Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

403. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

3429.

Algiers, August 25, 1982, 1255Z

For Asst Sec Veliotes from Chargé. Subject: Algerian Policy Towards the Sahara in the Aftermath of Tripoli. Refs: A. [less than 1 line not declassified] B. [less than 1 line not declassified] C. [less than 1 line not declassified].

1. C—Entire text.

2. During a recent talk with MFA, Secretary General Azzout, dealing mainly with other subjects, I asked Azzout what he thought the effect would be of the disarray at the OAU Summit² on the search for a Sahara settlement. Azzout reflected a bit (he is so new on the job that canned policy does not leap immediately to mind) and gave me what I believe is an honest answer. He said all Algeria’s efforts are focused on trying to restore unity within the OAU. He found it hard to believe that there would be real movement on the Sahara in the Implementation Committee or any place else before a summit took place healing the wounds of Tripoli.

3. Starting from this kernel of Algerian policy, it may be useful to examine the concrete interests that the GOA is now, and probably will be pursuing, in the wake of the Tripoli meetings. The main threads would seem as follows:

— Algeria’s overriding interest has got to be to rebuild its influence in Africa (and it follows among the non-aligned), given the fact that it is viewed by many Africans of all persuasions as a major culprit in causing the troubles that beset the OAU. Algeria has brought on itself this disfavor by its fervent and dogmatic support of SDAR admission into the OAU at Addis Ababa and Tripoli. It is not to be thought that in pursuing its interest in African unity (or put another way, the assertion of Algerian influence in Africa) Algeria will abandon its position on SDAR admission. At least it will never admit it has abandoned it.

— Algeria went to the lengths it did in pressing SDAR admission for several reasons, the dominant reason is unquestionably a determination to maintain Algerian control over the Polisario and not allow it to slip into waiting Libyan hands. Thus Algeria’s total inflexibility on the SDAR issue at Tripoli, which led purposefully to the summit’s failure, stemmed directly from Algerian-Libyan rivalry. That rivalry of course encompasses much more than control of the Polisario: It is based on a profound distrust of Qadhafi’s territorial ambitions and radical Islamic beliefs by a pragmatic and basically conservative military regime. (It is a regime, of course, which sees radical Third World rhetoric as a natural adjunct of its pursuit of influence internationally and of security at home.)

— Interestingly, one objective which Algeria has pursued with great consistency under Bendjedid is to maintain as normal relations with Libya as are possible given the two countries’ sharply conflicting interests. Algeria maintains that it is much better able to influence Libya if business-like relations exist, and cites as evidence its important role in getting Qadhafi out of Chad. [less than 1 line not declassified], we understand that after Foreign Minister Ibrahimi had given the coup de grace to the summit at the preceding Foreign Ministers’ meeting, President Bendjedid spent five days at the doomed summit buttering up Qadhafi—to the point that relations between the two countries are again on an even keel.

4. If control over the Polisario is a dominant Algerian concern (and SDAR admission a means to that end), what are the implications for Algerian post-Tripoli policy on the Western Sahara conflict? First, as implied by Secretary General Azzout, a serious effort to move towards a diplomatic settlement seems momentarily on the back burner. (This despite the fact that we believe such a settlement is the only kind Algeria sees as realistically possible.) Second, all indications point to an effort to keep the lid on the Polisario militarily. There is no evidence that Algeria has provided sophisticated equipment to the Polisario in recent months. In fact, recent intelligence indicates that Polisario leaders are becoming restive under the lack of Algerian guidance and direction in the post-Tripoli period (ref A). In short, it would seem that the Algerians believe they have their work sufficiently cut out for them in Africa without stimulating a Polisario dust-up with Morocco. Finally, in the consultations related to another effort to convene an OAU summit, we doubt that Algeria will again press SDAR admission to the point of a breakdown—so long as the venue is other than Tripoli.

5. Comment: It is ironic that at Tripoli Algeria should have helped achieve U.S. (and Moroccan) objectives because of its distrust of Libya while at the same time pursuing a policy diametrically opposed to ours on the question of SDAR admission. U.S. and Algerian interest clearly converge at important points even though the rhetoric remains far apart. This paradox obtains on matters other than the Western Sahara: In Lebanon, for example, the public Algerian line vigorously opposes U.S. policy, yet by accepting a large contingent of PLO combatants the GOA contributed to the success of the Habib Mission. There are of course many areas of convergence between U.S. and Algeria which are more straight-forward, one of the most important being the recent breakthroughs in LNG negotiations. If the Department is of the view (as we are) that immediate progress towards a Sahara settlement is not a vital U.S. interest, we conclude that the time is ripe for initiatives to cement and improve U.S.-Algerian relations.)

Lorenz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820441–0833. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, London, Nairobi, Nouakchott, Paris, Oran, Rabat, Tunis, and USUN.
2. Reference is to the abortive OAU summit scheduled for August 5–8, which was canceled after a quorum failed to attend. See footnote 3, Document 17.