Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

16. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

5728.

Tunis, July 30, 1982, 1358Z

SUBJECT

• Deterioration of Tunisian Relations With Libya.

Ref:

• (A) Tunis 5706,²
• (B) Tunis 4826.³

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary: According to SecState for Foreign Affairs Mestiri, implementation of Tunisian-Libyan rapprochement is now “frozen” and the GOT believes it is re-entering a “state of confrontation” with Qadhafi primarily as a result of Tunisia’s refusal to attend the OAU summit in Tripoli. End summary.

3. During my meeting July 30 with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Mestiri, he assessed current and prospective Tunisian relations with Libya as poor. He acknowledged that the principal reason was Tunisia’s refusal to participate in the Tripoli OAU meetings along with the SDAR. Qadhafi had tried hard to get the GOT on board, finally resorting to warnings that Tunisia’s continued boycott would have negative impact on Libyan bilateral cooperation. Such threats had only served to strengthen the GOT’s resolve to stick to its OAU position.

4. Mestiri acknowledged that Foreign Minister Essebsi and Economy Minister Lasram had got nowhere when they visited Libya July 19 primarily for the purpose of exploring Qadhafi’s willingness to strike a deal on the continental shelf question. While during the visit dates for future bilateral meetings had been fixed and announced, all implementation of rapprochement had now been frozen. In fact, the GOT considered that it was re-entering a “state of confrontation” with Qadhafi and that Libyan subversive activities against Tunisia—which had never really been halted—were likely to be increased. Mestiri said the GOT wanted the U.S. to know of its assessment.

5. Comment: As we have reported, there have all along been divisions within the GOT on how to deal with Qadhafi. Mestiri has been particularly skeptical of rapprochement, and his assessment must therefore be viewed in that light. Bourguiba was reportedly indignant at Qadhafi’s failure to receive his foreign and economic ministers earlier this month, and Bourguiba himself has made clear to us his unaltered distrust of Qadhafi’s intentions. Certainly Qadhafi must be unhappy about Tunisia’s OAU stance, particularly if he views Tunisia’s refusal to participate as influencing others and possibly spelling defeat for the summit. We believe the Tunisians have some reason for concern re prospects for retaliatory actions by Qadhafi, although the actual extent to which rapprochement may give way to confrontation will depend on further developments including how the OAU summit finally comes out. Mestiri’s intent on sharing with us the GOT’s assessment seems expressly designed to assure continued U.S. support for Tunisian security, current policy differences re Lebanon notwithstanding.

Cutler

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820399–0627. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Paris, and Rabat.
2. In telegram 5706 from Tunis, July 30, Cutler reported: “Mestiri told me that message had been received this morning, July 30, from Tripoli informing the GOT that SDAR had agreed to refrain ‘voluntarily and temporarily’ from attending OAU summit and urging Tunisia to attend. Mestiri said GOT regards this as ruse to secure attendance by Tunisia and others who had refused to attend on basis that SDAR did not qualify for OAU membership. In effect, Mestiri said, attendance on basis of SDAR’s voluntary withdrawal would constitute implicit acknowledgment of SDAR’s right to membership. GOT therefore has no intention of attending.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820396–0969)
3. In telegram 4826 from Tunis, June 25, the Embassy reported that a “Senior Foreign Ministry official responsible for the continental shelf dispute” said that Tunisia and Libya “now have until August 25 to reach an accord on demarcating their offshore boundary. He did not anticipate, however, that Libyans would be responsive during this period to Tunisian requests for an accommodation” to their expected suggestion of joint exploration of the shelf. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820333–0050)