Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

199. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Marrakesh, February 11, 1982, 7:50–8:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Private Meeting at the Palace. Secretary Haig, King Hassan II. 7:50–8:45 p.m., February 11, 1982. Marrakech, Morocco.

During the preliminary part of the conversation, the King pointed out that there are many countries in Africa that want to be and remain free. Only the U.S. can guarantee and maintain that freedom because whenever the Russians go anywhere they do not give money, they do not give gold of which they have substantial reserves; they give equipment: bulldozers, tractors, and that is really a field where the U.S. is second to none. Rather than give to Somalia or Tanzania money which must be accounted for, the King suggested the U.S. give them some tractors, bulldozers and the mechanics. This will constitute a limited presence. This is a fact that the Russians understand very well.

The King began the substantial part of the meeting by expressing his great pleasure in receiving Secretary Haig at this particular point in time, which offers for Morocco, the U.S., and the world, a propitious set of circumstances.

The King: This, however, is an opportunity that must be grabbed immediately. From the Moroccan standpoint, the consequences of the Western Saharan problem is that the Moroccan people are asking for reliable friends and allies. From the domestic U.S. standpoint, you have a year and a half before you start thinking of the next election. Everything will then come to a halt.

The Secretary: You know us too well, Your Majesty.

The King mentioned Europe and his perception of Morocco as part of Europe, Gibraltar being a purely geological accident and Morocco standing at the gateway of the Mediterranean. The King then looked at the map:

— SPAIN: It is the King’s strong wish that in 1983 Philippe Gonzalez not repeat² not win the election. The Spanish military is very worried.

— FRANCE: Mitterrand is anti-communist to be sure, but he is a dangerous man. He had said to the King, “I want things after me never to be like they were before me.” Mitterrand does not simply want to make changes in society, he wants to change the nature of society. In the FRG, we have a defeatist attitude. The German people were made for war just like the Japanese people, but they have been forbidden to make war. The King stated that the Secretary knew what the situation was in Italy.

The Secretary: Italy is in fact the strongest of the three with Germany and France and that shows you how bad things are.

The King: Then we have Yugoslavia, and Greece, who no longer want to be part of the West. And we have Turkey concerned about cultivating its poppies and producing heroin. To turn now to the Arab countries which ring the Mediterranean on the other side. Leaving Egypt aside, we have Libya. Tunisia is very small, then there is Algeria, and then there is us. The Mediterranean is like a chunk of Swiss cheese full of holes. We are more worried with European defeatism, which is more dangerous, than Soviet penetration in the Sahara because it is an intellectual attitude of defeatism. To whom can Morocco cling? Mauritania to the south of us offers a dangerous situation because there is a vacuum there but to the south of it are strong countries. Senegal is free and wants to remain free. Guinea, under Sekou Toure, made a 180° turn. Mohammed V has given his name to the current graduating school of Guinea students because in Sekou Toure’s words, he was the first liberator of Africa and Guinea wants to be free. The Ivory Coast wants to be free, also. The U.S. doesn’t have the right to practice political segregation. In the U.S. talk of the free world means Europe. Europe is not the free world by itself. For the U.S., which was the new world 200 years ago, today the new world is Africa. Tomorrow it will be Latin America which is opposite the African continent. Because Brazil is the world of the future, the Royal Moroccan staff must learn Portuguese. Brazil does not know its potential.

The Secretary agreed that Brazil was not prepared to take the effort to discover what its full potentialities were.

The King stated very strongly that Morocco wants and is determined to have an alliance with the U.S., and that he hopes very much that the answer will be yes. He wants this for his country because his country must live on after him and Morocco stands at a very dangerous crossroads today.

The King recalled at length the role played by Morocco in stopping Turkish penetration thereby saving Europe from a Turkish pincer movement. The King had told the Pope that Muslim Morocco had saved western Christianity. The Pope is coming in October, not to say a Mass for 150,000 faithful, but to address a group of 150,000 young people because the King views the Pope as primarily an educator.

The King stressed that Morocco wants an alliance with the U.S. in a realistic and courageous frame of mind and without demeaning itself. It cannot do as much for the U.S. as the U.S. can give to Morocco, but it will give the U.S. what its history has taught it to give. The King would like to have the Secretary’s reaction as well as President Reagan’s reaction.

