Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

3288.

Rabat, April 28, 1982, 1600Z

From the Ambassador. Dept please pass DCI; SecDef; Secretary Baldrige; Assistant Secretary West (DOD/ISA); and Lieutenant General Williams (DIA). Subj: King’s Meeting With Assistant Secretary West and Ambassador Reed Following Conclusion of Joint Military Commission Sessions.

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Following the conclusion of the Joint Military Commission meetings,² Assistant Secretary West and I met with King Hassan for 90 minutes. Foreign Minister Boucetta, General Dlimi and Col. Maj. Kabbaj attended as did Deputy Chief of Mission Sebastian (translator). The following are my verbatim notes on the King’s remarks. Where internal quotes are shown, they emphasize phrases to which, by gesture or expression, the King gave special emphasis.

3. The King seemed very pleased with the results of the initial meeting of the Joint Military Commission which he personally hosted in Fez. He stated that “Morocco will now have to live with countermeasures from the Soviet and Eastern bloc as a result of our decision to undertake this commission. The Soviets used to buy 250,000 tons of oranges and now ‘with difficulty’ they purchase 58,000. There will be other measures taken against us and I must be very careful. I don’t like playing this game of ping pong. Frankly, I don’t have that much room to maneuver.³ What preoccupies me is that the Soviets could put pressure on certain African and non-aligned countries. They could put enough pressure on me to make it very hot, and that is why I want the United States to support Morocco. The socialist world will exercise pressure on us.”

4. “The reasons that I have approved Morocco joining forces with the United States for a Joint Military Commission are that I believe that the Western world is in a state of immobilization and that the Soviets have made major progress in the last few years. The West is threatened. What I am reaching for with the United States is a spirit of cooperation. Certain developments in the world have pushed⁴ me to make my decision—Afghanistan (N.B., King emphasized with strong body language his view that the Soviets were ‘digging in’), Poland, Central America. It is in this context of the shifts of balance of power that I will visit Washington next month. You will recall that when Secretary Weinberger visited me in Fez⁵ I predicted that Spain would enter NATO and that with that event Morocco would be only 15 miles away from the nuclear mushroom. You will recall that I talked to Secretary Weinberger about an (Morocco) alliance with Spain and a regional alliance (Morocco-Spain-Portugal). I invited Secretary Haig and I developed the same thesis with him, but I went even further. I asked General Haig (rhetorically) why Morocco would enter into defense agreement with Spain and not NATO.⁶ I suggested that perhaps the United States could supply Morocco with weapons through a military arrangement with NATO. I am concerned for my people and offspring. When the next century comes, I want to have Morocco be as it is today, with freedom and sovereignty. I told General Haig that if there were certain requirements Morocco would not hesitate to join NATO and that my only stipulation was that the ‘N’ be dropped from the ‘NATO’ as I do not believe that the security of the free world rests with the North Atlantic. I have been on this throne for more than two decades; I can recall when Africa was calm because France and Great Britain had great colonies. Then came independence for many nations and with that independence the Soviets have found fertile ground and have put their foot into Africa from one end to the other. The Soviets have created a vast navy and they are looking for territory far beyond their own land and seas. I believe we must protect our nations from Canada to the South Atlantic and from Norway to South Africa. That is why I don’t like the ‘N’ for NATO. I am also concerned for your NATO alliance surviving, as you now have a Europe that is both divided and occupied by socialists. I will certainly talk to President Reagan about this when I see him. I like to dream but take note that I believe that important political acts are made of dreams. At the time of General Haig’s visit he and I talked about a closer military relationship with Morocco and Spain. He promised to send me Walters, who is well known to both Juan Carlos and myself, but I understand a death in the family prevented him from participating. I saw Juan Carlos at length, and we had a long evening together one on one. We then saw the Spanish Foreign Minister the next day and spoke of a common defense pact. Both Juan Carlos and his Foreign Minister were interested. The Spanish Foreign Minister visited Morocco, and told him I planned to take up this proposal of a military alliance with President Reagan and Secretaries Weinberger and Haig. As I don’t like to build castles in the sky, I asked the Spanish Foreign Minister for a letter. When I saw that Foreign Minister at a ceremony at El-Jadida, where we signed a major fisheries agreement, I found him ‘hesitant on what to put to paper.’ I then offered to write him a draft of what his letter might contain, and we now expect this letter in early May. Please note that the Spanish Army—ground, air and sea—is 1,000 percent with us on this proposal. Military and economic cooperation must go hand in hand. These are the pieces of the puzzle in my growing relationship as a result of the visits by you, Mr. West, and Secretaries Weinberger and Haig. I am very anxious to have General Walters come to Morocco before I go to Washington to send him to discuss this possible alliance with Spain. ‘It is of the greatest importance.’”

5. JMC:
“I want to see the points that we have agreed on in ‘document form’ with annexes. I want the documents signed by our respective Ambassadors and perhaps further understandings by my Minister and your Secretary. I don’t want it to seem that this is piecework; I want to have a sequence.”

