Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

70. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 16, 1987, 10:20–11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Second Shultz-Shevardnadze Plenary

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • Counselor Kampelman
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • Director Adelman
  • Col. Linhard
  • Mr. Burton (notetaker)

• USSR

  • FM Shevardnadze
  • DepFonMin Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Dubinin
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • Ambassador Obukhov
  • Mr. Stepanov
  • Mr. Tarasenko
  • Mr. Sokolov (notetaker)
  • (Not at Table)
  • Ambassador Glitman
  • Ambassador Lehman
  • Ambassador Cooper
  • Mr. Nazarkin
  • Mr. Masterkov
  • Mr. Kutovoy

The meeting began with a photo opportunity. The reporters asked about press reports of optimistic U.S. assessments of the meetings so far. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said “we also made some optimistic statements.” Asked about progress in the working groups, Shevardnadze replied that if the groups had not made some progress, “we wouldn’t be sitting here.” The Secretary commented that he and the Foreign Minister had agreed that the experts might not be perfect but they were the best we had.

Shevardnadze said that since the two ministers had very little time this morning, they had to be very specific. Yesterday in plenary² and then on the CNO’s barge, they had touched on some of the aspects of the nuclear testing. He wanted to call the Secretary’s attention to two ideas.

The first, he continued, was that the Soviet delegation at the Conference on Disarmament recently had introduced a draft of key elements of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear testing. The draft provides for the broadest possible verification measures, beginning with announcement of nuclear tests and ending with on-site inspection of testing sites. He would like to hear the American response, and sensed that it was somewhat positive. He also wished to suggest that the two sides put their discussions on nuclear testing on a more regular basis.

The Secretary said that he believed it was always useful, in multilateral settings, to have U.S. and Soviet representatives have special communication between each other. This was good practice—Max Kampelman is the master of it.

Shevardnadze said both the U.S. and Soviet delegations at Geneva are very prestigious and expert on nuclear testing and chemical weapons, and it would be useful to cooperate more actively. He wanted to propose reaching agreement on a joint statement on large-scale talks on nuclear testing, including ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. The Soviet side had prepared such a draft and would provide it to the American side. He understood a working group would meet today. He noted that since we had had consultations but they had failed, it would be important to make such a joint statement.

The Secretary said the U.S. has a text and is interested in seeing the Soviet text. The U.S. continues to emphasize improved verification of the magnitude of nuclear tests so we can, as Shevardnadze suggested, ratify the two treaties. We have a different view, he thought, about a cessation of testing. The U.S. believed that so long as we rely on nuclear weapons, there must be a testing process. But progress could be made as the volume of nuclear weapons went down and this reduction impacted on testing. The ultimate goal, he said, would be eliminating nuclear testing. He concluded that the experts could discuss this, and the U.S. would table a draft text of a statement.

ACDA Director Adelman said that the nuclear testing experts would meet immediately after the plenary.

Shevardnadze said the U.S. had done an enormous amount of work to improve verification, and the two sides were beginning to take a joint look at it, including discussions in Geneva. He wanted to remind us that the Soviet proposal to reduce the threshold to one kiloton (1KT) remains on the table. He knew there was not much enthusiasm in the U.S. Government for this idea, but he thought it should be discussed. He was aware of interest by many in Congress and in the U.S. public, just as there was among the Soviet public.

The Secretary replied, “Some in Congress.”

Shevardnadze said, “The majority, I think.” He then asked whether the U.S. could consider limiting the number of nuclear tests, say, to four per year, to make progress on the quantity of nuclear testing.

The Secretary answered that further down the road we could consider limits on the total number of tests, that this might decline over time as the number of nuclear weapons declined. But today, we haven’t even agreed on the first step, which is the first reductions of nuclear weapons, although we’re working hard on that.

Shevardnadze said he thought we did not need at this meeting to address nuclear non-proliferation in detail, but in the context of nuclear testing, he wanted to say that if the U.S. and Soviet Union failed to find a solution on nuclear testing and there were no progress on reducing nuclear weapons, it would be impossible to stop nuclear proliferation. There are many states capable of developing nuclear weapons. He didn’t want to list them now, but the monopoly of the nuclear club could not be maintained. So it was of “cardinal importance” to make progress.

The Secretary said that both sides have worked hard on nuclear non-proliferation, and there has been good progress over the years in associating a large number of states with the NPT regime. The efforts that the U.S. and Soviet Union had made, separately and together, had been broadly successful, and the situations predicted 20 to 25 years ago about nuclear non-proliferation had not happened. So, it was important to keep working.

In this connection, he had two things to mention. One he had mentioned before to Shevardnadze. It involved the Soviet sale of a nuclear reactor to India without full-scope safeguards. The other was the possible suspension of South Africa from the IAEA. The Secretary did not hold any brief for apartheid, as Shevardnadze was aware. But it would not be wise to expel South Africa from the IAEA, both because it would breach the principle of universality, and in part because we needed to keep a hand on South Africa in view of its capabilities. So excluding them would not be a good idea. Ambassador Kennedy had discussed these matters with the Soviet side, and we knew the Soviets took them seriously.

Shevardnadze said the most reliable thing is to end nuclear tests.

The Secretary said nuclear testing is the tail—the dog is nuclear weapons; the way you get started is in INF, then START.

Shevardnadze replied, “It’s both”. The best way is to eliminate nuclear weapons. He wanted to suggest that they move on to chemical weapons.

He continued that it is possible to say the two sides are not far apart. Lately, a great deal has happened to bring the positions of the two closer together. Yesterday, in his conversation with the President,³ Shevardnadze had said that elimination of chemical weapons is not a remote prospect. We could conclude a convention during the Administration, and Shevardnadze and the Secretary would have the prospect of signing an historic agreement. Shevardnadze’s people in Geneva said it was a real prospect.

