Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

209. Address by Secretary of State Shultz ¹

Los Angeles, October 18, 1984

Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship Over the Long Term

This distinguished audience knows well that the Soviet Union presents us with a conceptual as well as a strategic challenge. Let me take advantage of this occasion, therefore, to raise what I see as some of these larger conceptual issues that face us in managing U.S.-Soviet relations over the long term.

Differences Between the Systems

The differences between our two countries are profound. You and I know that, yet we need to reiterate it, remind ourselves of it, and reflect upon it. The United States and the Soviet Union have different histories, cultures, economies, governmental systems, force structures, geographical circumstances, and visions of the future. We cannot analyze the Soviet Union as if it were a mirror of ourselves.

We Americans stand by our values and defend our interests, but we also put great store by pragmatism, compromise, and flexibility in international life. Marxist-Leninist ideology subordinates all of these qualities to the so-called objective, scientific, and inevitable laws of history. We can debate how fully Soviet leaders follow this ideology. No doubt, however, it helps shape a political culture that does not accommodate well to compromise or truly positive relations with opponents. Their doctrine of history teaches them that their opponents are doomed to crisis and decline—and that the struggle between the two systems is a mortal struggle.

Most notable, perhaps, is the very different relationship between the government and the people in the Soviet Union and in the United States. Our national policies are the product of open debate, deliberation, and political competition guided by constitutional processes. In the Soviet Union, policy is the exclusive domain of a self-perpetuating ruling elite. Soviet leaders do not ignore public opinion; on the contrary, they vigorously seek to control it. Theirs is a system marked by repression and hostility to free political, intellectual, or religious expression. A nation whose system is the legacy of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin obviously bears scant resemblance to one that draws its inspiration from Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln.

When we in America conduct foreign policy, we must meet certain requirements that Soviet rulers can disregard. An American president must win and sustain support from the Congress and the American people if he is to lead the nation on any path, if our policy is to follow a steady course and a coherent strategy. Through this process, we gain the sustenance and commitment that come from democratic participation. And in the complex world of the 1980s and 1990s, the effectiveness of our dealings with the Soviets will benefit from a level of national understanding of the Soviet Union beyond what we have required, or had, in the past. That is why what the Rand/UCLA Center seeks to accomplish is so important, and why I look forward to the contribution that you can make.

Complexity of Managing the Relationship

Today, despite these profound differences, it is obviously in our interest to maintain as constructive a relationship as possible with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is powerful; it occupies a very large part of a shrinking world; and its military strength, including its vast nuclear arsenal, is a reality that we cannot ignore. Its people are a great and talented people, and we can benefit from interchange with them. And we owe it to our own people, and to the future of the planet, to strive for a more constructive pattern of relations between our countries.

A brief review of the postwar period reminds us of how complex a task this is. For the past two decades, Soviet defense spending has grown at a rate of 3%–5% a year, even when the United States was cutting back its own defense expenditures. And the Soviets kept up this military expansion even in the face of mounting economic difficulties.

In the postwar period, the United States never sought to expand its territory nor used force to impose its will upon weaker nations, even when we were the world’s preeminent power. The Soviets, however, have used force frequently—in East Berlin, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. And it was their threat of force that imposed martial law on Poland.

It has been argued that Soviet behavior is partly motivated by a historical insecurity, that they suffer from an endemic paranoia stemming from centuries of war and foreign invasions. But this analysis is clearly inadequate. The problem is that the Soviets seek absolute security in a way that guarantees insecurity for everyone else. Their policies have created antagonism when opportunities existed for better relations; their vast military power—and their demonstrated willingness to use it—go far beyond legitimate self-defense and pose objective problems for the world community. The Soviets’ interventionist policies in the Third World, for example, seem the result of ideology combined with new capability, not the product of “insecurity.” In the past two decades they have expanded their influence in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central America by purveying arms and backing those who subvert neighbors or block peace.

