Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

68. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 15, 1987, 3:30–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• First Shultz-Shevardnadze Plenary

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Kampelman
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • Director Adelman
  • Col. Linhard
  • Mr. Simons (notetaker)

• U.S.S.R

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Dep. FonMin Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • Ambassador Dubinin
  • Ambassador Obukhov
  • Mr. Stepanov
  • Mr. Tarasenko
  • Mr. Mamedov (notetaker)
  • (Not at the Table)
  • Ambassador Glitman
  • Ambassador Lehman
  • Ambassador Cooper
  • Mr. Parris
  • Mr. Nazarkin
  • Mr. Masterkov
  • Mr. Sokolov
  • Mr. Kutovoy

Shevardnadze said he understood they had two hours. The Secretary confirmed they had until 5:30, and invited Shevardnadze to begin.

Shevardnadze said he would try to adhere to the rules in order to accelerate the process. He would present his ideas more precisely, and go quickly. The only inconvenience was that it would have been good if the U.S. had tabled its documents in Geneva a little earlier. The Soviet side had not had enough time to analyze them and compare the positions, so that his position would not take the latest U.S. proposals into account. He had people who would be working on this, and would report tomorrow.

Shevardnadze said he wished to turn to business. He would start with the issues relating to the preparation of an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles. Both the Soviet and U.S. sides realize they are seeking a global solution. There was no difference on that. But a number of questions remain. They are both procedural and substantive, but can be overcome if the political will is there. The mission of his delegation and his mission was to facilitate the preparation of a draft agreement. It would be ideal if this could be achieved during his stay in Washington.

Shevardnadze continued that with regard to the class of medium-range missiles, there are many agreed points, and they should step up the search for solutions. The Soviet side had proposed what he might call a non-standard one: to remove all the warheads to one place under the supervision of inspectors. He knew not all people on the U.S. side agreed with this, and he wished to explain the reasons for it.

The Soviets wished to make it impossible for the missiles of both sides to be used during the first year, Shevardnadze continued. This would build confidence, politically as well. Inspection would give confidence that the warheads had been removed and subsequently eliminated. By warheads they meant “design-mechanical parts, which would be destroyed, and fissionable material, which would be turned over for utilization.” He thought utilization means the same thing in all languages.

The Secretary said he understood, and agreed with that. What the Soviets had said previously about warheads had stirred everyone up. The issue might not be too difficult to resolve. People had understood the Soviets wished to destroy fissionable material. This was not what they had proposed in Geneva. Reentry vehicles contain fissionable material, but also intricate shells or casings, and some contain guidance systems. Shevardnadze was talking about the casing when he described the “design-mechanical part.”

Shevardnadze replied that he was not talking only about the casing; there were also guidance systems and detonators. When the Secretary said casing, Shevardnadze was distinguishing between the structural part and the fissionable material. And the fissionable material is to be removed and utilized.

The Secretary said we agreed on the removal of the fissionable material. He thought the definition of what the mechanical part consists of should be set out with some care. But this should be a resolvable problem.

Shevardnadze said he thought this approach should provide a solution of principle, and the experts could work on the details. The Secretary said this could be one item for the working group that was being organized. Shevardnadze noted that one problem for the Soviets was that they had two people designated for each group, so some people were called on to be two places at once.

Shevardnadze continued that he wished to turn to a second aspect. Definition of a “warhead” should help with the simultaneous process of dismantling by both sides. The Soviet proposal is that within one year the Soviets would eliminate the SS–4’s, and the U.S. would eliminate the Pershing II. The Soviets would then remove and dismantle enough warheads so that the residual will correspond to the warheads on U.S. cruise missiles. The mathematics were complex, and this too was a topic for the experts.

The Secretary said that the mathematics might be complex, but there were differences in concept. The U.S. side had a different view of what should be done. It understood that the Soviet side wanted to disassemble and dismantle this class over five years. The U.S. side thought three years should be enough. We needed to proceed in a deliberate fashion to destroy and verify as we go. We should leave it to each other to appraise what should come out first; for our part we did not wish to take out all Pershings first. We wished to start at the same time, and to reach zero in three years; somewhere in between we would reach equality. The two sides should wrestle with this problem, and see what they are arguing about.

