Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

166. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 25, 1983

SUBJECT

• Central America—Our Strategy and the Presidential Commission²

I. The Presidential Commission is the latest attempt to deal with the gap between our interests in Central America and the policies we are able to employ to defend those interests.

There is little prospect, however, that the Commission will be able to change the fundamental domestic attitudes which constrain our policy in Central America:

— We will not be able to mobilize political support for the direct use of U.S. military force; and

— We will not be able to set aside concerns over human rights in El Salvador or domestic opposition to the U.S. overthrow of the Sandinista regime.

On the other hand, the Commission does provide an opportunity to build public and Congressional support for a long-term program of more U.S. aid to the region. While more aid is not by itself sufficient as a policy, it will be extremely useful.

Also, this should be an opportunity, as in the case of the Scowcroft Commission,³ to broaden support for our overall strategy in the Congress and improve our ability to sustain it over the critical period of the next 18 months.

II. This paper examines two major issues we need to face over the next few months:

1) How to get better performance out of the Salvadorans, militarily, politically and in human rights area?

2) What we are willing to settle for in Nicaragua?

EL SALVADOR

Our objectives in El Salvador are democratization/reform while wearing down the guerrillas militarily and marginalizing them politically. Two problems, resources and Salvadorans’ attitudes, have hampered our progress. We have not been able to provide enough resources and the assurance that they will be available long enough for reforms to be consolidated and the guerrillas kept on the defensive. But the disappointing Salvadoran performance is also a result of the fact that as our political commitment increases, the Salvadorans conclude that our stake is so great that we will do whatever may be necessary to prevent a Leftist victory, regardless of what they themselves do or don’t do.

The Presidential Commission is obviously an opportunity to deal with the resource issue. But it may also be an opportunity to try to deal with the second problem—Salvadoran attitudes. In fact, the Commission’s success in dealing with the resource problem will depend heavily on its being able to present a credible scenario for moving the Salvadorans on political development, human rights and military performance. It must be able to justify more resources by showing that they will produce results in all these areas.

Our approach to El Salvador over the past two years, and particularly the last six months, has been one of creeping involvement in nearly all aspects of policy formulation and implementation. Our military assistance program has become increasingly detailed in its focus on tactics, logistics, intelligence collection, etc.; on the political level, we press for early elections and then take on major responsibility for funding and organizing them; we have become the sponsors of judicial reform; etc., etc.

It can be debated whether this approach is working: is the Army making permanent gains, is polarization between the Right and the Center lessening, is the human rights performance improving? What is not disputable, however, is that our increased assumption of responsibility has greatly reinforced the Salvadoran tendency to conclude that El Salvador has become more important to us than to the Salvadorans. Our ability to use any real leverage on specific issues has diminished. Our increased involvement as program managers also risks increased anti-Americanism which would contribute to the reduction in our ability to control events.

We now appear to be leaning toward increasing substantially our involvement on the military front, in terms of both resources and the number and the role of U.S. personnel. But, increased U.S. involvement in the military effort, unless accompanied by reinforcement of the other elements of our strategy, ignores our analysis of the past two years: that the underlying problem in El Salvador is political, not military. To get on with the political solution (democratization, human rights, economic reform, etc.) the Salvadorans—not the Americans—have to take the lead. Ironically, progress on the military front will also complicate progress on the political front, since much of the blame for the country’s enduring political polarization is attributed to the military’s tendency to see itself as above the law and deserving of political power—a tendency that will be reinforced by success against the guerrillas. Similarly, our push for early Presidential elections threatens to exacerbate polarization through a Duarte-D’Aubuisson race and thus produce a government with even less ability to govern than at present.

In the meantime, the situation in the Congress approaches gridlock. There is not now a majority willing to take the political risk of cutting off military aid to El Salvador. But there is extreme anxiety over growing Ameircan military involvement and diminishing confidence that the democratization/reform strategy is working. Without substantial change in current Congressional attitudes, it is unlikely that we can obtain any major increase in aid, particularly military aid. The Congressional problem will become even more difficult as we get closer to the Presidential campaign.

Clearly, we need an alternative approach which addresses these problems. In particular, we must:

— provide more—substantially more—resources over a reasonable period of time (one to two years);

— put the burden for performance squarely back on the Salvadorans; and

— insulate El Salvador from the upcoming American electoral campaign.

The Presidential Commission may present an opportunity to establish such an approach.

A Possible Medium-Term Compact

We would use the Commission and its report to establish a three-way compact among the Congress, the Administration, and the Government of El Salvador. First, the Commission would develop a series of objectives for Salvadorans over the next two years. For example,

— Continued progress on democratization with a series of elections over the next two years segmented, timed, and organized as the Salvadorans themselves decide. We want to see functioning elected institutions in place in two years (i.e., municipal governments, National Assembly, and a National Executive). A credible opportunity for participation by the Left would exist at each stage and we would remain available to facilitate contacts;

— Continued implementation of the new national counter-insurgency program;

— Concrete, meaningful evidence that the Army and security forces are being brought under civilian control with visible punishment for abusers of the civilian population; and

— Solid, reasonable progress toward judicial reform:

— Completion of land reform on a basis to be agreed between the GOES and the Campesino organizations.

These objectives would in effect be negotiated with the Salvadorans (Government, military, and political parties) who would sign on to them as firm undertakings. It would be up to the Salvadorans to decide how they will meet these goals. We might provide technical assistance in some cases but it would basically be their problem. The quid for all this would be a major increase in aid guaranteed for the period of the compact.

The compact would simultaneously be negotiated with the Congress. The Commission would obviously have a key role here. Most importantly, it would have to sell the concept and the extended funding commitment. This would be difficult, and the Administration might well have to accept limits on its actions during the period of the compact, particularly on such neuralgic issues as the number and role of U.S. military personnel in El Salvador. But I believe there may be substantial Congressional enthusiasm for the concept. It takes away the political risk during the campaign period of a “who lost Central America” debate while keeping the focus on democratization and reform.

What would happen at the end of the contract period would have to be negotiated between the Administration and the Congress. The Commission could play a role in the evaluation of Salvadoran performance at the end of the compact period and, possibly as a monitor of performance during the period. The President should obviously try to keep his post-compact options as unconstrained as possible. But we would have to recognize that a Salvadoran performance which fell far short of the agreed goals would, as a matter of political reality, restrict our subsequent policy choices.

On the other hand, we would have gained two years, more resources, and reduced the risk that El Salvador will be a major issue in the 1984 election. There is also, I believe, a real chance that the Salvadorans would begin to perform more effectively, and we could see real progress.

NICARAGUA

Since mid-1981, our policy toward Nicaragua has aimed at creating a situation in which the Sandinistas would stop providing direct support to the guerrillas in El Salvador and rein in their “revolution without frontiers.” We have emphasized diplomatic and public information efforts to isolate Nicaragua. However, we believed that diplomatic pressure alone would not be enough and that we also had to “take the war to Nicaragua.”

This policy was based on two key judgments. First, we did not believe that the Nicaraguan opposition groups would be able to rally sufficient popular support to overthrow the Sandinistas within the foreseeable future. (Eden Pastora was a potential wild card. He claimed he would be able to rally substantial numbers of Sandinista troops and bring down the FSLN Directorate. But he has not shown that he can deliver, and it would clearly be imprudent to base our policy on the hope that he will.)

Secondly, we concluded that direct U.S. military action to dislodge the Sandinistas was not feasible. Barring a major provocation (e.g. Nicaraguan invasion of Honduras, introduction of large numbers of Cuban troops in organized units), we would not be able to rally sufficient support in the Congress or in the region to be able to sustain a U.S. military intervention or quarantine. Moreover, even with substantial numbers of U.S. troops, we would not be able to defeat the Sandinistas militarily. They would fade back into the hills and wait us out in a Nicaragua in which only a minority of the population would see the U.S. military presence as an act of deliverance.

Current Situation

There are some signs that this policy of limited objectives is beginning to work. Regional isolation and some pressure from the Contras, together with a moderate but critical shift in the Mexican position (i.e., Cancun declaration⁴), have gotten the FSLN’s attention. Their approaches to Tony Quainton and the July 19 proposal⁵ mark a change in their public posture. It may be largely a ploy, but it’s a change we can’t ignore.

This means we must be clear as to our objectives and realistic about how much negotiating leverage we have now and how much we are likely to have in the future. If we are going for an internal political formulation which would do for the Nicaraguan opposition what we are offering to the FMLN/FDR in El Salvador, we will have to mount a much more credible threat to the survival of the Sandinistas than now exists. The Contras have grown in number more rapidly than we had expected. However, they are at best now in roughly the same position as the FMLN after the January 1981 “Final Offensive” in El Salvador. They are troublesome to the Sandinistas and require a substantial military response, but they are active only in remote areas and are a long way from threatening Sandinista control over the bulk of the Nicaraguan population. Indeed, there is reason to question whether the Nicaraguan opposition groups, divided among themselves and some still tainted by Somocismo, would do any better in open elections in Nicaragua than the FMLN/FDR would be likely to do in El Salvador.

However, even the present level of Contra pressure on the Sandinistas may well be short-lived. We may be able to fund the Contras at the current levels through FY 1984, although the current Nicaraguan “peace offensive” will make this even more difficult in the Congress. But, it is most unlikely that the Congress will permit increases in our funding to the level which would be needed over one to two years to make the Contras as much of a threat to the Sandinistas as, for example, the FMLN is now to the Government of El Salvador. Thus, in assessing our options over the next 18 months we should assume that the Contras, as an instrument of political pressure on the Sandinistas, are probably now at their zenith.

The surge in U.S. military activity now underway in the region will heighten Sandinista (and Cuban) uncertainty. It will temporarily help to offset any decline in pressure from the Contras. But this new pressure will be transitory, and we will eventually be faced with the question of what we do as a follow-on.

As you know, there is an alternative analysis: one which argues that the Contras will soon become a real threat to the survival of the Sandinistas and either overthrow the regime or force the Commandantes to seek a political accommodation with the non-Communist opposition. However, the intelligence community concluded in the recent SNIE on Nicaragua that this will not happen with the current level of U.S. funding and support. Again, it would seem imprudent to base U.S. policy on the expectation that the Contras will be able to force the departure of the Sandinistas or their retreat from their political ideology within the next 18 months.

Moreover, the SNIE confirms our earlier judgment that if the Contras were to threaten the survival of the Sandinistas, the Cubans might well intervene. There are already several indications that the Cubans are increasing their presence, not with organized units, but with more advisors who can operate at the small-unit level with Sandinista troops. If this type of Cuban involvement increases, we will be left with a narrow range of unattractive responses. If the Cubans are not operating in organic units and if there is no major assault on Honduras (as opposed to quick strikes against the Contra base camps), it will be extremely difficult for us to use U.S. military force in Nicaragua. Other Latin countries would be alarmed but not to the point at which we could hope to get the OAS umbrella which might make U.S. intervention politically feasible in this country. Even a naval blockade or quarantine would be enormously divisive in the U.S. and in the region, and we might have to sustain it for a long period if we hope to force either the Cubans to withdraw or the Sandinistas to yield.

I conclude, therefore, that the optimal period for trying to deal with the Sandinistas may be rapidly approaching or even already upon us. If the Contra activity begins to melt away as our funding is restricted, the currently favorable diplomatic trends in the region will shift rapidly. Both our friends and the fence-sitters will begin to trim their sails.

Possible Negotiating Objectives

Our principal objectives should be (1) the removal of the Cuban military and security presence from Nicaragua and (2) the construction of a set of constraints on Sandinista behavior toward Nicaragua’s neighbors. Our primary negotiating leverage is our and Honduran support for the Contras. We should stick to our insistence on reciprocal, verifiable assurances on cross-border activity and non-interference for which the Contadoran countries would act as guarantors. They would provide observer teams and a virtually permanent mediation service. The diplomatic process itself would be a principal constraint on Sandinista behavior, and we should aim at making this process all-pervasive and on-going.

We cannot drop our democratization principle as it applies to Nicaragua, but we probably have to accept that we are not going to be able to give it much, if any, operational content. We should, nonetheless, try to maximize Contadoran pressure on the 1979 Sandinista pledge for democratic pluralism, keeping this as a political club with which to continue to pound the Sandinistas.

