Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

208. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated

THE ADMINISTRATION’S DEBATES WITH ITS DOMESTIC CRITICS

The terms of the public debate on foreign policy is too often being defined by the President’s domestic critics and not by the President and the Administration. Yet the first rule in these matters is: he who defines the terms of the debate is half-way toward winning it.

The Principal Issues

The President’s critics will continue to assert that the only issues facing us are:

— The choice between war and peace, and

— The choice between the arms race and arms control.

The principal way these critics reinforce their claim that these are the main issues is by redefining the standards of success in foreign policy. Thus, for example, if success in foreign policy is measured by the number of agreements we sign, with no regard to the substance of those agreements, then the absence of agreements must mean a failed foreign policy.

If the Administration is to avoid falling into the trap of being put on the defensive, and having to show that our foreign policy is not a failure as measured by standards set by our critics, the real foreign policy issues facing our nation will be obscured, and we will be the losers in the public debate.

The best way I have discovered to define the terms of the debate in the public speeches I have been delivering is to repeat these lines:

“Several hundred years ago, the issue was not bows and arrows and sabers; the issue was Genghis Khan.

“Forty-five years ago, the issue was not U-boats or V–2 missiles; the issue was the objectives, strategy and methods of Adolph Hitler and the Nazi party.

“Today the issue is not the MX missile or the SS–20. The issue is the intentions, goals, strategy and tactics of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and how these compare with those of the United States.”

Another way of saying this is:

“The issue is not the choice between war and peace.

“The real issue is freedom versus slavery.

“The real issue is peace with freedom and justice versus peace with injustice, the peace of the slave labor camp.”

I have found that nobody among the thousands of people who have heard me make this case has ever been able to argue against it.

Forcing His Critics on the Defensive: Arguing the Aggressive Nature of the USSR

Once the President puts the debate on these terms, his critics will be forced into their most vulnerable position. They will be compelled to defend their false view of the USSR. This view is characterized by the following:

— It is based on wishful thinking rather than realism.

— It proceeds from the assumption that the Soviets are not communists any more.

— Thus, it holds that Soviet global objectives are no longer unlimited as they necessarily must be if the Soviets are communists.

— Thus, it rejects that the political transformation, the communization, of the United States is no longer a Soviet goal. It rejects the possibility that the various forms of Soviet low-intensity conflict are ultimately directed against the United States. It tacitly assumes that all this is so because in the nuclear age the Soviets must realize that it would be suicidally dangerous to entertain such aggressive designs.

— It is based on a mirror-image view of the Soviets: they must be just like us. They must have the same notions of peace, freedom, fair play and common human decency as we do. Since there are hawks and doves in the U.S., there must be hawks and doves in the Kremlin. Since Brezhnev was for detente, and since Andropov was a “liberal,” the older generation of hawks must no longer be in the ascendency, and the doves must be in power. And, of course, since there must be such groups as hawks and doves, the hawks must be the real communists, but the “pragmatic, moderate” doves must no longer be real communists any more.

— This mirror-image view also holds that the Soviets can legitimately fear U.S. armed forces. After all, if nuclear missiles were pointed at you, wouldn’t you be afraid? If indeed, then, the Soviets have legitimate fears, it follows that any American military buildup is just as responsible for the arms race as the Soviet buildup. America, therefore, is equally responsible for U.S.-Soviet tensions. And perhaps, since we should “understand” those “traditional Russian feelings of insecurity,” our failure to act upon this understanding may even make us more responsible for bilateral tensions than the Soviets. This view, of course, is nothing more than that attitude which is ready to “blame America first.”

— This view thus treats the USSR as a traditional great power with limited objectives rather than a revolutionary power with unlimited objectives. The failure to make the same distinction between Nazi Germany and the Kaiser’s Germany led people to believe that appeasement was possible. You can appease a power with limited objectives, but you cannot appease a power with unlimited goals. In the latter case you only whet its appetite.

To demonstrate how this view of the Soviets is false and dangerous, the Administration must point out that:

— The Soviets must behave like communists whether they believe the communist ideology or not. They must stick to the ideology because it is the only means of legitimizing themselves in power, and because it is the key to the internal security system of the regime: the ideology determines the Party line, which sets the standard against which deviationism is measured. Those who deviate from the ideology in thought or practice can be easily identified as nonconformists and thus threats to the collective leadership.

— The idea of hawks and doves in the Kremlin is disinformation. If Brezhnev was a dove, then why did he invade Afghanistan? If Andropov was a liberal, then why did he reinstitute systematic torture of political dissidents? If the doves are the ones in power, then how can one explain a military buildup that exceeds all legitimate defensive purposes, and whose forces are configured for offense rather than defense.

