Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

69. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 16, 1987, 9–10:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Vasiliy Sredin (Notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

• INF, START

THE SECRETARY opened the meeting by volunteering a few comments on the read-out he had received from the U.S. arms control working group on their work of the night before. Specifically, he wanted to address INF and START.

On INF, the talks had confirmed a conceptual difference on the question of phasing, with the issue being three versus five years. As Shevardnadze had suggested the day before, there were clearly some practical problems to be dealt with as well. The issue was less one of principle than of the operational and practical consequences. We were trying to draw more of our technical experts into the discussion so as to come up with a solution which was careful, verifiable and conclusive. As the two Ministers had agreed the day before, we would be undertaking something totally new in destroying this class of weapons; we wanted to get it right. The Minister’s remarks of the day before seemed to reflect the same approach, and we appreciated this. So we would continue to explore the matter from a practical standpoint.

Regarding the verification material we had presented earlier in the week, the Secretary continued, the U.S. understood that the Soviet side would need time for careful study. We were prepared for detailed discussions when the Soviets were.

With respect to German P–1a’s, the Secretary had listened carefully to what Shevardnadze had said the day before. It was beginning to dawn on him that he (the Secretary) had not fully understood what had been bothering the Soviet side. The Secretary suggested he state what was dawning on him, that Shevardnadze see if his understanding was correct, and that, if so, the two sides see how they might deal with the problem.

The Secretary understood the Soviet position to be that, when the U.S. removed its warheads from the German P–1a’s, the Soviet side needed to know what would happen to those warheads. They might be shipped back to the U.S. But perhaps the Soviet side saw that as an “unknown”; perhaps this was not definitive enough. The Secretary had not until the day before appreciated this aspect of the problem.

What the U.S. was prepared to do to deal with it was to handle the warheads in the same fashion as any other warheads taken out of operation: i.e., they would be brought back to the U.S., fissionable material would be extracted, and the shell destroyed in accordance with agreed procedures. Thus, the Soviet side would be able to conclude that the warheads no longer existed. Observing that Shevardnadze had begun to take notes, the Secretary invited him to comment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary had made an important clarification as far as the P–1a warheads were concerned. But there were two aspects to the question. The Secretary’s clarification had dealt with one aspect—what would happen to the warheads once they were withdrawn. That was useful. But the question remained of when those warheads would be withdrawn. This point had to be clarified as well.

Shevardnadze pointed out that the Soviet delegation in Geneva had laid out various options for dealing with this problem, e.g. the separation of warheads from missiles and the concentration of systems in specific areas. These proposals had sought to take into account U.S. concerns. And the destruction timetable proposed by the Soviet side had sought specifically to take into account both U.S. and FRG concerns. Nonetheless, Shevardnadze observed, what the Secretary had said was very significant.

THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the U.S. could not regard a discussion of German P–1a’s as part of an INF agreement; nor could we merge discussion of the issue into the negotiations themselves. Chancellor Kohl had stated (and the statement had been given an official character by a subsequent vote of the Bundestag) clearly what he was prepared to do with the P–1a’s. The U.S. had said it would be prepared to take action on the P–1a warheads consequent to the Chancellor’s action. We had said we would be prepared to return them to the U.S. in accordance with whatever procedures might be developed. As Karpov had noted the day before, there were more than 72 warheads involved, and we understood that all warheads designed for use with the P–1a would have to be made inoperative. So, with respect to Shevardnadze’s second question, the timing was the timing laid out by Kohl in his statement.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that the question of when was very important. The Soviet Union attached the greatest importance to the timing of the destruction of the warheads involved. If one assumed that the P–1a’s were left aside in an agreement, a situation would eventually emerge in which U.S. and Soviet LRINF and SRINF were eliminated and the P–1a’s and their warheads would remain. This situation must be excluded. The Soviet proposals in Geneva had tried to deal with the situation Kohl had created in indicating that FRG systems would be dealt with only after the Soviet Union and U.S. completed the elimination of their LRINF and SRINF. Thus, the Soviets had suggested that under such circumstances a residual Soviet SRINF force equal in number to remaining FRG Pershings would remain in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Working groups could weigh again the various options, and what the Secretary had said was very important. The question of “when” nonetheless remained. Unless it was resolved, a time could come when the Soviet Union and its allies could find themselves in a situation unequal to that of NATO.

THE SECRETARY suggested he explore the issue further. He thought one had to read the Kohl statement carefully with respect to timing. The issue was precisely when the U.S. would be relieved of its obligations to keep our warheads in Germany and could bring them back to the U.S. This would largely obviate the question of their destruction. We needed to explore this question, and the Secretary wished to do so before responding definitively to Shevardnadze’s remarks. The problem seemed to be that Kohl’s statement contemplated the withdrawal of P–1a’s as the elimination of U.S. and Soviet systems was taking effect. The Soviet approach seemed formally to integrate this latter process with the P–1a question. We would probably have difficulties with that linkage. But our working groups could grapple with the problem. And the Secretary would see how he might be able to clarify the timing question.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought possible a solution which did not adversely affect the prestige of the FRG or the security of the parties involved. Experts could consider the options and should be able to come up with a solution acceptable to the U.S. and to Chancellor Kohl. The Soviet Union did not want to embarrass him, as it knew he had difficulties within his coalition, as well as outside the government. Moscow had tried therefore to take his interests into account, as well as its own.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the matter be left there. Working groups could address it further. SHEVARDNADZE noted that there was sufficient time remaining to work the issue, as well as such matters as verification. A lot of detail work remained to be done, but it should be possible to define basic parameters of agreement during his stay in Washington.