He continued that the Soviet side had accepted the American position for a bilateral data exchange. Some complex issues have arisen but they are looking for solutions. Work could proceed on a convention, and American wishes to exchange data even earlier could be accommodated. For example, the first exchange of data would take place during the final stages of negotiation on the convention; the second exchange would take place after the ban had been concluded but before signature, if the U.S. and Soviet Union gave mutual assurances of intent to sign. As for the content of the exchange, the Soviets understood there were no differences on that. Shevardnadze said he was offering this explanation to set the record straight. On inspection, the Soviet side favored three inspections of declared facilities and three challenge inspections. Regarding challenge inspection, the U.S. side was aware that the Soviet side had made proposals not to deny such requests.

Thus, it seemed to Shevardnadze that the two sides were discussing important elements of a final agreement to ban chemical weapons. There was some American reserve about intensifying efforts at Geneva. The Soviet side had made proposals for intensifying activities. In the context of U.S.-Soviet bilaterals, the two sides could work out on-site inspections. If the two sides could reach agreement and find common ground, it could be possible to improve and intensify efforts in other areas.

Shevardnadze said he was concerned about the French position. The French don’t seem to want to ban chemical weapons right away. He thought the U.S. and Soviet Union should both work more actively with the French.

On visits to facilities, he continued, some things have already been done, and the U.S. side has Soviet ideas. In early October, there will be a visit to the Shikhany. The Soviets could arrange a separate visit later for American experts to see Soviet facilities in greater detail. This could be arranged if the Soviet side could visit an analogous U.S. facility.

The Secretary said he believed such visits should be reciprocal and noted it was agreed that the Soviets would visit our CW facility at Tooele, Utah.

Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh said Tooele was a different type of facility than Shikhany; Dugway Proving Grounds is the analog to Shikhany; Chapeyev was the analog to Tooele.

The Secretary said “I feel the need for a working group.”

Shevardnadze commented that the question remains about reciprocity.

He also wanted to raise the question of binaries. He said that the effort to ban chemical weapons could not ignore developments in the United States. He wanted to state frankly that the U.S. binary program gives the Soviet side a sense of anxiety, because the foundation for a treaty has been laid, and we “should cross the t’s and dot the i’s on binaries.”

In this connection, he was not insisting on it, but wanted to suggest making a joint statement expressing an obligation not to transfer chemical weapons to others. He thought this would be useful, bearing in mind certain complications.

Shevardnadze continued that, just as we had set out our position on medium range missiles, namely that an agreement could be done in a short time, we could say the same thing about chemical weapons. Questions about confidence, on-site inspection, elimination of CW—all this permits us to create expectations of concluding a treaty.

The Secretary said Shevardnadze had said quite a bit. Shevardnadze’s August 6 statement⁴ was a very positive development, and his statements today were welcome. Experts’ work is necessary, since there are a lot of details to be considered. Our experience in INF is that when you have moved on the big issues, lots of other issues arise that assume importance, and these need to be dealt with.

The Secretary welcomed Soviet comments on bilateral data exchange. On binaries, the Soviet Union said it recently had halted production of chemical weapons. We halted production in 1969. So the U.S. has felt that some modest modernization was important as an interim measure. The U.S., like the Soviet Union, could not ignore the number of countries with a CW capability, and one argument for working hard now is the risk of proliferation, which is far greater than in the area of nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons had been used in the Iran-Iraq War and we were very concerned about Libyan activities regarding Chad. Thus, the spread of chemical weapons was a concern. The Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze’s statement about transfer. This was a very complicated question. There are precursors that are not chemical weapons but can be used to make them. Thus, there is the problem of understanding what it is you are restricting the transfer of. This is very tricky.

In conclusion, the Secretary said he welcomed Shevardnadze’s comments, and they should be discussed constructively in a working group.

Shevardnadze said he had his experts on hand and they were ready to work.

The Secretary said he had some important business to attend to. The President was coming to the Department and the Secretary should be on hand to greet him. This was of overriding importance.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to clarify one point. Time was running out in Vienna and final decisions would soon have to be made. There was a debate going on about formulating a mandate for negotiations. NATO refuses to incorporate tactical nuclear missiles or aircraft in the negotiations. The Soviets had been trying hard to come up with a compromise. We could let a working group discuss it, but what the Soviets propose is a formulation that “the subject matter of the 23 would be armed forces and conventional arms, including dual-purpose forces located on land.” He said the Soviet side had been scratching their heads trying to come up with something better, and would welcome U.S. suggestions. The experts could work on it.

The Secretary said Ambassador-designate Ledogar⁵ would be available. Ambassador Ridgway noted that Ledogar had confirmation hearings but would be available to meet.

Shevardnadze said he had a final suggestion—that the foreign ministers meet in Vienna to conclude the CSCE follow-up meeting. Perhaps he and the Secretary would be in a better mood than their last meeting in Vienna.

The Secretary said he had no problem with Shevardnadze’s suggestion in principle, it is just a matter of scheduling.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burton. The meeting took place in the Madison Room at the Department of State.
2. See Document 68.
3. See Document 67.
4. Reference is to Shevardnadze’s speech before the United Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva, in which he conveyed Soviet willingness to accept verification procedures as part of a chemical weapons treaty. (Paul Lewis, “Soviet Says Pershing Missiles Are Main Impediment to Pact,” New York Times, August 7, 1987, p. A–1)
5. Stephen Ledogar, chief U.S. delegate to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations.