Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

204. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Palo Alto, California, August 7, 1984, 9 a.m–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Looking Ahead in Foreign Policy

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Shultz, Robert McFarlane (NSC), Michael Armacost (P), Charles Hill (S/S), Peter W. Rodman (S/P), John Chain (PM)

1. NATO/Conventional Forces Initiative.

COMMENTARY:

PM: NATO’s problem is its success. It has both the attitude and the technology to deal with change; over time it has changed. The atmosphere in Europe is conducive to new ideas. Our biggest immediate problem is on our side of the ocean, primarily with Congress. The “reformists” on the Hill—though their knowledge base is very thin—all agree that something must be done to expand NATO’s conventional defenses and increase the equity of burdensharing. New technologies and new tactics are coming on stream. We need evolutionary change, not revolutionary change.

NSC: Agree that we have the technological instruments. We have the capacity to preserve deterrence. The East-West balance is not a hardware problem. The problem lies in the politics of getting resources approved and distributing them. NATO is a place where our resources match our commitments. NATO, however, cannot do the job through its existing structure. We should get the contentious issues out of the NAC and DPC for a while; a “wise men’s” group could review the situation for a year or so. This would avoid day-to-day contentiousness.

P: Deterrence is not in jeopardy. The Soviets have become more cautious as Eastern Europe is less a “springboard” for potential attack on the West than an “infectious disease” for the USSR. The problem lies in promoting orderly adjustments before Congress legislates them. A wise men’s group might merely delay tackling problems, and cause us to miss the opportunity that the Carrington visit presents.² We should address the NATO defense issues with some urgency so that we can show Congress we are ahead of the problems.

PM: A wise men’s group might be established on our side of the ocean, to include members of Congress and defuse the issues on the Hill. Congress is operating from a lack of knowledge about negotiations, whether on ASAT, or MX or MBFR. Unless we engage them more, Congress will just put a unilateral cap on us.

CONCLUSIONS:

GPS: We have a substantive problem and a political process problem. The latter is the more urgent. On the political side there is impatience and concern about burdensharing. Three points argue for doing something: (a) Carrington is the new man in charge. We need to help him produce results in his first year on the job; (b) If the President is re-elected, we will have an opportunity for a new start. We will have a window of three to six months to produce; (c) The European recovery is better than assumed. The Europeans may emerge from their sense of being in the doldrums, and budgetary constraints will be relieved somewhat.

The wise men idea is worth considering, but we should not postpone action until they finish studying the problems.

— MBFR: The evidence indicates nothing may be possible, but if we get something it would be to our advantage.

— Carrington visits in September. We need to inject our ideas into his thinking early, and to that end it is important that everyone sing from the same sheet of music. We should get our ideas to the NSC by the end of next week. P will produce a paper with PM, S/P, and EUR and give it to the NSC to work.³

— The cooperation of key Congressional people is important. We should do a Saturday morning meeting with them before Carrington comes.

— A US backstop group of wise men should be considered to coopt or solicit the views of the protagonists on our side (e.g., Nunn, Cohen, Tower)

— We should float an idea like this in one of the Secretary’s occasional briefings of Congress.

— Abshire should be asked for his views and should signal to Carrington that we are taking his visit seriously.

2. US-Soviet/Arms Control.

COMMENTARY:

S/P: This category includes the Eastern European issue: (e.g., the evolution of East Germany and the question of improving relations with individual countries). We should be clear about the criteria by which we differentiate or by which we measure the appropriateness of better relations. We cannot regard every Eastern European country as a candidate for wooing (Bulgaria is not), but in the case of East Germany we should look at the centrifugal forces that might give the East a “German problem.” We should, however, carefully assess how our interests would be affected by a free-wheeling Germany in the center of Europe. Other issues in this East-West topic include arms control, geopolitical competition, and the role of negotiation generally.

P: What is our strategic choice in East-West relations? We can concentrate essentially on the geopolitical competition, looking for further means of bolstering our position, courting weak links in the Soviet camp, building our defenses, seeking to isolate the USSR, etc. Alternatively, we can attempt major adjustments in our approach to key arms control and regional issues with a view to seeking a modus vivendi or revisiting detente. The bargaining situation has some appeal. Can detente be revisited without hyperbole? If we go this route, we will probably have to consider trading something in SDI for major Soviet reductions in offensive systems.