Shevardnadze said they should take into account that they were assuming different dates. The U.S. side was working with three years for medium-range and one year for shorter-range missiles; the Soviet side had 5-year and 2-year periods. They should readjust themselves to discuss the option that would suit both sides best.

The Secretary said that should not be impossible. The U.S. recorded one year from what the Soviet side had said in Moscow; that was where it came from. The situation was of course different for LRINF. Shevardnadze said he realized that, and would explain why later.

Shevardnadze continued that according to the Soviet draft, over the next six months the U.S. and the Soviet Union would complete the work of undocking and dismantling the remaining medium-range missiles. In two years they would eliminate all medium-range missiles and launchers; the timetable and specific procedures for destroying them would be subject to negotiation.

The Secretary replied that whatever the sequence verification would be needed. This was the burden of the protocol the Soviet side had not yet had time to study. We needed to make sure we had estimated non-deployed systems, and these should be destroyed too.

Shevardnadze said the principal premise of the Soviet approach was to remove warheads, verifying this with inspectors on both sides. This seemed to them the correct approach concerning the timetable, the phasing issue.

There is a serious obstacle, Shevardnadze continued, in U.S. unwillingness to eliminate all its medium-range warheads, its wish to except the West German P1a’s. This could jeopardize the treaty. More broadly, it aroused serious doubts about the partner’s willingness to implement global double zero. For purposes of a treaty, the two sides should base themselves on the following principles:

—Launchers, missiles and warheads were to be destroyed during an agreed period, with specification to be made at the beginning.

—The U.S. and Soviet Union would stop production of missiles in the 500–5000 km. range, both types that existed at the date of conclusion of the agreement and any new types, both ballistic missiles and land-based cruise missiles. They should end production of launchers for such warheads.

—The U.S. and Soviet Union would not transfer missiles and launchers for such warheads to third parties. He did not know how much this principle was reflected in the latest U.S. draft. If the U.S. had difficulties with implementing this, and specifically had difficulties with a number of shorter-range warheads, the Soviet Union could consider a timetable that would help the U.S. over these difficulties.

The Soviet side proposed to liquidate missiles, launchers and warheads in this class over two years in two phases, Shevardnadze concluded. In the first year after entry-into-force of an agreement the shorter-range warheads would be put into a status that would preclude their use in sites on the national territory of each side. They would be concentrated in one place, and would include P1a warheads. In the second phase all shorter-range launchers and warheads of all missiles in this class would be eliminated. The matter was hard to explain; perhaps the experts could go into it.

The Secretary asked to comment. They had been talking about warheads and what the working group could discuss. They had been discussing a process that would lead to zero, first for LRINF and then for SRINF.

The U.S. concept was to eliminate long-range INF in three years rather than five, but phase by phase rather than all together. The U.S. side thought that in dealing with something new and different it was best to take care, to go step-by-step and verify how things were going. This was a different concept. Let us hear each other’s point of view and explain our own, the Secretary urged.

On shorter-range missiles, the Secretary continued, the Soviet side had them and we did not. In Moscow they had suggested these should be destroyed in one year, and we had agreed. This had been in response to the problem of equality.

The German P1a were not part of this negotiation, the Secretary continued. The U.S. side did not own them, and we were only talking about those we owned. The Soviet side had raised questions, and Chancellor Kohl had made a statement of what he would do, and we in turn had made a statement of what we would do as he took those steps. The net was that as we reached the end the German P1a’s would also be gone, missiles and warheads, as he had stated. That would not be part of this agreement, but it would happen. The result the Soviet side was looking for would be achieved. But it could not be included in the agreement, since the systems were not exclusively U.S. or Soviet.

Concerning the Soviet proposal to stop producing, the Secretary said, we agreed with the Soviet side. We had none; we were going to eliminate that class; and since we would not have any, we could not transfer them. With regard to the arrangement between the U.S. and West Germany, Chancellor Kohl and we had gone on the public record. He assumed Shevardnadze had no doubt in his mind as to what we would do.

Shevardnadze said he had addressed some principles concerning how the Soviet side understood global double zero. The experts should compare what the two sides understood by global zero. If they were discussing zero seriously, the West German warheads could not remain outside. The relations of the U.S. with the Federal Republic were up to the U.S. If there were troubles, the Soviet Union was not responsible for them. But the situation troubled them. The Secretary could conceive of what this meant to the Soviet people, for psychological, moral, political and other reasons. The sharp reaction came from that.

