Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

165. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 15, 1983

SUBJECT

• Executive Summary: Goals and Priorities Paper

Below are a number of foreign policy ideas, which, taken collectively, offer a challenging and strategically focused program for the next 18 months. We are developing a separate and more detailed strategy paper, but wanted to get your reaction first to the key ideas set forth in this Executive Summary. I am also attaching the Shultz/Weinberger responses to your original memo of June 7, 1983 (Tab A).²

Resources: The Key to All Else

An extraordinary amount of what we want to do over the next two years hinges on our ability to get foreign assistance resources—to train, to reward, to encourage risks for peace, to punish. We have few other tools to work with; the words of our diplomats will only go so far. Even though the foreign assistance budget has grown each year, it is small in comparison with resources available in the post-war years. We need to replenish these investments to pave the way for a more secure and hospitable world.

We believe you should mount a major campaign—not so much to remove restrictions on existing aid (a separate problem)—but to increase levels in the aggregate.

One dramatic way of achieving this would be for you to publicly announce a plan to cancel a specially selected conventional weapons program now on drawing board—preferably one in some political trouble anyway—and to use the savings thus obtained to rebuild the foreign assistance account. This would operationalize the point we have tried so hard to make: namely, foreign assistance often makes a more immediate and direct contribution to our security than our own defense programs.

We suggest other ideas as well, such as a first phase effort to rebuild our foreign military training budget. This will be less costly, but if done ambitiously, could be equally important. It is easier to take these problems head on and be honest about real needs, rather than nibble at the edges.

Non-Proliferation: Unifying the Nuclear Suppliers

We have tried to strike a balance between actions that have immediate payoffs and actions that help us gain control over dangerous long range trends. Non-proliferation falls in this latter category. The spread of nuclear weapons will open up new options for radicals, force us and our allies to spend more for defense, and complicate arms control. To complement our sensitive intelligence and export control programs, we suggest giving even more public visibility to your comprehensive safeguards initiative. We propose trying to split the ranks of our allies, gaining early support of the British and Germans, nailing down a Japanese commitment on your trip, and—if necessary—isolating the French. A related goal is to end maverick, unsafeguarded Chinese nuclear exports using the positive leverage of our technology transfer program. Success on either or both fronts would be dramatic. The safeguards goal has eluded past Administrations. Your willingness to help Europe and Japan on other nuclear issues should provide the grease. This can legitimately be billed as a major arms control victory, and it is more immediately in sight than some of the others.

Defense: A Campaign to Raise the Nuclear Threshold

The ongoing debate about nuclear war has at least forced sensible persons to think more about the desirability of conventional defense. Moreover, new highly accurate technologies and deep-strike tactics may make a credible conventional capability possible at a more tolerable financial cost. For reasons too complex to elaborate here, accurate munitions have even more decisive effects on the flanks and Persian Gulf where our existing deterrent capability is particularly weak. Improved conventional defense capabilities have an importance that transcends their deterrent effect: namely that of making our allies more self-confident in the political-military competition that is ahead.

The problem to date is that much of this work is unfocused: many of the most interesting technologies are underfunded; they are not tied together as part of a coherent program; and our public affairs approach has not yet been harnessed to the possibilities at hand. We propose an urgent internal effort to bring these various strands together and to accelerate the most promising technological possibilities. What we want to do is create a new framework for our defense efforts raising the nuclear threshold. This helps us retain the high ground and demonstrate that it is we—rather than the Soviets, with their empty declarations—who take seriously the issue of avoiding the “first use” of nuclear weapons. Moreover, precisely because overall defense investments are unlikely to increase as much as we would like, we have to be sophisticated in achieving the maximum payoff from the investments we have.

Middle East: A Tortured Choice

The Middle East has probably never been more reflective of the fable you tell about the scorpion and the turtle. Assad is playing a waiting game and seems more interested in demonstrating his dominance over the other Arab States than in withdrawing from Lebanon or facilitating an autonomy agreement. Not only does this mean that it will be difficult over the near term for you to achieve your goals in both of these areas, it also means that you have a new objective with which to cope: limiting Syrian influence and, by implication, that of Syria’s Soviet patron.

We need then to begin to redefine for the public what it is possible to do, so that expectations are not totally dashed. We need to make clear that we have solid intermediate goals that can be met. These include: building the authority of the Lebanese government; enhancing stability in Lebanon; frustrating Syrian efforts to intimidate our friends, and nurturing changes on the West Bank and Gaza that keep hope alive until fundamental conditions have shifted more in our favor—at which time we may want to propose something more dramatic, like calling Mubarak, Hussein, Begin, and other West Bank notables to Washington.

For the near term we must help shape the Israeli partial withdrawal in ways that give confidence to the Lebanese while maintaining pressure on Syria. Along with our allies we will need to fill the gaps caused by the departing Israelis.

The relationship with Saudi Arabia also deserves close attention given the Saudis’ inability to go very far in taking risks for peace. Rather than increase their discomfiture (while ironically inflating their importance) by asking them to do things they will never be able to do—and yet for which we somehow become indebted—we may want to ask them to take more effective action on things they can do: e.g., more assistance for Turkey, Sudan, Somalia—and less badgering of Oman.