NSC: Arms control has to be a central element of the discourse, partly because of feelings here and partly because of the Russians’ fear. We should seek a “zero-based” examination of the past 15 years and of the next 15 years in arms control: Arms control has unfortunately been a placebo/substitute for sensible strategic thinking. We need to engage the Soviets in a fundamental discussion on how we view stability, how we view the relation between offense and defense, and what’s in it for them. But we cannot do so in our present bureaucratic system. The Soviets are also too suspicious. However, the Soviets might respond to an agenda of fundamentals at the first of the year. There would be value in laying out our ideas. We could send them two or three of our most knowledgeable, thoughtful people: e.g., Scowcroft, Nitze, Wohlstetter. They would seek to reinspire an agenda of serious arms control talks. In addition we must demythologize arms control in the US, although it is better if private groups (not USG) do it. A bipartisan board is needed.

S/P: The Soviets take strategic defense seriously. They don’t accept the idea that defense is immoral as do our critics.

PM: On arms control in general we must (a) Get our own house in order. Some on our side are opposed to arms control. Top-down guidance is needed; (b) We need a wise men’s group to talk to the Soviets and provide the core for a future agenda that would not separate SDI from START; (c) We must look at the Soviet and US strategic balance in the 1990’s and develop a master mosaic. PM is now working on what a balance would look like that would be tolerable to both sides.

P: It’s time to review all aspects of the US-Soviet relationship. Arms control should not be abstracted from other issues. It must be related to competition on geopolitical issues and our bilateral political relationship.

CONCLUSIONS:

— We should focus on the Secretary’s meeting with Gromyko in New York.⁴ The Secretary may be able to do nothing more than foreshadow our approach, but his instructions for that meeting will be important.

— Linking arms control with Soviet behavior on regional issues is a dubious exercise. Any arms control agreement should stand on its own feet as advantageous for us. Swapping concessions in and out of the arms control field will not work. Our problem is how to get a sustainable relationship with them while conveying that we will respond appropriately to outrageous behavior.

— We need to get a Presidential decision on guidance to the arms control community. The community must work from the same basic concept. The cast of characters must be changed.

— The notion of a grand, “zero based” look is desirable, both to get our own thinking together and then to engage them in a broad conversation. This will require our best people, who can dedicate themselves to it over 2–3 years. Possible participants would be Kampelman, Wriston, and Wohlstetter. This group might have a bipartisan advisory commission attached to it, including members of Congress. We need to focus on how such a group would tie into the Presidency and its relationship to the JCS, State, and the NSC.

— The Eastern European issue should be examined further. Perhaps have Roz Ridgway look at the relevant papers, come back to Washington for consultations, and lead a discussion of the issues.

— We need to reevaluate the issue of discussions with the Soviets on regional issues: What is the concept that lies behind it? How does it relate to other things we’re doing? P will coordinate.

— We should set forth our conceptual approach clearly: McFarlane’s Commonwealth Club speech⁵ and the Secretary’s Rand/UCLA speech⁶ offer special opportunities.

3. War Powers.

COMMENTARY:

S/P: Theory is that President’s reelection will be a moment of maximum political advantage. How do we exploit it to improve our situation vis-a-vis the Congress? Do we take on the War Powers Act?⁷ Do we try to work out new cooperative understandings? How do we organize ourselves better?

GPS: Related issues: The idea of never acting militarily without having broad, assured public support is impossible and self-defeating. We must act with decision and verve to command public support. Also, grey-area conflict is where the competition is. Massive intervention may not be appropriate, but such things as security assistance, covert operations, shows of force, etc., will be necessary.

CONCLUSIONS:

— The War Powers issue deserves analysis, but a confrontation over War Powers Resolution would consume our energies with no likelihood of a successful outcome. No one will take up the cause in Congress. It would be a wasted effort. Our time will be better spent in trying to achieve a positive bipartisan relationship across the board.

— We need to give more thought to how to organize and staff the H bureau, and how it should interface with the White House, NSC, and DOD Congressional Relations people.