The record shows that when the Soviets have perceived weakness, when they have seen a vacuum, they have seized the opportunity to gain an advantage. Their code of behavior has not included categories for voluntary restraint or self-denial.

And they have not hesitated to persecute those of their own people—whether intellectuals, religious figures, or average citizens—who dared to speak or write freely, or who sought to emigrate. After signing the Helsinki Final Act, which confirmed that human rights were a vital part of the diplomatic dialogue on peace and security in Europe, the Soviets and their East European allies even suppressed the very citizens’ groups that were formed to monitor compliance with the Helsinki accord.²

We are left with two inescapable truths: in the nuclear age we need to maintain a relationship with the Soviet Union. Yet we know that they have acted in ways that violate our standards of human conduct and rule by law and that are repugnant to us—and they will likely continue to do so in the future. What kind of relationship can we reasonably expect to have in these circumstances? How can we manage U.S.-Soviet relations in a way that can endure over a long period?

Question of Linkage

The U.S.-Soviet relationship, of course, is a global one. We impinge on each other’s interests in many regions of the world and in many fields of endeavor. A sustained and sound relationship, therefore, will confront the fact that the Soviets can be expected periodically to do something abhorrent to us or threaten our interests.

This raises the question of linkage. Should we refuse to conclude agreements with the Soviets in one area when they do something outrageous in some other area? Would such an approach give us greater leverage over Moscow’s conduct? Or would it place us on the defensive? Would it confirm our dedication to fundamental principles of international relations? Or would it make our diplomacy seem inconsistent? Clearly, linkage is not merely “a fact of life” but a complex question of policy.

There will be times when we must make progress in one dimension of the relationship contingent on progress in others. We can never let ourselves become so wedded to improving our relations with the Soviets that we turn a blind eye to actions that undermine the very foundation of stable relations. At the same time, linkage as an instrument of policy has limitations; if applied rigidly, it could yield the initiative to the Soviets, letting them set the pace and the character of the relationship.

We do not seek negotiations for their own sake; we negotiate when it is in our interest to do so. Therefore, when the Soviet Union acts in a way we find objectionable, it may not always make sense for us to break off negotiations or suspend agreements. If those negotiations or agreements were undertaken with a realistic view of their benefits for us, then they should be worth maintaining under all but exceptional circumstances. We should not sacrifice long-term interests in order to express immediate outrage. We must not ignore Soviet actions that trouble us. On the contrary, we need to respond forcefully. But in doing so, we are more likely to be successful by direct measures that counter the specific challenge.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, President Carter said his opinion of the Soviet Union and its goals had changed more in 1 week than throughout his entire term of office. He canceled the grain agreement, withdrew his own arms limitation treaty from Senate consideration, refused participation in Olympics, and stopped the annual meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko. But did his actions serve our economic interests? Did they further progress toward a better arms agreement? Did they get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan?

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner, in contrast, President Reagan was not derailed from his steady, firm, and realistic course. He never had illusions about the Soviet Union. After the KAL [Korean Air Lines] shootdown, he focused attention on the menace to civil aviation posed by such conduct. He made sure the world knew the truth about the incident. But he also sent our arms control negotiators back to Geneva, because he believed that reducing nuclear weapons was a critical priority.

In the final analysis, linkage is a tactical question; the strategic reality of leverage comes from creating facts in support of our overall design. Over the longer term, we must structure the bargaining environment to our advantage by modernizing our defenses, assisting our friends, and showing we are willing to defend our interests. In this way we give the Soviets more of a stake, in their own interest, in better relations with us across the board.

Need for a Long-Term Strategy

Sudden shifts in policy, stemming from emotional and perfectly understandable reactions to Soviet behavior, are not the way to pursue our interests. It seems to me that the West, if it is to compete effectively and advance its goals, must develop the capacity for consistency and discipline and must fashion—and stick to—a long-term strategy.

