Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

6444.

Rabat, August 27, 1982, 0900Z

SUBJECT

• Some Thoughts on Future US Policy Directions in the Maghreb.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: The purpose of this cable is to share with the Department and our colleagues in North Africa some thoughts and questions we have about U.S. bilateral and multilateral policies in North Africa after the success at the OAU summit in helping prevent a Qadhafi victory.² We believe the present situation offers us opportunities. End summary.

3. Introduction: It seems to us that what has taken place at Beirut and Tripoli may constitute significant turning points for the Maghreb.³ In taking stock at this time, we offer some thoughts for next steps in the evolution of U.S. policy. We send these observations from Rabat for further discussion, and we will welcome comments from the Department and advice on next steps.

First, we believe that Qadhafi’s fiasco with the OAU meetings can prove a highly satisfactory development in terms of U.S. policy objectives. Whatever the reason African leaders stayed away from Tripoli—opposition to Polisario membership of the OAU, rejection of attempts by Libya since at least February to manipulate and control the OAU, or avoidance of seemingly chronic inter-Arab quarrels—the result is clear: a rebuke to Qadhafi’s ambitions and long record of intervention. The “non-summit” was for the Polisario a major political setback, for it failed to win confirmation of the “Kodjo coup” by which it obtained access to the OAU February. Moreover, as the ostensible reason for the failed summit, the Polisario has caused discord between its prime backers, Algeria and Libya, and the particular resentment of the latter.

With the Tripoli fiasco and some modest military successes against the Polisario in July 1982, the Moroccan outlook has now rebounded sharply from the low point experienced after the Polisario blow at Guelta Zemmour in October 1981.⁴ Thanks to the Tripoli outcome high officials here regard the Saharan problem as in better balance. Recent talks with Moroccan leaders lead us to believe, however, that Morocco is not inclined to move rapidly away from what is essentially a static position. A standoff, or stalemate, that is, the status quo is probably acceptable for us over the short run; however, we believe it is not too early to discuss what might at some point reinvigorate the process of peaceful settlement of the Saharan dispute.

In the meantime, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and even Libya probably perceive they have a far more important issue before them now—the greatly altered balance of power in the Middle East by virtue of the dispersal of the PLO. It is not as contenders within the OAU but as members within the Arab League that we believe the Maghreb states will conduct themselves at least through September.

We also believe that more time will be required for the OAU to begin to regroup itself and resume the Nairobi mandate or some other solution for a Saharan settlement. We see no catalyst within the OAU at this juncture. Arap Moi has internal problems to address, and no other cohesive, broadly acceptable leaders of the African states has yet emerged. In a few months, perhaps, it may be opportune to relaunch the implementation committee processes, but it seems too early to make that judgment now. Perhaps, in fact, we shall have to wait until Sekou Toure assumes the OAU presidency. Active OAU attempts to settle the Saharan question may lie in abeyance in the meantime. End introduction.

4. With this as introduction, we suggest the following areas for consideration in the design of U.S. policy in the coming months:

A. The Sahara issue: The U.S. should continue to provide straightforward support for political settlement of the Saharan conflict under OAU auspices. This support, as in the pre-Tripoli summit period, should be expressed selectively and with relative restraint, particularly as long as a continuing Qadhafi candidacy is a possibility.

B. Stability in Morocco: The U.S. should pursue and expand the closer association with Morocco begun at the advent of the Reagan administration. Morocco remains a threatened state, subject to destabilization by adverse economic conditions combined with the military challenge presented by the Polisario. Helping to strengthen Morocco while encouraging the King to seek a political settlement of the Sahara conflict should be an important part of U.S. policy in the region. (We ought to bear in mind the military and economic imbalance faced by the Kingdom relative to Algeria and Libya.) In simple terms, we should continue to help deter some new Guelta Zemmour-like escalation of sophisticated weaponry supplied to and used by the Polisario.

C. Morocco-Algerian relations: In parallel with the above, the U.S. should continue to recognize that the best—perhaps sole—way to obtain a Saharan settlement lies with an eventual improvement of relations between Morocco and Algeria. We know that the King was disappointed by inability to bring about a meeting with President Chadli Bendjedid last December. Perhaps the Arab League context, soon to become highly active, may provide additional opportunities for high level Moroccan-Algerian contacts. The Saudis might be helpful. The Egyptians also. If there are appropriate ways to do so, we should encourage such contacts.
Visits by the new U.S. Secretary of State or Deputy Secretary might advance the better relations concept. On a less dramatic scale, we offer some other lower profile suggestions in the following paragraphs.