Those warheads had to be destroyed, Shevardnadze continued, and this had to be reflected in some form in an agreement. He asked whether they could not look for a compromise solution. The Soviet side was willing to look, he said, but it had to be convinced, from the top leaders down to every citizen. This was a matter of principle.

He agreed that Kohl had made an important statement, Shevardnadze said. But it had not even been a government statement in parliament. Let Kohl work for another twenty years, if the West German people wanted him, but tomorrow there might be someone else. That was for the launchers. It was a different matter for the warheads that belonged to the U.S. Kohl and Genscher had told the Soviets and the world: concerning the warheads talk to the Americans and reach an agreement with them. This was a matter for Soviet-American talks. It could not be evaded.

The Secretary replied that as concerned the content of what would happen, that was clear from Chancellor Kohl’s statement. It had been discussed and approved by the FRG’s constitutional congressional body, and represented a clear and reliable statement of what the German Government intended. We had followed up on it. The net was that the missiles would no longer be operative, as INF came to pass. That was the result the Soviet side said it sought. Ways of saying that could be discussed, but the U.S. side thought that nothing could be more authoritative than what the Federal Chancellor had said, and we had followed up on.

The experts could discuss that, the Secretary suggested. Both the content of what would happen and the procedure were important. The Soviet side sought a procedure that would leave it confident. We would try to explain why it should be.

Shevardnadze said he had to make one thing clear. The P1a warheads belonged to the U.S., and not to the FRG. How could the Bundestag make decisions concerning U.S. property? Therefore the warheads were a matter of principle. If we were talking about Pershing II’s we should also be talking about P1a’s. He did not know how many there were; perhaps 400. The matter was not simple. Kohl and the Bundestag could say what they wanted, but these belonged to the U.S. side. The question could not be left open. Kohl had said that the missiles would be destroyed after the U.S. and Soviet Union had carried out an agreement, there were his five points. What guaranteed that before destruction the U.S. would not return the same warheads to those missiles? This should be reflected in some kind of agreement. Or they could look at another avenue; but he was not prepared to talk about that right then.

The Secretary said those warheads were not just owned by the U.S. West Germany and the U.S., on behalf of NATO, had undertaken this system together. The Germans had an undertaking concerning ownership of nuclear weapons which he assumed the Soviet side was happy to have them keep. As a result, this was a cooperative enterprise, in which the U.S. controlled the warhead part, and the Germans the missiles. But the U.S. in a sense did not own the warheads; it could not just take them away; it was a cooperative system. So we had said that as they did what they said they would do, we would remove the warheads, and the fissionable material would wind up like other fissionable material.

The Secretary said they should ask the working group to examine the issue, but the U.S. side was not in a position to include this issue in an INF agreement or do anything other than seek an understanding with the Soviet side about what will happen. There would be a result, which should be agreeable to the Soviet side; it had been produced by the West Germans; we needed to find a form to express it.

Shevardnadze reiterated that the two sides had to search for a solution. The issue could not be left aside. The U.S. side could say that they belonged or did not belong, but the issue needed to be made clear. From bitter experience the Soviets were sensitive. They could not leave it aside. Perhaps the experts could come up with something clever.

With regard to the timetable, Shevardnadze continued, he wished to set the record straight on one point. He did not wish to leave the impression that the Soviet Union opposed eliminating missiles and warheads in a short period. Mikhail Gorbachev had proposed the solution for shorter-range missiles. They had nothing against going along with three years for medium-range and one year for shorter-range. But it was hard to imagine how this would work, and the topic was new. They asked how it would be feasible practically and technically. Shevardnadze asked whether U.S. experts had developed technologies for doing this without hurting the environment or creating other negative factors. If so, he requested that the U.S. side share this, and if it were practical the Soviet side could accept it. If not, perhaps a longer period was called for.

The Secretary said the two sides should share their thoughts on this. He knew that some on the U.S. side had wanted to proceed more rapidly, precisely because this would be new and we needed to be careful, but we had decided three years was feasible. This was something the working group could take on.

The Secretary added that he also assumed the Soviets would have studied the material we had presented on verification. We would be interested in the Soviet response.