— Structural changes needed include: shifting the LMO function at State to non-FSO’s who know the Hill (perhaps recruit from bloated Congressional staffs); greater effort to brief and persuade Congress of the reality of Soviet behavior (e.g., Soviet stimulation of low-level conflict worldwide), which would require briefers with substantive background; new leadership in Congressional liaison (e.g., Andy Gibson and Bob Keating mentioned as “possibles”);

— Possibly take key Congressional leaders off on a retreat soon after election to have candid dialogue on the subject of foreign policy priorities and procedures for assuring greater legislative-executive cooperation.

4. The Middle East.

COMMENTARY:

GPS: There are four parts to the issue: Iran/Iraq and the Gulf; Lebanon; the Israeli economy; and the peace process. The Gulf is fairly quiet now and we seem to be in pretty good shape, though we need to examine whether there are ways of keeping doors open to better relations with Iran. We know what track we’re on with respect to the Israeli economy and Lebanon. Our focus should still be on the peace process; the status quo is unstable; without a peace process we will see a different Middle East.

New technology can change the military balance drastically. Cruise missiles threaten Israel’s existence. The impact should lead the parties to see the value of accommodation but the evidence that they do does not yet exist.

Agreement in the short term in unlikely. Yet we can’t leave it alone.

A way to deal with Syria is needed. No solution can be found in the absence of dealing with the intra-Arab politics of the problem, as well as the question of the Golan Heights.

It is unrealistic to imagine a lack of Israeli presence permanently on the West Bank. We need to think about a different concept of how the West Bank would be administered. For example, a trusteeship which would give Israel a legitimate role and the West Bankers an Arab identity. At the same time we need to recognize the demands of the Arabs for something that is akin to sovereignty.

CONCLUSIONS:

— The basic conclusion may be that the best we can hope for in 1985 is a “damage control” approach. The problem may have passed beyond the possibility of a satisfactory solution. We were probably right, at the time of September 1, to say that it was the Arabs’ last chance.⁸

— At the same time it’s striking how the level of Arab, European, and media pressure on the US has fallen off as a series of events have moved the focus away from the Arab-Israeli problem: e.g., the Grand Mosque incident,⁹ Libya, Iran-Iraq. Arafat must be worried by this. The problem will probably lead to another war eventually. But it may be better for us not to be seen as the fall guy. A new US effort in 1985 could lead to the reawakening of massive pressures on us that could overshadow our initiatives in other key foreign policy areas.

— The possibility exists for exploring a more comprehensive approach. One possibility might be a special emissary to talk privately to the three or four key Israeli decision-makers to see whether a strategic approach might be feasible. This might combine features of the Allon plan¹⁰ plus Saudi interest in a major development plan for the West Bank. Would be worth trying, if only to be able to say we had done it.

5. Central America.

COMMENTARY:

S/P: Negotiations are a benefit to us regardless of the possibility of agreement. We need to be seen as pushing a compromise and a peaceful solution even without the possibility of progress. Little likelihood that Nicaragua will agree to anything significant.

P: Question we will face in negotiation is how hard we push on Nicaraguan internal reform. If we get genuine progress on other three points, we will face a tough political choice—with Congress pushing in one direction, the Core Four in another.

NSC: Cuba and Nicaragua are first-generation revolutionaries. Neither will change their spots about the way they run their countries. At present we are dealing with the problem’s symptoms rather than its source (Cuba). We should examine whether this is the correct approach. Signs are better than even we can make progress with our present strategy, given better Congressional picture re Salvador funding. Contra program is big question: They’re getting some money from elsewhere, but it won’t last beyond end of year.

GPS: One of our successes of recent weeks has been to move Nicaragua and Mexico farther apart.

PM: Nicaraguans can claim some legitimacy after their election, even if it’s a rigged election.¹¹ Governments need 10:1 ratio to defeat guerrillas: Nicaraguans have it over Contras; El Salvador doesn’t have it over the guerrillas.

CONCLUSIONS:

— Maximum effort needed with Socialist International to keep European from going too far.

— We need to think of political strategy for Salvadoran elections of March 1985: political strategy for Duarte to split guerrillas. US needs to look as formidable as possible between our election and March 1985, to demoralize the guerrillas.