But consistency is difficult for a democracy. Historically, American policy has swung from one extreme to the other. We have gone through periods of implacable opposition—forgoing negotiations, building up our defenses, and confronting Soviet aggression. Then, concerned about confrontation, we have entered periods of seeming detente, during which some were tempted to neglect our defenses and ignore Soviet threats to our interests around the world—only once again to be disillusioned by some Soviet action that sent us swinging back to a more implacable posture.

We have tended all too often to focus either on increasing our strength or on pursuing a course of negotiations. We have found it difficult to pursue both simultaneously. In the long run, the absence of a consistent, coherent American strategy can only play to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, we must come to grips with the more complex reality of our situation. A sustainable strategy must include all the elements essential to a more advantageous U.S.-Soviet relationship. We need to be strong, we must be ready to confront Soviet challenges, and we should negotiate when there are realistic prospects for success.

Purposes of Negotiation

Winston Churchill understood both the limits and the necessity of negotiating with the Soviet Union. In May 1953, he said: “It would, I think, be a mistake to assume that nothing can be settled with the Soviet Union unless or until everything is settled.” In the 1980s, as then, the process of U.S.-Soviet negotiation has as its purposes both to avert dangerous confrontations and to reach agreements that are in our mutual interest.

If we are to be effective in negotiations, we need a clear sense of what we want to achieve.

The United States seeks an international environment that enhances the freedom, security, and prosperity of our own people, our allies and friends, and of all mankind. We know that such a promising future depends, above all, on stability and global security. It cannot be achieved in a world where aggression goes unchecked and where adventurous foreign policies succeed. Nor can it be achieved in a world where the two largest powers refuse to engage in constructive relations.

To pursue our goals successfully we must persuade the Soviets of two things:

First, that there will be no rewards for aggression. We are strong enough and determined enough to resist attempts by the Soviet Union to expand its control by force; and

Second, that we have no aggressive intentions. We mean no threat to the security of the Soviet Union. We are ready and willing, at all times, to discuss and negotiate our differences.

The conditions for successful negotiation exist when both sides stand to again from an agreement or stand to lose from the absence of an agreement. We have to accept the fact that on many issues, our respective goals may be incompatible, making agreements impossible to reach. When this occurs, we should not despair or panic about the state of our relations. Certainly, we should never accept disadvantageous agreements for the sake of making negotiations seem successful. Occasional disappointments are part of the long-term process, and we should move on to seek negotiations when and where the conditions are ripe for progress.

Some argue that if you cannot trust the Soviets, you should not negotiate with them. But the truth is, successful negotiations are not based on trust. We do not need to trust the Soviets; we need to make agreements that are trustworthy because both sides have incentives to keep them. Such incentives operate best when there are clear and working means to verify that obligations undertaken are, in fact, carried out.

Each side will watch the other carefully to ensure that neither can gain a one-sided advantage by violating an agreement. If we spot Soviet violations, we must do what is necessary to protect ourselves and to raise the cost to the Soviets of further violations. We cannot allow them to use negotiations or agreements as a cover for actions that threaten our interests.

Sometimes it is said that plain statements by us about Soviet violations of agreements, whether on arms or human rights, harm our relationship. In our system, it is our obligation to speak out and tell the truth—to the Soviets, to the world, and to the American people. Our own values have claims on us, both to speak out honestly and to use our leverage when we can, and often quietly, for humanitarian goals. Those goals are not a burden on the U.S.-Soviet relationship; they are, for us, a key part of that relationship. If we can help a Shcharansky³ or Sakharov, or prevent the jailing of a priest in Lithuania, or ease the plight of Soviet Jewry, we have gained something worth negotiating for and worth using our influence to obtain—not to score points against the Soviets but because we are a moral people.

The experience of negotiations shows that the Soviets recognize reality and that tough, sober bargaining, when backed by American strength, can lead to mutually advantageous results. Negotiation without strength cannot bring benefits. Strength alone will never achieve a durable peace.

A Policy of Strength and Negotiation

Throughout this Administration, President Reagan has adhered to this approach. He has based his policies toward the Soviet Union on a solid foundation of realism, strength, and negotiation. This approach has created the objective conditions for a safer, more constructive relationship in the years ahead.

