Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

71. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 16, 1987, 3–3:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

• INF, Syrian CW

THE SECRETARY opened the unscheduled private meeting by observing that he had thought hard about what Shevardnadze had said in their morning conversation about the P–1a problem. The Secretary had described at that time what the U.S. planned to do with the warheads for that system. Shevardnadze had responded with an explanation of the Soviet concern that a situation could arise in which only the FRG would retain operable missiles.

The Secretary then read the text of Chancellor Kohl’s August 26 statement on P–1a’s.² He then told Shevardnadze that the U.S. interpreted this to mean that, at the moment U.S. and Soviet INF missiles had been eliminated, Kohl’s statement would take effect. At that same moment, the U.S. would take the P–1a warheads remaining in the FRG and bring them back to the U.S. Thus, there would be no point at which the only operational missiles would be German missiles, because their warheads would be withdrawn at the same moment as other INF systems ceased to exist. The Secretary emphasized that he wanted to say this to Shevardnadze because he believed it to be specific to both ends of the system.

SHEVARDNADZE said he believed the Secretary. But he thought that what the Secretary had said should be reflected in a document.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that what Kohl had said had been approved by the Bundestag, and so that was a clear event. As for what the U.S. would do consequent to the Chancellor’s statement, the Secretary had described that to Shevardnadze. The Secretary could consider what, beyond just sitting and talking with Shevardnadze, we would be prepared to do. Shevardnadze could be confident that what the Secretary had said was what would take place.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the question he had raised was not a mere formality. The P–1a warheads belonged to the U.S. The Soviets were negotiating with the U.S. All other aspects of INF systems—from launchers to weapons to associated facilities—would be covered by the agreement being negotiated in Geneva. They would all be documented. What the Secretary was proposing would not be documented in any way. A means had to be found to deal with this problem.

Shevardnadze suggested that the U.S. was not so constrained as it appeared to think. Kohl and Genscher had told the Soviets officially that “the missiles are ours; the warheads belong to the U.S. Its up to you and them to decide what to do with them.” It would be no disaster for U.S.-FRG relations were the warheads to be covered by the INF treaty. That was how Shevardnadze saw it, in any case. Moreover, the U.S. obligations to the FRG had been formulated before the onset of the INF negotiations. The situation had now changed fundamentally. The FRG would in all likelihood be grateful if the U.S. and Soviet Union could agree on a way to resolve this problem.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze had asked what the U.S. would do with the P–1a warheads and he had told him. Shevardnadze had asked about the timing of withdrawals, and had expressed a concern, which the Secretary understood, that the FRG not retain operational missiles once the Soviet Union had given up its own. The Secretary had responded to that. That should have dealt with the content of the matter. Now the question was how to express that content beyond their conversation. (SHEVARDNADZE interjected that this was exactly the problem.) THE SECRETARY said he had not thought that through yet. He wanted to consider the various possibilities, but first wanted to make sure that the content was clear to Shevardnadze.

SHEVARDNADZE did not respond directly, but observed that he had consulted with his experts on the problem as well, and said they had identified various options. Shevardnadze had outlined one that morning. This was not a situation in which there was no way out.

THE SECRETARY replied that he did not think the idea of leaving a residual Soviet SRINF force behind to balance remaining FRG P–1a’s was a good option. SHEVARDNADZE said it was only one option. He suggested that experts take up the problem on an urgent basis, noting that they had little time. Perhaps they could work all night. THE SECRETARY agreed it should be possible to solve the problem, subject to expressing it in a satisfactory way.

SHEVARDNADZE concurred that how to reflect any solution in a document was key. The Soviet side believed the Secretary and Kohl. But international norms generally dictated that such understandings be reflected in accords. Any solution should be reflected in a manner which meets the interests of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and their allies. THE SECRETARY said the issue would be resolved, and suggested that they move on into his outer office for a discussion of regional issues.

Before adjourning, SHEVARDNADZE made a few points on Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY then raised a final point. He had obtained information that Syria was developing a chemical warfare capability, a capability which included missile delivery systems capable of reaching Israeli cities. If correct, this was potentially very ominous. Without getting into whether or not Syria intended to use such weapons, their existence would represent a threat to Israel. It was impossible to state how Israel might react to such a threat. Thus, the potential existence of a Syrian CW capability was a threat to regional stability.

The Secretary said he did not know what information Shevardnadze had on this matter, or even if our own was correct. But he urged Shevardnadze to use whatever influence the Soviet Union had with Syria to discourage the development of a CW capability. The Secretary recalled Shevardnadze’s past expressions of concern over CW proliferation, and made his approach in that spirit.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that he had no information on the issue the Secretary had raised. Relations between the Soviet Union and Syria were indeed full and good. Soviet information on developments there was generally solid. Shevardnadze said he would keep the concern the Secretary had expressed in sight. He suggested that the Secretary might also want to consider the possibility of disinformation. As for the Syrians, Shevardnadze knew that they were very concerned about the possibility that Israel would acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems, including missiles.

THE SECRETARY said he would not have mentioned the issue if he did not consider our intelligence credible. But he did not exclude that our information was wrong. He expressed appreciation for Shevardnadze’s offer to keep the issue in sight. It would be unpleasant were the concerns the Secretary had expressed to come to pass.

SHEVARDNADZE confirmed that he would look into the matter. He agreed that it would be not only unpleasant, but “inadmissible,” were it to be proven true.

After a brief further discussion of the agenda for the subsequent meeting on regional issues, the private session ended.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz’s private office at the Department of State.
2. In telegram 26346 from Bonn, August 26, the Embassy reported on Kohl’s announcement that the Federal Republic of Germany would not modernize its Pershing 1A missiles, and was prepared to dismantle them if the United States and Soviet Union signed, ratified, and adhered to an INF treaty. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870697–0730)