Even if successful, this negotiating approach does not eliminate the Sandinista presence from the Isthmus. It will remain as an on-going threat to our interests. However, if we can significantly constrain the Sandinistas’ external behavior and insulate this threat to the rest of the Isthmus, we will have advanced our interests substantially. Over time, there may be some prospect that a de-fanged, economically troubled Nicaragua will gradually drift away from adherence to the Cuban model, particularly if the Cuban military-security connection is limited.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 7/16–31/83. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. A copy was sent to Motley. Shultz’s stamped initials appear on the memorandum. McKinley initialed the memorandum and wrote “25/7.”
2. In remarks made at the quadrennial convention of the International Longshoremen’s Association in Hollywood, Florida, July 18, the President announced the creation of “a bipartisan national commission on Central America. The commission will lay the foundation for a long-term, unified, national approach to the freedom and independence of the countries of Central America. The commission will be honored by a very distinguished American, outstanding in the field of diplomacy, virtually a legend in that field. It will be headed by Dr. Henry Kissinger, who will present recommendations to me later this year. Their focus will be on long term, looking to what it is that we want and what we must do in the years ahead to meet the underlying problems of the region.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book II, p. 1047) Executive Order 12433, July 19, formally established the Commission; for the text, see ibid., pp. 1054–1055. Also, on July 19, the White House released a statement listing the individuals to be appointed to the Commission; for the text, see ibid., pp. 1055–1056.
3. Public Law 97–377 (see footnote 4, Document 129) required the administration to produce a report concerning the basing mode for the Peacekeeper missiles. On January 3, the President announced the establishment of a bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces, chaired by Scowcroft, to review the strategic modernization program. The text of the statement is printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book I, pp. 4–5. On April 11, the Commission presented a report to the President, recommending that the United States base 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos and consider developing a new single-warhead missile. (Hedrick Smith, “MX Panel Proposes Basing 100 Missiles in Minuteman Silos: Urges New Limit on Arms,” New York Times, April 12, 1983, pp. A1, A20) The Report of The President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, April 6, is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1983, pp. 273–300. On April 19, the President endorsed the Scowcroft Commission’s recommendations. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book I, p. 555) Both the House and Senate, in late May, approved the release of funds for the MX. (Steven V. Roberts, “President’s Plan for Basing of MX Approved in House: Key Victory for Reagan,” New York Times, May 25, 1983, pp. A1, A18, and Margot Hornblower, “Senate Completes Reagan’s Victory On MX Funding,” Washington Post, May 26, 1983, pp. A1, A18)
4. Meeting in Cancun, de la Madrid, Herrera Campins, Betancour, and de la Espriella (the Contadora Group) released a communiqué on July 17 that “called upon ‘states with interests and ties to the region to contribute their political influence in strengthening the cause of understanding and commit themselves, without reservation, in favor of the diplomatic option for peace.’” (Richard J. Meislin, “4 Latin Presidents Urge Steps to End Conflict in Region: ‘Deterioration’ Deplored,” New York Times, July 18, 1983, pp. A1, A3) The text of the “Declaration of Cancun on Peace in Central America” is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983, pp. 1328–1331. In telegram 10841 from Mexico City, July 19, the Embassy transmitted an unofficial English-language translation of the 10 point declaration. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830408–0928)
5. In a July 19 address made in Leon, Nicaragua, on the fourth anniversary of the revolution, Ortega indicated that the Government of Nicaragua would participate in international talks to end the violence in Central America. He noted that the government had also called for negotiations with the United States over various issues of concern. (Marlise Simons, “Nicaragua Offers to Join in Talks on Regional Peace: Sandinista Anniversary,” New York Times, pp. A1, A9, and Christopher Dickey, “Managua Offers Area Peace Plan,” Washington Post, pp. A1, A10; both July 20, 1983) In telegram 3172 from Managua, July 20, the Embassy noted: “While Ortega made the customary swipes at the US, the tone was far different from his strident diatribe last year and reflected the Sandinistas’ appreciation of the gravity of military, economic and diplomatic challenges they are now facing.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830414–0003)