In light of Moscow’s history of taking advantage of any weakness, it is not surprising that we suffered setbacks in the 1970s. In light of the recent clear improvement in our relative position, it is not surprising that Moscow is complaining about our policy. The 1970s were a time when our economy was deeply troubled, when our military capabilities were eroding, and when our self-confidence and sense of purpose both at home and overseas were at a low ebb. The Soviets had grounds for believing that what they call “the global correlation of forces” had shifted in their favor. And we, in turn, had grounds for fearing that they might overreach themselves and present us with a challenge that we could neither ignore nor effectively counter.

Since then, the United States, in particular, and the West, in general, have made an impressive turnaround. We have begun to recover lost ground and to move ahead.

• Our own economic recovery is well underway. Sustained growth without inflation is within reach. The American economy has bounced back and is giving welcome impetus to global recovery.
• The much-needed modernization of Western defense capabilities is on track. The gaps in the East-West military balance that were expanding in the 1970s are being narrowed and closed. The Soviets’ temptation to preempt or intimidate at any point on the spectrum of deterrence must be diminishing.
• We have restored the relations of confidence and harmony with our key allies in Europe and Asia, which have been the bedrock of American security throughout the postwar era. We have provided leadership in the community of nations joined to us by common values and common interest. Disagreements have, at times, been sharp, and debate vigorous, just as they are in our country. The result, however, just as here, has been increasing consensus on the challenges to the common security and widening agreement on what is required to meet those challenges.
• Most important, we have restored our own confidence in ourselves. We know that we are capable of dealing with our problems and promoting our interests and ideals in a complex and dangerous world. We have renewed our commitment to democratic values and human rights, a commitment that joins us not only to our allies but to other millions across the globe.

These achievements put our relationship with Moscow on a substantially safer, sounder, and more durable basis. Our credibility as a strong and resolute nation has been enhanced. In contrast to the 1970s, Moscow has not only failed to add any new territory to its extended empire in the 1980s but it has been unable to prevent adverse trends in Central America, the Caribbean, Asia, and southern Africa. Some in Moscow must wonder if the “correlation of forces” is not shifting against them.

We hold to the principle that America should not negotiate from a position of weakness, and this Administration has ensured that we need not face such a prospect.

But we reject the view that we should become strong so that we need not negotiate. Our premise is that we should become strong so that we are able to negotiate. Nor do we agree with the view that negotiated outcomes can only sap our strength or lead to an outcome in which we will be the loser. We will stay strong to enforce the peace; we will bargain hard to ensure that any agreement we sign is reliable and verifiable; and we will negotiate seriously to find solutions that endure.

In bargaining with the Soviets, we are prepared for modest advances as well as major breakthroughs. We have made limited proposals designed to stabilize the current state of relations. And we have made ambitious proposals that, if accepted, could put the Soviet-American relationship on a fundamentally new and safer footing.

In conducting negotiations and discussions in the major areas of U.S.-Soviet relations—arms control, regional issues, human rights, and bilateral cooperation—we have been guided by four basic principles.

First, we must have a strong defense. The United States does not seek military superiority over the Soviet Union. But the Soviets must know that in the absence of equitable and verifiable agreements, we will proceed with defense programs that will deny them superiority. The test of arms control is whether it reduces the danger of war. An arms control agreement that controls the United States but does not control the Soviet Union would only increase the danger of war. We know we will adhere to agreements; based on their conduct, we cannot be sure they will. Therefore, agreements must be reliable and verifiable.

Second, we must be united both at home and with our friends and allies. We must continue to strengthen our alliances and friendships and, above all, reaffirm and reinvigorate our own bipartisan consensus about the need for a foreign policy based on realism, strength, and negotiation.

Third, we must be patient. We cannot abandon negotiations or change our whole strategy each time the Soviets misbehave. We must not allow ourselves to panic or overreact to every fresh demonstration of incivility or intransigence. Nor can we abandon our defenses or forget the importance of our friends and allies each time there is a period of negotiating success.