Shevardnadze said he had two words on verification. Dropping the Asian missiles had helped solve many problems. He therefore had not understood the President’s comment concerning verification.² Frankly, the Soviet side resented such remarks. He knew the U.S. side was telling people it was proposing more simplified verification. The Soviet side was in fact proposing global effective verification. The two sides needed to work more on this. As far as he knew the U.S. was looking for revision of the stringent proposals it had made. The Soviet side was willing to look at a mutually acceptable solution. But it was not fair to accuse the Soviet side of being afraid of verification. It also had a rostrum.

The Secretary said we had noticed. If we succeeded in reaching an INF agreement, it would have the strongest verification in the history of arms control by a long shot. He had said to Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow that verification would be easier with zero than with any finite number. We were now talking about zero, and verification was simplified; this was all we had done. 100 warheads meant production, and contact was required with the processes. Zero meant no production or testing; the requirements were different. That was the nature of the adjustment. Concerning inspection, it was important to retain this right, for U.S. and Soviet facilities in basing countries, until the systems were eliminated, no longer there. But the Soviet proposal for worldwide inspection everywhere was unnecessary and unwarranted; it was not a good proposal.

Shevardnadze replied that it was needed if there is suspicion. The Secretary rejoined that we have a provision for suspect sites, and that should be retained. Shevardnadze said the Soviet side would see what the U.S. documents contained. It was not simply for rigid verification, but it wanted verification as tough as possible. The Secretary replied that the U.S. did too. Shevardnadze said that meant they had made progress. The Secretary recalled that at Reykjavik the President and the General Secretary had vied with each other concerning their commitments to verification before the two ministers. Shevardnadze said that the two sides had made good headway since then.

Summarizing, Shevardnadze said that on medium-range and shorter-range missiles the outlines of an agreement were emerging quickly, and there was much for the two delegations to do. He would not simplify. They needed to talk about the P1a’s, about phasing and about verification, taking the new U.S. proposals into account; they would study them, and perhaps reply the next day. Ambassador Karpov interjected that the Soviet side would need to scrutinize those proposals. Not all details were clear, and they should not go into details at this time. Ambassador Obukhov said they needed thorough study.

The Secretary said the experts should work on these matters. He would remind the U.S. working group members before the Soviet members that he expected to receive a report on their work before the two ministers met again. Their first order of business was to see what impulse they could give. Shevardnadze noted smilingly he had briefed his people at the Embassy. Karpov noted the experts would not be looking into space.

Shevardnadze said he had asked his people to prepare guidelines on the problems where they could not reach agreement, on INF and shorter-range systems, on strategic offensive arms and on defense and space. The Secretary said the experts should see what they could come up with. Shevardnadze said the issues should be clear by the next day.

Shevardnadze suggested they turn to strategic offensive arms, and the Secretary agreed.

Shevardnadze noted that he had told the Secretary that morning and repeated to the President that the Soviet side considered this the root problem. The Soviet side was for independent reductions in strategic offensive arms. Reykjavik had been an important step. There had been agreement in principle to 50% reductions, and to 1600 delivery vehicles. To both the Secretary and the President he had said that the Soviet side was seeking to reach agreement with this U.S. Administration. This meant that time was relatively short. He believed that reserves existed. No doubt the negotiators were working hard. The Soviet side had submitted a draft which took account of the U.S. text; it should be possible to speed things up on that basis.

There were general problems, Shevardnadze went on. He did not wish to engage in polemics, but the U.S. side had destroyed the SALT II Treaty. It planned to implement unlimited deployments of sea-launched cruise missiles. There were also purely negotiating problems. On many elements the U.S. position did not take legitimate Soviet security interests into account.

For instance, it called for sublimits on Soviet ICBM warheads that were unacceptable, and it sought to eliminate heavy missiles. In Moscow he and the Secretary had agreed they should take structures of forces into account. At least he had thought the Secretary had agreed. But now the U.S. position in the talks tries to upset the structure of the Soviet strategic arsenal.

The Soviet side could not accept the proposal to ban mobile ICBM’s, Shevardnadze went on. It did not think the proposal was warranted or justified. In April he and the Secretary had discussed the advantages of mobiles for stability. He could say that these advantages were great, and this truth should not be ignored. The Secretary had said verification was difficult, but this difficulty should not be exaggerated. Mobile ICBM’s were verifiable. The U.S. had had experience with this: the SS–20’s were mobile, and had presented no great verification difficulties.