Soviet Union: Striking a Deal While Redefining Expectations

Managing the Soviet relationship over the next eighteen months will require two things: first, probes to determine whether our strength and seriousness have as yet created real openings in the Soviet position; and second, measures to sustain support policies that have increased our leverage.

The key is to recognize that these two efforts are decisively related: the more strength we amass the greater the likelihood we can create openings; less obvious, perhaps, but equally vital, the more serious we are about looking for openings, the better chance we have of maintaining support for tough policies in all of the many areas where toughness will continue to be necessary.

More than our ability to reach any specific agreement, the real test before us is to try to permanently redefine U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. This means, in short, making clear that the most likely medium-run goal is an enduring but safer competition, one in which we do not reach agreement on everything—nor pretend that we can—but rather press to find agreement in particular areas. While it is in our interest to force tough choices upon the Soviets and to compel them to foresake opportunities, it is not in our interest to make them desperate and more inclined to take great risks.

The difference between this approach and detente is clear. We have to push on every issue, but our activism on many fronts does not mean we need progress on every front to succeed. If we think we do, we will be pushed to split the difference on issue after issue. This was precisely the problem with detente: it split the difference with the Soviets too often, and ended up with second best across the board. It also ignored the need for creating pressure and put the form of agreement ahead of content.

This leads to the question of a summit. The risks of a summit are clear. But there are dangers, too, in appearing unwilling to talk, since this could cause our consensus for competition in other areas to unravel. We need to realize that if our friends feel our hostility is unbounded, making every conflict a possible stepping stone to a wider war, their willingness to compete at all will rapidly decline.

We propose trying to lay the foundation for a summit aimed at a controlled and balanced outcome—an outcome that in fact reflects the new balance in public understanding we hope to strike. On the positive side this means shooting for an arms control agreement. But if an agreement were the sole focal point, that fact would be determinative in shaping public expectations. Hence, we will need to lay down some hard markers on Central America, Afghanistan, and chemical weapons violations. We need to be clear in communicating what we want. And we need a program for turning up the pressure to demonstrate that a Summit doesn’t mean an end in our willingness to compete. A special new White House/NSC channel—similar to what was once contemplated under the Kennedy Administration—may provide a unique way of communicating these messages.

Central America: Facing Up to Requirements

If we are to remain credible to our allies and at the same time avoid a human and refugee tragedy of massive proportions, we must reverse the course of current events in the region. The historical record cannot be left to show that while the Soviets were committing over $4B a year and positioning thousands of troops and advisors in and through Cuba, we countered with less than $500M and 120 military advisors in El Salvador and Honduras.

A strategy for success mandates that we heighten attention to the risk that we could face within a year, a historic failure which would permanently damage the national security position of the United States. At the same time we must emphasize the breadth of our opportunity to promote democracy, recognizing that democracy itself is the single best means of assuring human rights.

We need to cogently present what it will take to prevent a failure and educate the American people on the responsibility of the Congress to provide adequate resources for the execution of a successful policy. This should be accomplished by:

• A Presidentially mandated bipartisan commission.
• A renewed round of working visits by Monge, Suazo, and others.
• New pressure on the EEC.
• A regional diplomatic offensive that is counterbalanced by new efforts to isolate radicals.
• New military pressures.
• A Presidential trip.

Persian Gulf: Making Our Power More Commensurate With Our Interests

Our power in the Persian Gulf is still not commensurate with our interests. We need to move quickly to reverse this situation. Khomeini’s passing may create opportunities too large for the Soviets to resist, and for which we have done too little planning. The key is to break free of self-imposed constraints and begin to make greater use of three large assets: Turkey, new technologies (also referred to in the section on defense), and Israel. The National Security Decision Directive you just signed sets this in motion.³

Among the specific initiatives we foresee:

• Cooperation with Israel to work together in the event of Soviet attack in the Gulf.
• A diplomatic initiative in the Aegean to end—or reduce—the disagreements of our Greek and Turkish friends.
• New efforts, coupled to your resource initiative, to help Turkey truly modernize its forces.
• Innovative near term steps with the Germans and others to signal the Soviets we will use Turkish geography to exploit their vulnerabilities if they attack the Persian Gulf.
• A quiet effort to identify vulnerabilities among key Soviet clients and to exploit these vulnerabilities—particularly S. Yemen—to show that Soviet gains are reversible.
• A special emissary to our key NATO allies to lay out our master plan and specific requirements. We may need to cut back on some of the many marginal things we are asking the allies to do in order to channel their efforts into higher payoff opportunities. We must end our piecemeal approach to this problem. This only gives our allies an excuse to hold back, since they are never sure of our bottom line.

Asia: Building on an Inherent Dynamism

Japan should remain the cornerstone of our Asian strategy. Our objectives with Japan should: (1) encourage that country to open its markets; (2) continue our push for viable self-defense capabilities; (3) respond positively ourselves to the defense initiatives Nakasone has already outlined; and (4) stimulate genuinely significant, better coordinated, and more strategically oriented Japanese foreign assistance investments.