Fourth, we must be purposeful, flexible, and credible. We must negotiate with the Soviet Union on the basis of equality and reciprocity, in ways that demonstrate to the Soviets and to our friends our commitment to reaching agreements that are in the interests of both sides. We stand ready to join the Soviets in equal and verifiable arms reduction agreements, and we are prepared to move rapidly to discuss both offensive and defensive systems, including those that operate in or through space.

Future Prospects

This was the spirit in which President Reagan and I conducted our recent discussions with Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko.⁴ We set out for him our agenda for the years ahead. We presented some new ideas for getting nuclear arms control negotiations on track and for achieving some worthwhile results. We offered a dialogue on regional issues, to avoid crises and aid the search for peaceful solutions. We urged the Soviets to take steps in the human rights area. And we outlined constructive measures to improve bilateral cooperation in a variety of fields.

Our discussions with Mr. Gromyko lead me to conclude that the Soviets are interested in continuing our dialogue and in exploring ways to enrich that dialogue and turn it into concrete results.

What can we expect? The Soviets may now realize that it is in their interest to engage with us on the larger issues in a constructive way. Their intransigence in walking away from negotiations has brought them nothing.

A patriotic Russian looking back over the history of our relations would find it difficult to construe how the policy of rejection that Moscow has been following has served his country well. And he would surely realize that such a policy will prove even more costly in the future. In weighing his present choices, he would have to ask some very pointed questions.

• If the Soviet Union will not accept equitable arms agreements, then the United States and its allies will continue their modernization programs. Is there any Soviet gain in this result?
• If the Soviet Union pursues aggressive policies in the Third World, and not least in our own hemisphere, that threaten us and our friends, then we will respond equally strongly. Isn’t the level of armed conflict in the Third World too high already?
• If improvement in Soviet human rights performance continues, as in the past, to be nothing more than the cynical manipulation of human lives for political purposes, then the Soviets cannot expect that international—and internal—pressures for better performance will stop growing. Doesn’t the Soviet Union pay a price for this censure and for the isolation that goes with it? The price is large and steadily increasing.

We pose these questions knowing full well that a state founded on the theory that the global correlation of forces must move in its direction does not easily alter its course to suit new and changed circumstances. The temptation, if not the compulsion, is always present to create new facts to confirm an old theory. Therefore, we should not count on, or even expect, immediate and exciting breakthroughs.

But the way is wide open to more sustained progress in U.S.-Soviet relations than we have known in the past. In recent months, there have been at least a few signs of Soviet willingness to meet us halfway on some secondary but contentious issues. We have been able to agree to upgrade the Hot Line,⁵ to extend our 10-year economic cooperation agreement,⁶ and to open negotiations to expand cultural exchanges.⁷ And, of course, Moscow has made it possible for us to resume high-level contacts. These are welcome steps: they just may herald more substantial and productive moves to come. And I can tell you, certainly, that President Reagan welcomes yesterday’s statement by Chairman Chernenko that the Soviets are ready to pursue a constructive dialogue with us.⁸

We cannot confidently fathom, much less predict, the direction of Soviet policy. We recognize that much of Soviet behavior stems from problems and pressures within their own system. Our statements and our actions are often far less relevant to their decisions than some might think. During this Administration, President Reagan has had to deal not with one Soviet leader but three, which has not made the negotiating process any easier.

What we have begun to do over the past 4 years, and can continue to do in the future, is to persuade Soviet leaders that continued adventurism and intransigence offer no rewards. We have provided persuasive reasons for the Soviets to choose, instead, a policy of greater restraint and reciprocity. We must be comfortable with the requirements of such a strategy, including its price, its risks, and its predictable periodic setbacks. We must be able to deter Soviet expansionism at the same time as we seek to negotiate areas of cooperation and lower levels of armaments.