D. Some practical possibilities: In unspectacular but practical ways, there may be opportunities for lessening Algero-Moroccan animosities. For example, the establishment of technical, economic, and other non-confrontational relationships is a possibility we should consider and urge forward when appropriate. Given the high sensitivity here of any contacts with the Algerians, we must, of course, move very carefully indeed. Nonetheless, the matter seems worth exploring. Perhaps folding such emergent relationships within a wider context—triple association of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, for example, or within the Arab/Muslim framework—would help to reduce the controversiality of such undertakings. Tunis with its “neutral” cast in North Africa and its Arab League credentials might be a good site for meetings.

E. Public affairs and AID initiatives: We hope that the U.S. Information Agency will use its new look⁵ to see how its resources can be applied to keeping up the pressure on Libya’s dictator Qadhafi on the one hand and to encouraging regional trust in the Maghreb on the other.
Morocco doesn’t hear VOA well. But we understand that Arabic medium wave broadcasts reach North Africa east of here. If correct, such broadcasts are an important element in convincing Libyans of their country’s failing foreign policies and the benefits of moderation and association with Western countries.
At the same time USIA and AID could do more, we believe, in promoting regional conferences and meetings to foster contacts among Americans, Europeans, (e.g. relations with the European Community, the Iberian connection with the Maghreb), Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians and others) thus hopefully reinforcing the benefits of association with other free world nations. The Salburg Seminar and Aspen Institutes programs might be an appropriate model for consideration.
English teaching conferences for ministerial level officials are a prime opportunity in the Maghreb. So are workshops on television and radio production and distribution systems.
AID is engaged in matters of vital importance to the region: water resource management; dryland farming; population; alternate sources of energy. Many Maghreb officials have a shared background in U.S. colleges and universities. We believe here that this mix offers significant opportunities for advancement of regional relationships and thereby USG interests in the areas.

F. Mediterranean initiatives: It seems evident to us that the U.S. should continue to work both sides of the Atlas and Gibraltar, as it were. Security acceptance for Morocco is essential if we are to reduce the apprehensiveness of those here towards the Algerian arsenal. Adding Morocco to the countries who take part in U.S. assisted military exercises for the defense of the Mediterranean basin is a constructive step to undertake. Now that we have a Joint Military Commission with Morocco, we have a means of enhancing military cooperation as we have already done with Tunisia and Egypt. At the same time, continuing a carefully structured military sales program with Algeria may help to loosen its Soviet connection and encourage intensification of Algerian ties with the West. We must, of course, keep Rabat and Algiers judiciously informed about our respective doings, so as to allay suspicions to the maximum extent possible.⁶

G. A special perspective: France: We also believe it important to be sure our policies complement those of France, which does and should retain the extent and depth of its relations with the states of the Maghreb. (Our purpose may well be to avoid the kind of cross purposes represented by the contrasting French and U.S. positions on African attendance at the Tripoli OAU summit.) We understand that the essence of French policy is often precisely its deliberate independence, but we feel that sustained consultation and, where possible, cooperation with France are very much in our North African interests. France also should be encouraged to avoid stimulating speculation that the U.S. is preparing to invest heavily in North Africa—a ploy we think might be designed to foster inevitable disappointment and thus strengthening of French influence.

7. Department may repeat as desired to other posts and agencies.

8. Ambassador Reed has seen this message and concurs.

Curran

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820447–0499. Secret; Limdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Paris, and Tunis. The document is misnumbered in the original.
2. Reference is to the ceasefire in Lebanon brokered by Reagan’s Special Envoy to the Middle East Philip Habib that resulted in the PLO’s withdrawal from Beirut. Documentation on the Habib Mission is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVIII, Part 1, Lebanon, April 1981–August 1982.
3. Because a two-thirds quorum did not attend, the OAU meeting scheduled for August 5 in Tripoli was canceled. News reports indicated that “most of the absentees were protesting admission to OAU membership of the Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara.” Others had “misgivings about Colonel Qaddafi’s assumption of the OAU membership for 1982–83;” they considered his policies in Africa “too radical.” (Geoffrey Godsell, “OAU Summit Fizzles in Qaddafi-land,” Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1982) See Document 403.
4. See Document 387.
5. Reference is to the International Communications Agency returning to the name United States Information Agency.
6. See Document 203.