Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

9160.

Rabat, December 10, 1982, 1228Z

SUBJECT

• Moroccan-Algerian Relations: Some Signs of Thaw?

1. (C)—Entire text.

2. Summary: There are a number of indications that Morocco perceives its relationship with Algeria as on the mend. Official sources have spoken favorably of Algerian participation in Arab League activities at Fez² and subsequently, of the Algerian role at the failed Tripoli II Summit of the OAU,³ and of the Saudi mediation effort. Meanwhile, in its treatment of Algerian matters, the Moroccan press has shown considerable restraint during recent weeks. There is, of course, a strong element of wishful thinking involved; no tangible evidence of a more conciliatory Algerian position on key bilateral differences—in particular, over the status of the Western Sahara—has yet lent substance to the expectant mood at Rabat. End summary.

3. A statement to a Saudi newspaper by Foreign Minister Boucetta to the effect that Morocco stands ready to respond “forthrightly” to the mediating role of King Fahd, received prominent coverage in the local press. (Certain pro-palace dailies headlined it, after the official Maghreb press agency filed the item.)

4. MFA Political Affairs Director Cherkaoui expressed gratification over the warming trend in the overall relationship with Algeria, during a meeting with PolCouns and former Ambassador Robert Neumann December 4.⁴ Cherkaoui said that Fahd had detected at Algiers a more practical and supple GOA approach towards Morocco than heretofore. Furthermore, the Saudis reportedly concluded that Algiers had come to consider its domestic problems and the Libyan threat as more urgent policy priorities than the Saharan question.

5. Constructive Algerian participation at the Fez Arab League Summit and the later delegation visit to Washington was appreciated by King Hassan, Cherkaoui continued.⁵ At Tripoli II the Algerians had conducted themselves with dignity and statesmanship. (Cherkaoui said that the Algerians had scheduled the Fahd visit adroitly, so as to provide themselves a reason to limit their stay in Tripoli.)

6. Comment: These statements of position, together with a fairly prolonged absence of anti-Algerian comment in the local press, suggest to us that the Moroccan official line is to show the maximum restraint about its long-time adversary. We sense a kind of expectant optimism, in which Moroccans look to King Hassan and President Chadli Bendjedid to reach some sort of normalization with each other. Because they assume that secrecy and negotiations at the highest level are indispensable preconditions for any such normalization, otherwise knowledgeable Moroccans do not seem concerned that they have no specifics about the process. Combined with the sustained relative calm of the Western Sahara military situation and the successfully thwarted Tripoli summits, the possibility of a rapprochement with Algeria seems to have given Moroccans more confidence in the country’s diplomatic prospects than at any time since the Polisario tried to obtain OAU membership last February.

7. This relatively euphoric mood cannot, however, obscure the very tangible problems to be overcome in moving toward some kind of accommodation with Algeria. For example, the Moroccans seem to have discounted, for the moment, the implications of the usual Algerian resolution on the Sahara at UNGA, on the grounds that the resolution was ritualistic Algerian behavior, and, in any event, the resolution enjoyed less support than in previous years.⁶ To be sure, the Moroccans have had their hopes high before. Just a year ago they expected an imminent Hassan-Chadli summit. None occurred. Instead, there were a number of reminders, most notably the Algerian attempt to slip the Polisario into OAU membership, that differences between Rabat and Algiers are deep and not easily surmountable. Good feelings notwithstanding, the Western Sahara remains the proving ground of Algerian intentions as far as this Kingdom is concerned. End comment.

Curran

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820642–0330. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Nairobi, Paris, USLO Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Tunis, and USUN.
2. Reference is to the Arab League summit held in Fez, Morocco, September 6–9.
3. See footnote 3, Document 17.
4. No record of the Neumann-Cherkaoui discussion was found.
5. See footnote 5, Document 116.
6. In telegram 3408 from USUN, November 13, the Mission reported that on November 12, the “Fourth Committee adopted the Algerian Resolution on Western Sahara,” which urged direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820590–0172)