These are the essential elements of our long-term policy. If we pursue such a strategy with wisdom and dedication, we have a much better prospect for achieving our goals: countering the Soviet challenge, directing the competion into less dangerous channels, and eventually forging a more constructive relationship.

1. Source: Department of State Bulletin, December 1984, pp. 1–5. All brackets are in the original. Shultz spoke before the Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior. In his memoir, Shultz wrote that he “used my speech to develop the larger conceptual issues that faced us in managing U.S.-Soviet relations over the long term and to make an important conceptual point: I put aside the Nixon-era concepts of ‘linkage’ and ‘détente,’ and set out a new approach that I hoped would prove more effective and that reflected the reality of what we were in fact doing.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 487–488) According to telegram 312379 to all East Asian and Pacific diplomatic posts, October 20, the text of Shultz’s October 18 speech was sent to all posts via Wireless File EPF 415 on October 18. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840671–0523)
2. See footnote 4, Document 48 and footnote 3, Document 120.
3. Reference is to Anatoliy Shcharansky, a Soviet dissident and refusenik.
4. See footnote 4, Document 204 concerning Shultz’s September 26 meeting with Gromyko. Gromyko also met with the President and Shultz at the White House on September 28 and again with Shultz at the Department on September 29. The memoranda of conversation are in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 286–288.
5. In telegram 236476 to Moscow, August 10, the Department reported that talks regarding improvements in bilateral communications had taken place in Washington, July 11–17, adding: “On 13 July, the delegations agreed on the text of an exchange of notes to add a facsimile transmission capability to the Direct Communications Link (DCL). After the Soviet delegation received Moscow’s approval of the texts, Acting Secretary Dam and Soviet Chargé d’Affaires Isakov initialed the notes on 17 July in the presence of the two delegations. In their approach both to the drafting of the text and the initialing ceremony, the Soviets continually worked to downplay the political significance of the agreement. At the same time, however, they clearly recognized the intrinsic value of upgrading the hotline.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840512–0983) In a July 17 statement, the President commented: “I see this agreement as both an appropriate technical improvement to the hotline, which has served both our governments well for over 20 years, and as a good example of how we can, working together, find approaches which can move us towards a reduction in the risks of war.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, p. 1051)
6. The Long Term Agreement on Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation (25 UST 1782) was signed in Moscow on June 29, 1974, and entered into force that same day. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 199. In telegram 166798 to Moscow, June 7, 1984, the Department reported: “The President on May 14 approved extension of the US-USSR long-term agreement to facilitate economic, industrial, and technical cooperation (EITCA) for ten more years.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840367–0952)
7. In telegram 131845 to Moscow, May 4, the Department indicated that the NSC had “approved the negotiation of a new general agreement on contacts, exchanges, and cooperation with the USSR” and transmitted draft texts prepared by USIA and the Department, which had been approved as the basis for the negotiations, in addition to negotiating instructions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])
8. Reference is to an interview Chernenko gave to Washington Post reporter Dusko Doder on October 16. For information concerning the administration’s response to the article, see Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Praises Tone of Soviet Leader: But Refuses to ‘Pay a Price’ to Have Moscow Return to the Nuclear Arms Talks,” New York Times, p. A11, and Lou Cannon, “Soviet Bid Is Greeted Cautiously: U.S. Finds Tone More Promising than Substance,” Washington Post, pp. A1, A33; both October 18, 1984. Speakes, reading from a statement at the daily press briefing on October 17, said: “We agree with President Chernenko that there is no sound alternative to constructive development in relations between our two countries. We are pleased to see the emphasis he puts on positive possibilities for U.S.-Soviet relations. We will be studying his remarks carefully, and as was agreed during Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko’s recent meeting with President Reagan, we will be pursuing our dialog with the Soviet Union and exploring the possibilities for progress through diplomatic channels.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book I, p. 1562) In telegram 309061 to all diplomatic and consular posts, October 18, the Department sent the text of the October 17 White House statement, in addition to “contingency press guidance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840664–0167)