Shevardnadze continued that it caused a certain irritation, as he had said to the President and to Ambassador Kampelman, to see an inexplicable demand artificially raised in the talks for limitations on the TU–22M, the Backfire. He thought Ambassador Kampelman had also been surprised. The Secretary said Ambassador Kampelman spoke for himself. Ambassador Kampelman said Minister Shevardnadze could speak for him, so long as he could then speak for Minister Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze continued by asking why we should change agreed counting rules. He and the Secretary had discussed this in Reykjavik, and he had thought the matter agreed. Now the U.S. side seemed to have adopted a different approach. This looked like an artificial obstacle. The sooner the U.S. got away from it the better for the two sides’ common interests. If it was there for diplomatic bargaining, it should be dropped, for the sides were running out of time.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to believe that what the whole Administration, including the top level, said about its interest in concluding a strategic arms agreement was sincere. He would repeat for the experts what he had told the President: the two sides could talk about establishing a quantitative ratio within the strategic triad, based on equal security for all sides, providing that the proportion of any one component should not exceed 60% of the total number of warheads. The experts would know what to think of this new proposal. It had no preconditions. It took into account the U.S. desire to reduce the proportion of land-based ICBM’s in the Soviet arsenal, and worked out to 3600. This had figured in various phases of the talks, and was a compromise proposal. The experts should work on it.

Another question the Secretary had raised in Moscow, Shevardnadze continued, concerned the relationship of strategic offense and defensive armaments. This was a major, serious question. It had a theoretical or ideological side, and it had practical aspects. The Secretary had given him a paper, which he had read and had his people read. The Soviet side had prepared a response. To read it would take an hour and a half; it was about 12 pages. He would like to hand it over. He asked if it were available in English. Bessmertnykh said they had it only in Russian. The Secretary said it could be given to Simons or Parris. Shevardnadze said there should be work for everyone. He proposed they discuss the paper³ when they met again.

Shevardnadze asked if the Secretary had comments on strategic offensive weapons, or whether he should go on. The Secretary invited him to go on. Shevardnadze said the next question was how to preserve the ABM Treaty and prevent an arms race in space. This was not a new question. At Reykjavik it had been agreed that the two sides would not use their rights to withdraw from the Treaty for a period of 10 years. He did not understand why the U.S. side now proposed that this should be 7½ years. They understood the President’s desire to continue with SDI. That was why the Soviet proposal provided for research and testing in laboratories, and for mockups, models and the like, even though earlier they had not taken this approach.

Shevardnadze continued that he had told the President that day that if the ABM Treaty were exploded there would be no agreement on strategic offensive arms. This was the firm view of the Soviet leadership. The sides should work on preserving the ABM Treaty and on 50% reductions in offensive arms. Both were possible, both the first and the second.

Shevardnadze went on that favorable conditions for reducing offensive weapons lie in the obligations of both sides not to withdraw from the treaty. They had made a pragmatic proposal: to agreement on lists of what will be banned in space. This was not the freshest proposal, but it was constructive. The lists would be drawn up irrespective of the purpose of the devices on it. The Soviet side had given some examples before; it was now prepared to give the specifications of which devices would be involved. This was solid work, and the Soviet side would hand it over. Unfortunately it had been left at the Embassy.

Shevardnadze said that the two sides could speed up their work on a treaty for reducing strategic offensive arms, but if time did not permit them to finish, the Soviet side had proposed drafting key provisions, and the two sides could get back to that version as well.

He did not rule out another option, Shevardnadze went on. The two sides could abandon the effort to agree on characteristics or specifications of devices to be banned, and he and the Secretary could simply reach a firm agreement that over the next 10 years the two sides would firmly adhere to the ABM Treaty and would reduce strategic offensive weapons by 50%.

On the question of deviations from the treaty, Shevardnadze continued, he had stated to the President on behalf of the Soviet leadership the Soviet view that the work of the SCC should be overhauled, and proposed a meeting in the SCC this fall of the two Ministers of Defense. It was important to both sides to be assured that the ABM Treaty was not being violated, and to go ahead with 50% reductions. There was thus a need to clarify the question of violations, including the Krasnoyarsk radar. Hence it was not accidental that they had invited some Members of Congress to visit Krasnoyarsk. They also wished to talk about Greenland. The U.S. side said this was experimental, but it was in fact a new system. There was also the proposal for a high-level meeting. If we could get rid of doubts in these ways, we could create optimal conditions for proceeding to cuts in strategic arms.

