ End FYI.

6. For info addressees: Any relevant information on proposed January Implementation Committee would be appreciated.

Haig

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820014–1005. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by William Hudson (AF/W) and Hull; cleared by Robert Bruce (AF/W), Marie Huhtala (AF/C), Flaten, Richard Roth (AF/E), and Bishop, and in substance by Albert Fairchild (AF/I and for information by Douglas McElhaney (IO/UNP); approved by Crocker. Sent for information Immediate to Paris, Lagos, Bamako, Conakry, Dar es Salaam, Rabat, Algiers, Nouakchott, USUN, London, Khartoum, and Freetown.
2. In telegram 300474 to multiple recipients, November 11, 1981, the Department reported: “At this juncture it is critical both that no party believe it can successfully pursue a military solution to the conflict in the Western Sahara and that the momentum generated by the OAU summit this summer and the subsequent meeting of the Implementation Committee not be allowed to lag. To this end the USG will supply Morocco, in the framework of the long-standing US/Moroccan military relationship, with defensive equipment which will allow it to counter the sophisticated weaponry recently introduced in the Western Sahara. At the same time, we seek to encourage the OAU to get ceasefire negotiations underway as soon as possible.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810534–0625)
3. In telegram 314187 to Rabat, November 26, 1981, the Department instructed the Embassy to emphasize “that the primary policy of the United States with regard to the Western Sahara conflict is support for the OAU process which is based on the King’s initiative and which aims at a peaceful solution of the conflict through a referendum.” However, the Department stressed, “we do not rpt not believe a military solution is feasible.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810563–0093)
4. Reference is to the Arab League Summit held in Fez November 6–9, 1981.
5. Not found.
6. In telegram 28825 from Nairobi, December 31, 1981, the Embassy reported that Biwott said “Moi’s first OAU priority will be Western Sahara which is in fact a more urgent and more important problem” than Chad. “Moi,” Biwott continued: “is responsive to Hassan’s urgent desire to resolve this issue while a compatible moderate chairs the OAU. When Qadhafi becomes chairman, no progress will be possible.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820001–0942)
7. In telegram 1466 from Nairobi, January 20, the Embassy reported that in response to the U.S. démarche, “in addition to ceasefire, President Moi expects Sahara Consultative Ministerial (February 3–6) and Summit (February 7–8) will discuss voter registration rolls question, interim administration, and other modalities for referendum in Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820032–1072)