Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State and the Embassies in Morocco and Tunisia¹

328.

Algiers, January 25, 1982, 1511Z

SUBJECT

• Status of Polisario Relations With Algeria and Libya.

Ref:

• A) [less than 1 line not declassified], B) [less than 1 line not declassified]

1. S—Entire text.

2. We would like to draw Department’s attention to the two referenced [less than 1 line not declassified] reports, which highlight a critical element of the Western Sahara conflict—Libya’s present denial of arms to the Polisario following its June accord with Morocco.²

3. Ref A reports [less than 1 line not declassified] that fundamental differences exist between the Polisario, Libya and Algeria over how to proceed in the Western Sahara conflict. While the Polisario wishes to press forward militarily to achieve its objectives, Algeria and Libya are urging reliance on the OAU negotiating process. With regard to Algeria this seems to us an accurate reading for, as we have noted before, Algeria increasingly sees its interests in terms of regional stability and economic cooperation. In addition, the U.S. response to Guelta Zemmour³ has probably convinced Algeria that military escalation is a no-win proposition and gravely risks superpower involvement.

4. On the other hand, Libya’s denial of sophisticated arms to the Polisario seems more fragile than Algeria’s policy of restraint. Libya’s purpose last June, as we understand it, was to secure Moroccan acquiescence to Libya’s chairmanship of the OAU and an end to Moroccan military assistance to Habre. We doubt Qadhafi has much faith in OAU efforts to reach a Western Sahara settlement or would hesitate to resume supplying sophisticated weapons to the Polisario if he thought it in his interest to heat up the “situation”.

5. [less than 1 line not declassified]. It seems to us that the paramilitary training which General Dlimi has reportedly agreed to provide anti-Qadhafi elements is exactly what Qadhafi would regard as grounds to break the June accord. If that occurs, it could have a profound effect on U.S. and Moroccan interests in a peaceful settlement of the Sahara conflict. This is only one part of the picture, but one we hope will be taken into account in our discussions with Morocco on its future relations with Libya.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820041–0859. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Reference is to the June 17 meeting between Hassan and a Libyan diplomat regarding a rapprochement between the two countries contingent upon Libya ending its military support for the Polisario.
3. See Document 385.