Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

286550.

Washington, October 27, 1981, 1903Z

SUBJECT

• Secretary Haig’s Message to King Hassan on SAM–6 Request.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. The Secretary has approved the following message for delivery by Ambassador Reed to King Hassan in response to a letter from Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun requesting assistance to counter the use of SAM–6s in the Western Sahara:

Begin Quote: Your Majesty: I have read with great concern the recent letter from your Ambassador to Washington describing the introduction for the first time of more sophisticated weapons into the fighting at Guelta Zemmour. I am disturbed by this escalation in the technology employed in the Saharan conflict at the very moment the OAU is³ endeavoring to arrange a ceasefire preliminary to holding a referendum in the Western Sahara.

Ambassador Bengelloun’s letter of October 16 contains specific requests for assistance to meet the new situation.⁴ I have authorized the following actions to be taken in response:

— The Department of Defense will make available a team of specialists to provide advice on tactics to use against the SAM–6.⁵

— The Defense Department will do everything possible to expedite delivery of ammunition that already has been ordered by Morocco.

— We agree to sell an appropriate number of CBUs for use against SAM–6 systems.

Additional decisions will be communicated to you separately.⁶ We will continue to consider with you and in close collaboration with Ambassador Reed other steps, that can be taken to be helpful to Morocco at this time.

Let me take this opportunity to repeat my deep respect for the imagination and courage of Your Majesty for having taken the initiative within the OAU on behalf of peace. The recent incident demonstrates the urgency of proceeding with the negotiation for the ceasefire which was proposed by Your Majesty and endorsed by the OAU. Sincerely, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. End quote.

2. Ali Bengelloun’s letter to the Secretary dated October 16 follows:

Quote: Dear Mr. Secretary: As you are aware, developments this week in the Sahara have escalated the situation and caused grave concern within our government. On the afternoon of October 13, 1981, Moroccan forces near the town of Guelta-Zemmour were attacked on force by Soviet armor and a large number of troops. The battle was continued for several days. The opposing forces have proved quite formidable, especially with the increasingly sophisticated equipment being used. Of greatest concern to us is the introduction of the SA–6 missile, its associated equipment, and very well-trained and experienced missile operators. You will recall similar concern raised by Israel when they discovered the same threat in Lebanon earlier this year.

To date Morocco has lost 3 aircraft and crews—a C–130 and 2 Mirage F–1’s. The fact that the Mirage aircraft was shot down at over 30,000 feet, while supersonic, indicates to us that the SA–6 operators are quite experienced and well-trained.

Morocco has no counter to the SA–6 missile system. We therefore must give up air superiority and support for our forces in the area. Morocco urgently requires the support and immediate aid of the United States to meet this escalation and neutralize the new equipment. Specifically, we need:

1. Reconnaissance information on opposing forces and equipment, specifically EOB (electronic order of battle) and GOB (ground order of battle) information. This should include quantity and location.

2. ALO–119 jamming pods with the velocity gate pull-off (VGPO) program to counter SA–6. Without these programs the pods will not help. B–10 are needed immediately with proper technical support and logistical support. More may be needed later.

3. CBU’s including the Rockeye (anti-armor) and CBU–58 (anti-SAM site). We need 100 x CBU–58 and 400 x Rockeye immediately.

4. 30 anti-radiation missiles (ARM)—to counter the SA-6 radar. Additional cockpit wiring and operational support as necessary.

5. Immediate delivery of 155 mm and 105 mm projectiles/ammunition.

6. USAF logistical support, tactics and advice on operations to use against the SA–6.

7. Any type of stand-off jamming capability to be used against SA–6 acquisition radar.
Mr. Secretary, the use of such sophisticated weaponry and tactics is an undeniable escalation of the Sahara situation. It is obvious that strong support is being made available from the Libyan side to give our opposition their new capabilities. Without a counter to this sophisticated equipment, we urgently need the help of the United States Government and people. As a long-standing ally, I respectfully request your earliest response in this time of heightened peril to Morocco and the stability of North Africa. With warm personal regards, Ali Bengelloun. End quote.

8. [2 paragraphs (9 lines) not declassified]

Haig

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jul–Dec ‘81). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Kuniholm; cleared by Flaten, Rudd (DOD/DSAA), Bremer, Morton, Ted Strickler (S/S–O), George Harris (INR), Burkhalter, Arnold Kanter (PM/P), Graner (DOD/JCS), Richard Secord (DOD/ISA), Carlucci, Constable, Walters, and Richard Aherne (T); approved by Haig.
2. An unknown hand underlined the subject line.
3. An unknown hand highlighted “disturbed by this escalation in the technology employed in the Saharan conflict at the very moment the OAU is.”
4. An unknown hand highlighted “the new situation.”
5. An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph.
6. Not found.