— The discussion should particularly review what we do regarding Cuba and Nicaragua that could inhibit their flexibility, including possibility of economic sanctions. (Strains on these economies suggest that such pressures might have impact.)

6. Southern Africa.

COMMENTARY:

S/P: We’re doing well with present strategy. Pressures are all on the other side. We shouldn’t relieve the pressures prematurely. Angolans may crack after our election; they’re bound to be demoralized by Reagan victory.

NSC: The Soviets are likely to hang in there. It doesn’t cost them much.

CONCLUSIONS:

— We should explore the Portuguese angle for getting additional leverage on the Angolans.

— [less than 1 line not declassified].

— Recognizing that Savimbi is not a “card to be played,” we should be alert to MPLA signals about “social integration”, i.e., national reconciliation. It is morally and strategically sensible to encourage support for a winner like Savimbi.

— Our patient, persistent, low-key diplomacy in southern Africa should be examined as a possible model for other areas, such as the Middle East.

7. Pacific Basin.

COMMENTARY:

GPS: It’s going well, and evolving naturally.

CONCLUSIONS:

— If Fairbanks leaves, this function should pass into EAP.

— The focus on training is correct. Student training and military-to-military exchanges need to be rejuvenated. A dramatic new effort in educational exchange would be valuable—on a global scale.

— Coordination with Secretary Bell and the Department of Education will be needed on foreign student exchanges.

— Armacost will take the lead; PM will examine the military-to-military exchanges.

8. New trade round.

COMMENTARY:

GPS: Essential to fight off protectionist pressures for remainder of this Congressional session. New trade round is a highly complicated problem; it requires legislation to give the negotiators authority. In the 1970’s, trade bill was artfully made part of a package of other, “safety-net” kinds of measures like Social Security and pension bill. Best defense is a good offense. If you don’t have a good strategy, you get nibbled to death. It’s a very big commitment.

What we want from a new trade round is (a) to spread coverage of trade agreements into new areas (e.g., services); and (b) to bring new industrialized nations to see the advantages of opening up to trade.

— We should study what residual authority may exist from old legislation.

CONCLUSIONS:

— Ken Dam knows these issues well and should take the lead for us in examining how to proceed.

13. “Gardening.”¹²

CONCLUSIONS:

— Countries that warrant more attention: Somalia; the Dominican Republic; Fiji; Malaysia (pay close attention to the new foreign minister¹³ at UNGA); Brunei (talk to Ambassador King about how to approach); Belgium; India; Pakistan; Jordon; GDR.

14. Pakistan-India and the Soviet Union.

COMMENTARY:

NSC: Recent convergence of factors that seemed to signal Soviet-Indian pressures. Our interests are not matched by our means to support them. We can’t influence our friend (Pakistan) and we can’t deliver Congress. One option is just to retrench. But it would be a disaster if the Soviets came into Pakistan and gained access to Indian Ocean.

Our strategy three years ago was to woo Pakistan away from nuclear program by more security assistance. Didn’t work. We can’t sustain our security assistance program if Pakistan goes nuclear.

S/P: China factor is key. China can back Pakistan better than we can. Pakistan is also a pivot of China-Soviet-US triangle. Chinese regard Soviet-Indian pressures on Pakistan as critical to their security; we should show we understand this, or else we risk harming our China relationship. This is our main geopolitical stake in Pakistan.

CONCLUSIONS:

— Various possibilities should be examined such as a sustained diplomatic effort to foster better US relations with India; a middle-man role in bettering Indo-Pak relations; long-term US security guarantees for Pakistan beyond security assistance.

— We need personnel involved in this issue with a deeper understanding of the complexities of the issues and the cultural and historical background.

— An enhanced effort to persuade Congress is required. It may be impossible to return Congress to the view it held of India 25 or 30 years ago.

— An NSDD on this issue will be produced in 10 days or so.¹⁴

Procedural/Management Issues. (CH to do separate paper)¹⁵

— Need major effort to try to rebuild popular support/consensus for foreign aid. (NSC is working on paper.)¹⁶

— We should seek to close out the analytical phase of our looking Ahead exercise and produce papers for the President to focus on and provide guidance for the day after the election. Each issue involves policy, promotional, and people dimensions.