Shevardnadze said he had instructed his people to pull together a rough draft of a list of areas which were agreed and which required further work on INF. Once they were in hand, the same thing could be done for strategic and space weapons. But priority attention should be on the “first” complex of issues (INF), so as to determine how much time was necessary to agree on the outstanding issues. Those were the instructions he had given his people; he had asked for a first draft by the end of the day, or by tomorrow morning at the latest. Without such a list, it was difficult to address final solutions. And experience had proven that what had initially been secondary issues could assume paramount importance in the final stages of such a process. So now was the time to sum up what had been done, and what had not been done.

THE SECRETARY said Shevardnadze had outlined a good approach. He recommended that, as the working groups labored, they do their best to keep the list short by resolving as much as possible. SHEVARDNADZE said he believed that process was already underway. The number of outstanding issues was being reduced; but he would like to see them reduced still further. THE SECRETARY said he would like to see the list zeroed out. That would be a “third zero.”

SHEVARDNADZE said he was ready. If some details remained, they should be dealt with, because the two sides were embarking on a new, important enterprise. It was important for the details to be right. So he had told his people that they should seek, as Shevardnadze had suggested yesterday to the Secretary, to pull together instructions to delegations to prepare a draft agreement in, say, a month, so that an end could be put to that part of the work and there would be a draft agreement available for signature.

THE SECRETARY said he did not plan to sign any such agreement. He would leave that to his boss.

SHEVARDNADZE protested good-naturedly that the two of them were responsible for producing the document. Therefore they needed a complete text on the “first” complex of issues (INF) and, if possible, on the second (START/D&S) as well if they were to avoid being criticized by their chiefs. Before Reykjavik, there had been a major preparatory effort, but even it had been inadequate. Had more been done, major agreements could have been signed. The two sides would have no right not to sign a major agreement at the next summit. So it was important to resolve as many questions as possible in advance.

In response to THE SECRETARY’s remark that our working groups could get started on the process right after lunch, SHEVARDNADZE said he was keeping in the back of his mind the suggestion he had made the day before for a second meeting with the Secretary a month later, in Geneva. THE SECRETARY said he was, too. He was certain there would be such a meeting before a possible summit, regardless of what we were able to do on INF. SHEVARDNADZE said the idea of a follow-up meeting had returned to him the night before after their boat ride, as he reflected on all the details that remained to be wrapped up. He feared that unless the two sides’ negotiators were faced with a deadline of a month or forty days when the Ministers would seek an accounting of their progress, talks could go on forever. So he felt a second meeting would be necessary to deal with the details, although every effort should be made to resolve issues of principle while Shevardnadze was here. THE SECRETARY said he hoped that would be possible.

SHEVARDNADZE indicated that, if time permitted, he would like to say a few words on Afghanistan. Perhaps the issue could be discussed at a plenary session, but Shevardnadze believed the two Ministers’ one-on-ones were particularly useful.

THE SECRETARY said he would be glad to hear what Shevardnadze had to say, but suggested that detailed discussion be put off to the afternoon. Perhaps a fairly small group could be convened in the Secretary’s office to discuss regional issues. If necessary, time could also be allotted for a discussion of regional questions in plenary session. SHEVARDNADZE agreed to the approach.

THE SECRETARY said he would like to make a few points on START. Reflecting on the reports of the U.S. working group (and he had been told the discussion of START issues was useful), he wanted to take the opportunity to emphasize to Shevardnadze the importance we attached to the concept of an overall limit on ballistic missile warheads, within the overall 6,000 warhead limit which was already agreed. The reason for this was straightforward: weapons carried by airplanes were in a different class from those mounted on ballistic missiles.

This was obviously true in a descriptive sense, and past Soviet proposals had seemed to reflect this. We had taken this into account in suggesting a 4,800 limit on ballistic missile warheads, applying the Soviet figure of 80% to the 6,000 limit agreed to in Reykjavik. The problem we had with the current Soviet 60% proposal was that it would allow all 6,000 warheads to be on ballistic missiles. That would be undesirable, as ballistic missiles were the most threatening and destabilizing element of the triad. So we needed to find means of forcing those numbers down. The Secretary wanted Shevardnadze to understand the importance the U.S. attached to the 4,800 limit on ballistic missile warheads within the 6,000 overall warhead limit.