We think you might strike an agreement on your trip to form a U.S.-Japanese foreign assistance coordinating committee.⁴ We will also be developing imaginative ideas for increasing Japan’s defense commitments, e.g., by drawing attention to the subsidy now built into Japanese procurement costs we may be able to persuade the government to write part of that subsidy off to an account other than the Defense Forces. Ultimately, this could trigger a common-sense reaction that would lead to more direct weapons sales from the U.S. This in turn would allow the Japanese to get “more bang for the yen” and also would correct the trade balance. We also need to recognize the far-reaching importance of Nakasone’s willingness to close the Straits and to take account of this in our joint exercises.

On the Korean peninsula we must continue to explore all practical options to reduce tensions while further enhancing a credible defense posture capable of responding to a surprise attack from the North. We will be looking at ways to begin to stimulate subtle forms of Japanese-Korean defense cooperation.

With China, we will complete the liberalization of our technology transfer effort⁵ and, hopefully use this, to tax Soviet defense investment patterns in ways favorable to the U.S. We also hope to convert the liberalized technology program into political gains. We think we can show real progress in bringing China in line on nuclear export policy. Finally, we need to pay attention to quick-fixes that could potentially improve China’s capability to withstand certain selective military pressures from the Soviets. This is important for preventing a Soviet effort to coerce and and neutralize China without recourse to a major war. We will also key in on a U.S. visit by Zhao Ziyang to help demonstrate your attention to U.S.-PRC relations.

Africa: New Possibilities for Pressure and Diplomacy

In Africa we are also looking at a program that would emphasize both continuity and innovation.

A priority objective for the next 18 months is Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, in connection with an agreement on independence for Namibia. Besides being a success for our Soviet policy, this major achievement would strengthen the African and domestic flanks of our policy of constructive engagement with South Africa. A Presidential speech to the U.N. General Assembly would be an occasion to reiterate our objectives, but other forms of direct involvement by you may also be required.

Our present strategy of linking Angola and Namibia is the right way to pursue our interests even if it does not produce immediate results. If the obstacle turns out to be South African reluctance to accept an Angolan proposal we think is reasonable, we could dangle the prospect of a P.W. Botha visit to Washington. Given the legitimate political sensitivities here, a visit would probably be best in the context of final agreement on a Namibia solution coupled with U.S. encouragement of further internal reforms.

We envision other innovative, and strategically focused initiatives as well:

• We may want to work quietly through the Somali insurgents in Ethiopia to start making life more difficult for Cuban-troops in that country. Moreover, we need to fortify Somalia against the threats they now face and we need to discourage the Soviets from trying to embarrass us in Somalia, thereby discrediting our broader regional strategy.
• We also think it may be possible to turn the limited rapprochement between Somalia and Kenya into a larger U.S. diplomatic success story. This would make it easier for Somalia to get assistance from Congress and would further isolate Ethiopia.
• We think we may be able to promote a deal in Northwest Africa in which Spain would make concessions to Morocco to provide a cover for Morocco’s settlement of the Western Somalia dispute. France in turn would reward the Spanish by earlier entry into the EEC. And this in turn would help us get Spain into NATO.

Conclusion

It is all too easy—and equally wrong—to try to shape policy to affect tomorrow’s headlines. We have tried to focus instead on actions that will leave an unmistakable and constructive legacy for the future, both in terms of improved international security and a deeper public understanding of the difficult—if inherently manageable—problems that lie ahead. At the same time, we are sensitive to the fact that concrete, near-term success in certain areas may be necessary to create momentum and mobilize support for longer-range and more difficult foreign policy objectives.

It is also easy to spawn a long list of desirable objectives that bear little relationship to one another—to ignore, in short, the critical problem of tradeoffs among competing alternatives and to forget that our leverage over both allies and adversaries is far from infinite. We have tried to be sensitive to these constraints in what follows, though ultimately you will yourself have to wrestle with this fact of life as you think through your approach to the possibilities outlined below.

Many of the goals we recommend are now possible because of the strides that have been made in rebuilding American power and in cultivating an image of consistency and perseverance. Nonetheless, we have a long way to go. We must continue rebuilding our strength, recognizing that doing so will open up even more opportunities. This is because our friends and foes will continue to alter their expectations in accordance with their ever increasing appreciation for U.S. strength.

The conventional wisdom of course is that Presidents consolidate rather than innovate in the second two years of their term. While this is to some extent inevitable, we believe the argument for innovation is also strong. First, there is much yet that needs to be done. Second, the shifting pattern of international events—and the offensives of our adversaries—make it both dangerous and difficulty to simply consolidate succcess. Third, new initiatives can help us continue to set and refine the agenda for debate and deflect attention from problems whose solution will come only over a much longer period of time.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Goals and Priorities (June 1983). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for Information. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “NOTED.”
2. Not attached. The Department of State response is Document 161, and the Department of Defense response is Document 162. The President’s June 7 memorandum is Document 155.
3. Presumable reference to NSDD 99, “United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia,” issued on July 12. It is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
4. The President was scheduled to visit Japan, November 9–12.
5. See footnote 12, Document 161.