The Secretary: Over the years we have benefitted from Moroccan friendship and from the King’s own friendship. We have just emerged from the Vietnam/Watergate nightmare. We are beginning to understand the changes in the world. I agree that the situation in Europe is very dangerous. Mitterrand is on his good behavior for the present but he is a revolutionary and in a year or two, there may be great difficulties with France. The FRG is in a difficult situation. I had long talks with Genscher in Madrid.³ The Bundestag endorsement of Schmidt is a charade. Schmidt barely survived. We can smell the death.

The King: Who comes after Schmidt?

The Secretary: Maybe Kohl who is not strong. Perhaps Genscher as a compromise candidate, who is good and strong and who will make sure that Schmidt is able to operate.

The Secretary described the domestic German political situation and then turned to Spain.

The Secretary: Philippe Gonzalez is strong but if he comes to power the Spanish military will move. If the present government sees the Socialists become the majority in the minority group, they will turn to Fraga and the [“]Right.”

The King: Fraga is a close personal friend, a good man, and our adviser on tourism.

The Secretary: We welcome your close communication with the King of Spain. You know how they feel about Morocco.

The King: The Spanish Air Force Chief of Staff told Colonel Kabbaj that if forced to choose in strategic terms between defending the King of Spain and the King of Morocco, he would choose the latter.

The Secretary: The situation in Africa is extremely dangerous largely because of Qadhafi who destabilizes regimes with money and Soviet military equipment. The U.S. is concerned about the central African countries and Nigeria.

The King: Nigeria especially because Qadhafi was stopped in Chad by Nigeria.

The Secretary: France will not play in the future the role it played in the past in Africa. I go on pressuring them but they are not reliable. Fate may intervene. I get reports that President Mitterrand is gravely ill.

The King: I found his complexion very sallow. He keeps clutching his right arm. De Marenches has given me some confidential information as has my personal physician. The danger in medication is that it affects the decision making process as happened with the Shah of Iran and Boumediene. Mitterrand may die two or three years from now but will he be making rational decisions or will they be irrational?

The King commented on the marital difficulties of Mitterrand.

As an example of confused policies in France he said that at lunch Mitterrand told him, asking him to keep it a secret, that the Russian gas deal had been signed while he, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Foreign Trade were uninformed. Four days later, Cheysson, Prime Minister Mauroy, and Foreign Trade Minister Jobert said on French TV that they had not known of the signing of the agreement.

The Secretary commented on the change in Egypt. Mubarak has limited resources. If there is a surprise or a setback, he may panic. He is going to need help, stability, and counseling.

The King pointed out that Mubarak is a flyer, knows how to use a checklist, but is not brilliant like Sadat. Two weeks ago, his Chief of Intelligence came to Marrakech. No one saw him come or go. The King wishes to see Egypt come back into the Family of Nations on the occasion of the next Summit which will be held in May or June, for the sake of Egypt and also for the sake of the Saudis so that they are not alone confronting the extremists.

The Secretary expressed his concern about seeing the Saudis move too quickly. He felt a setback would make them lose their nerve. We needed them, but they needed constant reassurance.

The Secretary described U.S. pressure on Begin so that he will stay out of Lebanon, and the fear of the Sinai withdrawal becoming a problem. The Secretary stated that we felt now that it would be returned and with luck we would prevent an Israeli attack against Lebanon. But the Soviets now understand there were opportunities for them in the Middle East. For the first time Gromyko, in Geneva,⁴ suggested carving out a benign state for Palestine. Begin was itching to go in and crush the PLO. He has six months of equipment, could defeat any combination of Arab states, and buy five or six years of security. That was the danger in the immediate sense.

The King mentioned the large Moroccan Jewish community in Israel; it is large and influential, 600,000 strong. He knew that Begin prayed daily that he would sooner die than return the Sinai.

The Secretary said that Secretary Weinberger had talked to him of his visit to Saudi Arabia.⁵ Two agreements had been signed—one on AWACS, and one on the Joint Commission. (The King had asked about those agreements.) The Secretary described the Saudis’ reluctance to discuss anything publicly even in the face of new threats.