6. Access and Transit:
“I would like to have a small technical team come to Morocco, and we can work on the details prior to my visit, but the principle remains a formal ‘yes.’ Though I would like to keep my military understandings with you confidential, I would hope that the Kremlin, Tripoli, Berlin and Algiers would not sleep a week for fear of what I may be doing.”⁷

7. Secretary West raised the question that there was “a French concern” over American involvement with Morocco on the JMC and the possibility of “access and transit.” King Hassan replied: “France has been split into two. When I spoke with Mitterrand on my recent visit to France, and I saw him two times on formal occasions, we did not speak about U.S.-Moroccan relationships. In addition, he came to my house for lunch and we talked privately and frankly for 90 minutes. There was no mention of this issue. Recently Guedira was asked by the Elysee to come to a meeting at our Embassy in Paris and we were told that Mitterrand will go to Algeria to look deeply into Chadli’s eyes and ask him if he does or does not want a referendum. I asked Mitterrand to come to Morocco, and we have set a date in October. We were also given a message from Mitterrand for me which stated that the President had feelings of deep friendship and esteem for me, and he only wished they could be shared. Why does he say that? For a variety of reasons, but principally because of the weight that Morocco has in the Middle East and in the African continent. The other half of France is represented by Jacques Chirac, who came to Morocco where we had a good meeting. Chirac endorsed my desire for a strong, independent Morocco and thought that Morocco was quite correct in searching for an alliance with America. How can you explain this curious situation? The socialists do not speak to me of America and Morocco, but the other half of France encourages me to join forces with America.”

8. Secretary West inquired as to how the King viewed Qadhafi. The King replied: “If the U.S. could help me in a certain plan, Qadhafi could be in trouble. Egypt must come back to the Arab world as soon as possible. I know Egypt, and they will respect their engagements. I have sent a message to Moubarak, and I will send Boucetta in a few days to Cairo. There are 20,000 Egyptian soldiers in Iraq . . . what a strange honeymoon! I suggest the U.S. speak to Kuwait in strong terms. Each time that we reach an agreement, they break it up. I am sympathetic with their being one million people with 600,000 Palestinians, but . . . when Iraq gets ready and gets a chance,⁸ they are going to eat Kuwait. The U.S., and Great Britain, whose influence is still considerable, could give Kuwait a real push. It would be good for Kuwait. You should keep Qadhafi busy. How? You could arrange to have the OAU Summit take place someplace else. That would be something! There will be a Non-Aligned Summit in September, and I will go there and plan to let the group hear some ‘home truths.’ As a co-founder of this organization four months after my accession to the throne, I am eager to do it. At the time of the founding I was with people like Nasser, Tito, and Nkrumah. I will use this occasion in the fall to attack Qadhafi like a ton of bricks. Qadhafi must be isolated for the good of the world. I have been on this throne for 21 years, and I put my entire experience on the scales. [2 lines not declassified]
[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

9. The King concluded the audience with a special request to me to undertake a mission to Washington to nail down all aspects of the forthcoming “working visit.” “Reed, this is the turning point in history. General Dlimi and others will be following you to settle the program.”

10. Ambassador’s comment: Please note that I had two private audiences during the JMC with the King to discuss certain aspects of the official and private sections of the trip to the United States. The King is eagerly looking forward to the trip and considers it a milestone. In addition to his meeting and afternoon with the President, he is looking forward to separate meetings with Vice President Bush, Secretaries Weinberger, Haig, and Baldrige, and Casey.⁹ He also has accepted Senator Percy’s offer to speak before a joint meeting of the Foreign Relations and Armed Forces Committees and plans to make a foreign policy statement before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He confirmed desire to accept outstanding invitations from former President Nixon, David Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, and confirmed he will proceed to Chicago. Note: Boucetta confirmed that the King would spend two days in Canada following his visit to the US. My sense from talking to numerous members of the court in preparatory stages for the JMC as well as at the actual meetings is that everyone repeat everyone at all levels within the power structure has great expectations for this forthcoming visit of King Hassan II to Washington. End comment.

Reed

1. Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Moroccan Hassan (05/18/1982–05/21/1982). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the NSC Message Center.
2. Telegram 3210 from Rabat, April 27, contains a record of the JMC’s April 26 opening plenary. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820217–1046)
3. An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence.
4. An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin highlighting the portion that begins “The reasons that I have approved Morocco” and ending with “Certain developments in the world have pushed.”
5. See Document 198.
6. An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the portion of this sentence that reads: “Morocco would enter into a defense agreement with Spain and not NATO.”
7. See Document 199.
8. An unknown hand wrote two vertical lines in the right-hand margin highlighting the portion that begins “Egypt must come back to the Arab world as soon as possible” and ending with “when Iraq gets ready and gets a chance.”
9. An unknown hand wrote a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the portion that reads: “The King is eagerly looking forward to the trip and considers it a milestone. In addition to his meeting and afternoon with the President, he is looking forward to separate meetings with Vice President Bush, Secretaries Weinberger, Haig, and Baldrige, and Casey.”