The Secretary added that he wanted to express appreciation for the paper which Shevardnadze had presented the day before in response to a paper the Secretary had presented on the offense-defense relationship during his last visit to Moscow. We were having the paper translated into English, and would read it with interest. The Secretary hoped that working groups could have a good discussion on the issues involved, because we felt that the Soviet side’s presentation of the paper was a constructive step.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the two Ministers leave that particular discussion to a later stage, since Shevardnadze also found the topic interesting.

On START, Shevardnadze said that the Soviet position was not based on egotism or gamesmanship. It was based rather on the fact that a strategic structure already existed—the triad, which both sides had configured to meet their specific needs. What the U.S. was proposing would shatter that structure, to the detriment of Soviet security interests. Shevardnadze had already said the day before that, at this stage, the Soviet Union could accept a 3,600 limit on ICBM’s. That was a significant step in the American direction. The experts could play further with the figures, but that was the Soviet number. Shevardnadze said he could not accept the Secretary’s contention that ballistic missiles were more destabilizing and dangerous than bombers. Bombers were very dangerous indeed, as U.S. experts would be able to tell the Secretary. Otherwise, why would the U.S. want to keep so many?

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that each side had accepted the concept of a strategic triad as insurance against degradation of any one “leg.” He acknowledged as well that bombers and cruise missiles were important weapons. If they were not, as Shevardnadze had said, neither side would have them. But their characteristics were quite different from those of ICBM’s: they were more easily intercepted; they could be recalled; they were slower. (SHEVARDNADZE interjected that ballistic missiles also had their vulnerabilities. THE SECRETARY said he didn’t know what they were.)

The Secretary explained that the concept behind our 4,800 sublimit was that it allowed for a certain minimum space for the air leg of the triad. Since both sides had a major investment in that leg, the restructuring issue should not arise. The sublimit represented a simple “notation” about one leg of the triad in a minimal way, amounting to no more than about 20%. But the Secretary did not want to reach any conclusions in the current discussion. He wanted simply to underscore the importance that the U.S. attached to the 4,800 figure.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was certain that if the decisions were up to the two Ministers, they could agree to eliminate all nuclear weapons. As in Reykjavik, they could agree on eliminating everything. Shevardnadze recalled the logic of Gorbachev’s proposal in Reykjavik: each side had built up a triad in accordance with its needs; why not cut each leg by 50%—ICBM’s, SLBM’s, and strategic aircraft. The Soviet side had thought that the President and the Secretary had agreed. Then all kinds of limits and sublimits had begun to appear. Shevardnadze feared these had confused the issue. He believed that the most realistic, simple approach remained that proposed by Gorbachev in Reykjavik. When his experts told him it would not work, his response was always, “Why not? Let’s cut them right in half.”

Shevardnadze noted that the Soviets had sought to be responsive to U.S. concerns on heavy missiles in similar fashion. They had offered to reduce such missiles by half. But their offer had been sidetracked. This was not fair. Perhaps this was only simple mathematics, but simple mathematics sometimes served as the basis for higher mathematics.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that there had been problems. The U.S. had been trying to translate relatively simple concepts into concrete agreements which enhanced stability and equality. Thus, when we proposed that, within a limit of 6,000 warheads, no more than 80% would be on ballistic missiles, the triad concept would survive. Similarly, were there no more than 3,600 ICBM warheads (although our position was 3,300) there would be a constraint, but the triad would still be there. There would be, in short, room for differences in structure, to reflect both sides’ different needs. We did not want a solution which forced either side to restructure. Our approach would not have this effect. But the Secretary did not want to consume time in a detailed discussion of this issue. He wanted only to emphasize the importance we attached to the number 4,800 so that Shevardnadze understood our views fully. SHEVARDNADZE noted that they could return to strategic arms later in the day or the following morning if the Secretary liked.

THE SECRETARY suggested that, procedurally, they focus on regional issues during the afternoon with a different and smaller group. Three quarters of an hour remained before the Secretary had to excuse himself to greet the President. The Secretary suggested that the Ministers reassemble the plenary group of the previous afternoon. He understood that Shevardnadze had a number of points to make on arms control issues which had not been covered. So did the Secretary. Arms control working groups could be active in the afternoon.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if the Secretary thought the working groups should be asked to give brief reports at the morning plenary. Perhaps, since the two of them had already received individual reports and discussed the issues, that could be dispensed with. THE SECRETARY thought that reports would not be necessary, and recalled that Shevardnadze had said he had some points to make on conventional forces, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. We would be glad to hear what he had to say, and working groups could be deputized to follow up on the plenary. SHEVARDNADZE agreed, noting that he would have something to say in each area.

THE SECRETARY proposed that in that case they adjourn to the eighth floor, where the Secretary would invite Shevardnadze to lead off and then offer some comments of his own. He would, however, have to depart at 11:00 sharp. SHEVARDNADZE said he understood.

As the meeting concluded, the SECRETARY said that the two Ministers should allocate time to briefly review the work of the bilateral working group. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz’s private office at the Department of State.