— The Soviets do not fear American military forces whatsoever. For 40 years, through periods of U.S. nuclear monopoly and nuclear superiority, we have proven to them that the U.S. poses no military, geopolitical threat to the USSR. We did not cross the scrimmage line in Korea or Vietnam; we did not help the Hungarian Freedom Fighters in 1956—all to prove to the Soviets that we did not want to take any action that would risk military confrontation. Today, when our country is even less anticommunist than it was in the 1950s, there is no political constituency in favor of taking military or geopolitical action against the USSR. The Soviets know this and America knows this. We all know that U.S. forces are only for defense and deterrence.

— As George Kennan explained, the Soviets, because they are communists, hate us not for what we do, they hate us for who we are. This means that they hate us because we exist as a democracy, with a different principle of legitimacy than theirs. This is the greatest threat that the Soviets face, because if all men are created equal and endowed with equal rights, then Russians are just as good as we are to give their consent as to who governs them. If this idea ever gets into the minds of all the Russian people, then the Soviets face an insurmountable internal security threat. Unless we renounce democracy, there is nothing we can do to reduce this threat. Because the Administration’s critics proceed from the premise that the Soviets are not communists, they think that we can actually do something to make the Soviets hate us less and therefore to reduce tensions. But, because the Soviets are communists, this is impossible.

— Because the Administration has a realistic view of the Soviets, we have reasonable cause to be cautious in our dealings with them. Simply signing agreements with them is not a standard of success in U.S.-Soviet diplomacy. It is easy to sign agreements on Soviet terms, as the Carter Administration did, but such an agreement could not pass a Democratic-controlled Senate.

— The principal reason we have to be cautious about arms control with the Soviets is the fact that they have cheated on most agreements they have signed. If we remind the public of this fact, and assert the inconvertibility of our evidence, the President’s critics will be forced into their most vulnerable position: they will either have to deny that the Soviets have cheated or be forced to defend the Soviet position. If we fail to raise this point, the President’s critics may successfully force the President to distance himself from the Administration’s reports on Soviet non-compliance.² This will only have the effect of discrediting these reports, deceiving the American people, and protecting the Soviet position.

The True Standards of Success in Foreign Policy

If indeed the real issue facing us is the Soviet threat rather than a false threat of the mere existence of weapons, then the rejection of the Administration’s critics’ false standards of diplomatic success necessarily means rejecting the idea of the arms race as failure and arms control as success.

True foreign policy success consists of preserving our freedom and the freedom of our friends and allies, and preserving peace with justice. True success is measured not by trying to do things that will make the Soviets hate us less—because that cannot be done. Instead success in foreign policy means successfully deterring Soviet aggression and Soviet proxy aggression.

Staying on the Offensive on Other Issues

The same principles apply to any other issue on which the Administration may be attacked. For example, if the latest Beirut terrorist bombing is raised,³ the Administration should reject that small incident as the terms of debate. Instead, the real issue is terrorism and what has been done to combat it. The Administration can go on the offensive here and boast of doing more than any previous Administration to combat terrorism.

The Consequences of Remaining on the Defensive

If the Administration refuses to define the terms of the debate and accepts those of its critics, the President will be forced into the inglorious position of forever saying:

— “No, I am not a warmonger.”

— “No, I am not a nuclear cowboy.”

— “Yes, I am for peace.”

— “Yes, I really am serious about arms control. Please, please believe me.”

1. Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC Records, Subject File, NSC General (2); NLR–170–11–19–8–2. No classification marking. Lenczowski sent the paper to McFarlane under an October 17 memorandum and also sent copies to Matlock, Fortier, and Sims. (Ibid.) Lenczowski wrote to Fortier: “Since there is nothing irregular about the way I wrote the attached paper, I decided to send it through the normal, legitimate channel. Otherwise, it would look like there was something to hide. I hope it is still of some use. Thanks, John L.” (Ibid.)
2. For information concerning the 1984 non-compliance report, see footnote 3, Document 182.
3. On September 20, a van packed with explosives blew up in front of the U.S. Embassy in Aukar, several miles northeast of Beirut. Twenty-three people were killed. (John Kifner, “Blast Kills Driver: Vehicle Raced Forward past Concrete Blocks in a Hail of Gunfire,” New York Times, pp. A1, A12, and Nora Boustany, “Bomb Kills 23 at U.S. Embassy in Lebanon,” Washington Post, pp. A1, A28; both September 21, 1984) Documentation on the bombing is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 1, Terrorism, January 1977–May 1985.