For the Soviet side, Shevardnadze said, the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty was inadmissible. The Treaty should be retained for 10 years as it had been written by its authors, some of whom were in the room that day.

From the Soviet point of view, serious cuts in strategic offensive arms were a very promising prospect indeed, Shevardnadze concluded.

The Secretary said he found Shevardnadze’s remarks serious and interesting.

On START, the Secretary said the U.S. side wished to reach an agreement that provided for large cuts. He wished to summarize the U.S. view of where things stood:

—We agreed on 6000 warheads, and 1600 delivery systems.

—We agreed on a bomber counting rule.

—We agreed on 154 heavy ICBM’s, and the U.S. side had said this should be expressed in warheads, assuming ten per delivery system.

—The Soviet side had said that the effect of agreed reductions would be to reduce Soviet throw-weight by 50%, and we thought this should be translated somehow into the agreement.

The U.S. side regarded all this as of key importance, the Secretary went on. The U.S. side had also said that ballistic missiles are different from bombers or cruise missiles. The Soviet side had made the suggestion—he thought it was in August 1986—of a formula of 80% applied to the total. We had applied this to 6000, and derived 4800. We thought these distinctions crucial, and the reasons for them clear. We had also called for an ICBM warhead sublimit of 3300. The Soviet side had now proposed 3600, but derived from a formula for all legs of the triad. We continued to think it was important to distinguish between land-based ballistic missiles and other forms, particularly submarine-launched ballistic missiles, whose accuracy is not so great. These are important distinctions. We had also proposed a limit of 1650 on heavy and highly-fractionated ICBM warheads. The Secretary said he wished to underline the importance of the 4800 sublimit.

The Soviet side had raised questions concerning SLCM’s, the Secretary went on. The U.S. side understood the importance of the questions, but saw no way of verifying these systems. We had thought about it, but not figured one out. If Shevardnadze had thoughts, we were ready to listen. Shevardnadze said they had proposed a good formula. The Secretary said it must have slipped by him, and invited him to propose it again.

With regard to mobiles, the Secretary continued, there is the same difficulty in verifying. There was a problem of verifying the SS–20. That was the reason zero was better than 100 warheads. In our view, therefore, mobiles should also be at zero, for verification will be easier there than for any finite number. But if Shevardnadze had thoughts on that, the Secretary said, he would be glad to hear them.

The Secretary said there were other issues as well, like counting rules, Backfire and some others. They had not been put in as talking points. The Soviet side should listen to the problems we had raised, and try to resolve them. Just because SALT provided one rule for heavy warheads did not mean we should not think it over. We wished to hear Soviet thoughts, and express ours. This was a matter for the working group to pursue.

If the two sides could put their minds to work on the strategic area, the Secretary said, we had identified important elements of agreement, and should push forward.

Turning to the ABM Treaty and space, the Secretary said that here we had an anomaly. Both sides said they wished to live up to the ABM Treaty, but they had agreed that the constraints on defense in the 1972 treaty should be followed by reductions in offense, and that had not happened. The Soviet side had four times the numbers it had then, and ours were up too. Offense had increased in a way not envisaged by the ABM Treaty. The offense-defense relationship had gotten out of kilter. Both sides should want to put it back in perspective.

With regard to the ABM Treaty, the Secretary said the U.S. side would read the materials presented by the Soviet side. The sides should also explore Shevardnadze’s second option. There was irony involved in saying we could not have reductions in strategic offensive arms if the other side violated the Treaty, when each says the other is now violating it. This needed to be cleared up.

The Secretary said he would like to summarize where things now stood:

—In the context of 50% reductions, each side would give up its withdrawal rights. Both sides had put this proposal forward.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the Madison Room at the Department of State.
2. Reference presumably is to Reagan’s refrain of Dovorey no provorey (“Trust but verify”), which he invoked at a public event the previous day. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book II, pp. 1029–1033)
3. Not found.
4. The version on file ends at this point.