10. Libya.

COMMENTARY:

S/P: Options paper is done.¹⁷ We answered Secretary’s questions.

CONCLUSIONS:

— Consider greater effort to close student centers and limit Libyan presence in US.

— We should be sure we are satisfied with Stair-Step exercises, which are a systematic program of routine measures to stick our finger in his eye.

— We should leave ourselves steps to take if we are to ask our allies to take measures as well.

— Economic sanctions should not be excluded. We should particularly try keep down the exposure of US citizens in Libya. They are really hostages.

— Italy will be a problem. The approach to Andreotti will be important.

11. Strategy toward the UN.

CONCLUSIONS:

— Consider Kirkpatrick paper.¹⁸

— Examine present organizational structure and relationship between IO and USUN. Should PermRep have Cabinet rank?

12. NAM.

— Review Kirkpatrick paper.¹⁹

13. Vulnerabilities: Philippines

COMMENTARY:

P: Treasury wanted to block World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan until IMF accord is reached. They have a point. DOD is worried about insurgency and wants to spend more money; not clear that more money will help unless the Philippine military gets its house in order (rampant cronyism, politicization, corruption, incompetence).

CONCLUSIONS:

— We should use our presence better. We should look at legal impediments to using Subic and Clark for training of Filipinos. Perhaps we can change the way the laws are interpreted.

— Essential to step up military-to-military contacts.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meeting With the President (08/07/1984). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 10; although no drafter is indicated on this copy, an August 9 covering memorandum from Rodman to the Acting Secretary of State attached to another copy of the memorandum indicates that Hill and Rodman drafted the memorandum of conversation printed here. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons Looking Ahead—Papers from S/P Chrons (11/2/84)) Misnumbering is in the original. The meeting took place at Shultz’s residence. Under an August 7 covering memorandum to Shultz, Rodman forwarded an agenda and discussion paper, as well as a “list of topics.” (Ibid.)
2. Carrington, who succeeded Luns as NATO Secretary-General in June, was scheduled to visit Washington, September 11–13. In telegram 275051 to all North Atlantic Treaty Organization capitals, September 15, the Department provided a synopsis of the visit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840588–0303)
3. The paper is an August 14 information memorandum from Burt, Chain, and Rodman to Shultz entitled “Looking Ahead: Conventional Forces and NATO.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons LOOKING AHEAD—Papers from S/P Chrons (11/2/84))
4. Shultz and Gromkyo met at the UN General Assembly session in New York on September 26. Documentation is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 284 and 285.
5. Not further identified.
6. Printed as Document 209.
7. See footnote 5, Document 191.
8. Reference is to the President’s September 1, 1982, address; see Document 116.
9. See footnote 6, Document 28.
10. Proposed by Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon in July 1967, the plan called for a partition of the occupied territory between Israel and Jordan, permitting Israel to maintain a row of fortified settlements along the Jordan River. The rest of the West Bank would be demilitarized.
11. Scheduled to take place November 4.
12. In a July 27 information memorandum to Shultz, Rodman noted that in response to Shultz’s request, Armacost had tasked the regional bureaus to submit lists of countries that required more “attention.” Rodman forwarded the submissions to Shultz, adding that the countries were ones “that might be neglected because there were no dramatic problems, but that should receive more ‘tending’ in the coming year.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons Looking Forward—7/3/84) The submissions consist of a July 21 information memorandum from Wisner, a July 21 memorandum from Motley, a July 20 information memorandum from Wolfowitz, a July 21 information memorandum from Burt, and a July 23 memorandum from Murphy, all addressed to Armacost. (Ibid.)
13. Tengnku Ahmad Rithauddeen, who had served as foreign minister from 1975 until 1981.
14. The NSDD concerning India and Pakistan was not issued until October 11. NSDD 147, “U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan,” is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXIII, South Asia.
15. Not found.
16. Not found.
17. The options paper, entitled “Libya Issues and Options” is attached to a July 20 covering memorandum from Rodman to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 7/16–31/84)
18. The paper is a July 31 memorandum from Kirkpatrick to Shultz entitled “Increasing U.S. Effectiveness in the U.N. System.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 5/1–31/85)
19. See Document 202.