The King described the problems he has dealing with the Saudis: they have no sense of time. They never embrace their friends openly and directly, having yielded once to blackmail, they must now pay every time. The King knows for a fact that Saudi Arabia recently gave Syria $9 billion. The King has asked for 200 million dollars for CBU’s and 3 or 4 C130’s but the Saudis tell him to wait.

The Secretary concluded that the Saudis are prompt to pay their enemies and not to support their friends. He knows that on Weinberger’s agenda was strong pressure on the Saudis to help Morocco. The U.S. would keep up that pressure. The Secretary added he wanted to return to the King’s original question. The King has been a stable friend, a strategic thinker, and an experienced leader of the region. How best to achieve a stronger and closer cooperation? Not by formal treaties requiring Congressional action. We can get the same outcome or closer cooperation, understanding, and coordinated work by other means. The Secretary had not discussed this in detail with the President, who looks forward to talking with the King about the dangers and the role of Morocco. The Secretary could assure that President Reagan was not Jimmy Carter. Changes had been made in the Department of State, too, so that dealing with Africa was more realistic. A brief discussion took place concerning Qadhafi.

The King then outlined the following approach concerning closer understanding with the U.S.: first, regarding the facilities the U.S. was asking for, these are granted. The King agreed that we (U.S.) will get Sidi Slimane, the one we prefer. In the second place, the King outlined a Moroccan, Spanish, Portuguese mutual defense treaty which is a very natural arrangement that no one can object to. The Secretary agreed that this was a sound approach which Spain was willing to consider. The new Chief of Staff has been hand picked by the King of Spain. King Hassan said that General Aramburu had recently visited with him and agreed to that approach.

Mrs. Thatcher’s strong personality was discussed by the King in very favorable terms, with the Secretary and the King exchanging anecdotes.

The Secretary concluded that he wants DOD to move quickly. The King has received many assurances but seen little action.

The King said: We trust you.

The King pointed out that the Polisario would retreat because of Moroccan military action and also because of the presence of the U.S. in Morocco; Gromyko would tell Chadli, “the more you do the more it brings the U.S. to Morocco.” The entire Moroccan people were united, pointed out the King; the defense of Morocco comes first.

The Secretary pointed out that after eight hours with Gromyko he found him confronting great difficulties, which Gromyko did not know how to solve. The King responded that he saw the Polish situation as the beginning of the end for the Soviet Union.⁶

The Secretary observed that for the first time Gromyko was prepared to discuss an arrangement concerning Angola. The Secretary described the parallel withdrawals. Both agreed that in any future Angolan settlement, Savimbi must play a part. The King knew that the Saudis had been asked to give Savimbi $5 million and had given $500,000 to Savimbi. A brief discussion of the Clark Amendment took place.⁷

It was agreed that at dinner the discussion would be general, concerning Nairobi, the Bi-National Commission for Cultural Matters, and the Security Assistance Agreement. A private conversation would take place again after dinner.

The King said that CBU deliveries would begin arriving in 48 hours. He needed a C130 and two or three helicopters. The Saudis were sitting on these requests.

A brief discussion took place on Syria and the present problems in the North. The King then introduced Professor Alaoui and requested the Secretary’s support for a setting up of a cardio-vascular surgery department in the military hospital in Morocco. The Secretary agreed to support this request.

The meeting adjourned at 8:45 p.m.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Alexander Haig Papers, Day File, Box 69, February 11, 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Alec Toumayan on February 17. The meeting took place at the Royal Palace in Marrakesh. At the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: “Very Close Hold” and circled the word “Morocco” in the subject line.
2. An unknown hand crossed through the word “repeat.”
3. Haig visited Madrid February 7–10 to discuss the status of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with NATO Foreign Ministers. Documentation on the meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.
4. Reference is to Haig’s meetings with Gromyko in Geneva on January 26. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Documents 137 and 138.
5. Documentation on Weinberger’s visit to Saudi Arabia is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
6. Reference is to the recent crisis when, in December 1981, the Reagan administration warned the Soviet Union against invading Poland after Polish Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Documents 116–118, 120–123.
7. Reference is to an amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (1976) (CP.L. 94–329; 90 Stat. 729), sponsored by Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), which prohibited aid to groups involved in military or paramilitary operations in Angola.